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INTRODUCTION
American public policy debates about the legal regulation of the
family are often framed as a contest between liberals and
conservatives, battling out their different political visions in gladiatorlike performances. The dividing lines are easily drawn on issues
ranging from welfare to abortion to same sex marriage: liberals with
their emphasis on equality and an egalitarian family line up in favor,
while conservatives with their emphasis on morality and the
traditional family stand opposed. While this divide does characterize
much political debate, it is by no means up to the task of explaining
contemporary public policy debates over the legal regulation of the
family. Indeed, a focus on this divide risks obscuring an equally
important clash of political visions structuring these public policy
debates, namely, the divisions within conservative political discourse.
To risk stating the obvious—yet remarkably overlooked in analyses of
contemporary family law and policy—conservatives do not always
agree with one another, even on questions of the family. Rather, the
clashes, cleavages, and contradictions within social, fiscal, and
libertarian conservative political discourse, and the ebbs and flows in
the relative power of each of these visions, have produced much of
the current constellation of laws and policies regulating the family.
This Article examines these contesting conservatisms in public
policy debates over the legal regulation of the family. It does so by
focusing on the question of the privatization of dependency within
the family. Family law has always involved the public enforcement of
private responsibilities of individual family members. But, in an era of
privatization and the emergence of a neo-liberal state, characterized
by a reduction in government social spending and a transfer of these
responsibilities to the private sphere,1 it might be expected to have a
1. This process of restructuring and retracting the Keynesian welfare state has
been extensively documented, although variously labeled within the literature.
Compare PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE?: REAGAN, THATCHER, AND
THE POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT 17 (1994) (describing restructuring as the politics of
retrenchment, which the author defines as “policy changes that either cut social
expenditure, restructure welfare state programs to conform more closely to the
residual welfare state model, or alter the political environment in ways that enhance
the probability of such outcomes in the future”), with NEIL GILBERT, TRANSFORMATION
OF THE WELFARE STATE: THE SILENT SURRENDER OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 45 (2002)
(describing a similar restructuring process as a shift from a largely social democratic
state to a more market oriented body, which the author calls “the enabling state”).
He describes the enabling state as involving an increased emphasis on the private
delivery of public goods and “less emphasis on providing income support to people
out of work than does the welfare state and more weight on fostering social inclusion,
mainly through active participation in the labor force.” Id. Others have described
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newfound importance. Indeed, in many western nations, family law
has become a more important regulatory instrument for the
enforcement of private support obligations for economically
dependent family members.2 More specifically, society has called
upon family law to address the economic needs of women and
children at precisely the moment when it is dismantling the welfare
state and public financial assistance has become increasingly scarce.
In the United States, however, this privatization has been partial.
On one hand, a very public debate about welfare reform has been all
about privatization. The privatization of child support obligations has
this process of restructuring as privatization. See, e.g., STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH AND
MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF
CONTRACTING 188 (1993) (describing privatization as “a broad policy impulse which
seeks to change the balance between public and private responsibility in public
policy”); see also PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM 4 (Brenda
Cossman & Judy Fudge eds., 2002) [hereinafter PRIVATIZATION] (describing
privatization as capturing “the process of transition from welfare state to neo-liberal
state as the material base upon which the Keynesian compromise rested has been
undermined and its mode of governance transformed”). See generally Isabella
Bakker, Introduction: The Gendered Foundations of Restructuring in Canada, in
RETHINKING RESTRUCTURING: GENDER AND CHANGE IN CANADA (Isabella Bakker ed.,
1991) (explaining that the neoliberal approach emphasizes the allocation of
resources through markets, which reflect the motivation of individual self-interest);
Gøsta Esping-Anderson, After the Golden Age?: Welfare State Dilemmas in a Global
Economy, in WELFARE STATES IN TRANSITION: NATIONAL ADAPTATIONS IN GLOBAL
ECONOMIES 23 (Gøsta Esping-Anderson ed., 1996) (noting that, in most countries,
there have not been radical changes in the welfare state, though privatization is slowly
gaining strength); JACOB HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002) (examining
alternative social welfare approaches); JOEL HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE
AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT (1996) (claiming that
decentralization and privatization are now worldwide movements); MICHAEL B. KATZ,
THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2001) (insisting
that the American welfare state is both a public and private structure); PAUL
KRUGMAN, THE GREAT UNRAVELING: LOSING OUR WAY IN THE NEW CENTURY (2003)
(condemning the Bush administration and its fiscal policies, including the welfare
state); PAUL PIERSON, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE (2001) (stating that
social conflict surrounds the welfare states of affluent democracies); JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST PROSPEROUS
DECADE (2003) (detailing the inconsistencies of American welfare policy and its shift
toward privatization); Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability
and Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work
Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559 (2001) (arguing that welfare reform and
privatization has led to the erosion of administrative law structures and government
accountability); Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging
the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783 (2003) (condemning
neoliberalism as promoting a racialized, genderized, and class-biased vision for
society); Panel Discussion, The Changing Shape of Government, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1319 (2001) (discussing the positive aspects of privatization and government
accountability as the welfare state shifts toward privatization); Lisa Phillips, Taxing the
Market Citizen: Fiscal Policy and Inequality in an Age of Privatization, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2000, at 111 (using the Canadian system to illustrate that
privatization may perpetuate gender inequalities).
2. See PRIVATIZATION, supra note 1, at 4 (recognizing the shift toward
privatization in Canada and its effects on women and children).
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been identified as an explicit policy objective of welfare reform, and
the literature has debated the appropriateness of this privatization.3
However, this form of privatization is not evident in other family
support obligations, where there has been very little expansion of the
scope or content of family obligations.
In contrast to the
developments in other jurisdictions where there has been a
broadening of definitions of spouse, domestic partners and marriage
for the purposes of support obligations, as well as a significant
expansion of the support obligations often quite explicitly in pursuit
of savings to government spending, both the scope and content of
family support obligations (other than child support) has remained
relatively unchanged. The story of the privatization of public
responsibility in American family law is then a story of partial
privatization.
This Article seeks to analyze some of the factors underlying this
partial privatization. Why, given the extent to which the United States
has lead the way in the privatization of a range of once public goods
ranging from education and environmental regulation to electricity
and prisons, is the privatization of the family so partial? Why have
some areas of family law been amenable to privatization, while others
have been resistant? The question has been surprisingly unaddressed.
The legal literature on privatization in the United States is unhelpful
in addressing this question, since it pays such scant attention to the
family. Privatization overwhelmingly refers to the delegation of once
governmental services to the private sector—specifically, to the
market (private enterprise) and the voluntary sector (non-profit
charitable actors).4 The idea of delegating public goods and services
to the family is all but invisible.5 But, even the social welfare and
3. See infra note 11 and accompanying text (detailing the debate over the
privatization of what has traditionally been considered public responsibility).
4. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1508-30 (2001) (admitting that privatization is difficult to
define and dividing the concept of privatization into various categories, touching
briefly on the role of the family in privatization); Ronald A. Cass, Privatization:
Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 450 (1988) (explaining that in the
United States, privatization is not a clear-cut term, though it generally refers to the
idea that government should have less involvement in particular activities); Matthew
Diller, Introduction: Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in
the Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1307, 1309 (2001) (explaining that
privatization may take many forms and emanates from skepticism that the
government is able to solve problems); Martha Minow, Public and Private
Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1230
(explaining that the new form of privatization calls for market-style competition in
providing social services).
5. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths:
Independence, Autonomy, and Self- Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
13 (1999) (detailing the exclusion of the family as a site of analysis in mainstream
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family literature, which has observed the privatization of dependency
in the family, has offered little by way of explanation for its partial
nature.
A notable exception is found in the work of Grace Blumberg, who
has observed that unlike other Western nations, in which private
rights and obligations have expanded as public welfare rights
contract, in the United States, there has been no similar expansion of
private rights and obligations.6 She has suggested that this is due to
the fact that unlike other Western nations, the United States never
had a particularly robust welfare state, nor an ethic of collective
responsibility for the social welfare of its citizenry.7 As a result, the
dismantling of the more limited welfare state has not lead to a
concomitant expansion of private rights in order to ensure the basic
welfare of its citizens.8 This is no doubt an important part of the
story—if there is but a limited welfare state and no sense of social
responsibility, then the dismantling of welfare need not be
accompanied by a transfer of social responsibility to the private realm
legal literature). “Feminist legal theorists can legitimately complain that most
mainstream work fails to take into account institutions of intimacy, such as the
family.” Id. at 13 According to Fineman, the family is typically treated separately from
the market and the state. Id at 13-14.
6. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation:
Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1265, 1267-69 (2001) (tracing the laws of cohabitation in the United States and
noting that as the government attempts to defend marriage, private employers more
frequently provide benefits to non-marital spouses).
7. See id. at 1270-71 (arguing that the United States has never achieved the
status of a fully developed welfare state because it has never committed itself to doing
so).
8. See id. at 1307 (suggesting that part of the explanation lies in the invisibility
of the public welfare function of the family).
Although the family plays a greater role in the well-being of its members in
the United States than it does in nations that have a more highly developed
and transparent public welfare system, the American state's relatively weak
and cloaked role as a provider of social welfare seems to obscure the welfare
function of the American family.
Id. According to Blumberg, more fully developed welfare states tend to be more self
conscious about the welfare role of the family, and in moments of welfare
retrenchment, have shown a greater willingness to expand the realm of private
obligations. Id.
Unlike most other Western countries, the United States has never committed
itself to the comprehensive goals of a fully developed welfare state.
Consequently, it is not ordinarily thought to be the role of the government to
guarantee the social welfare of its citizenry. This perspective may have
affected the way the United States has conceptualized and rationalized family
law obligations, as compared to countries that have experienced the content
and ethos of a more fully realized welfare state. Specifically, American family
law does not recognize or acknowledge the extent to which the law of private
family obligations serves a public function.
Id. at 1308.
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of the family.
In this Article, I seek to supplement Blumberg’s analysis, arguing
that there are other important factors at play in the partial
privatization of American family law. Public policy debates around
the family are characterized by a number of very different visions of
the family; different conservative visions of the family with very
different ideas about privatization. Privatization as the transfer of
public goods and services to the private sphere of the family is one of
at least three distinct visions of privatization of the family. A second
understanding of privatization of the legal regulation of the family
involves the shift from public norms to private choice. American
family law has been said to be characterized by an increased
individualization of the family and a heightened emphasis on private
decision-making.9 Within this private choice vision of privatization,
individuals should be able to decide for themselves how to structure
their intimate relationships, and how to restructure them if and when
these relationships break down.
A third understanding of
privatization of the family involves a return to the ‘traditional family’
and the sanctity of marriage. In this social conservative vision, the
family with its highly gendered roles is envisioned as the natural site
for a range of care-giving responsibilities. This family needs to be
restored to its once privileged position.
In this article, I argue that these divergent visions of family and
privatization, their convergences and contradictions, are factors
animating the public policy debates over the legal regulation of the
family. The three visions of privatization can each be associated with
political positions often labeled ‘conservative’: the fiscal conservatism
of privatization as transferring once public goods to the private
sphere; the libertarian conservatism of privatization as private choice,
and the social conservatism of privatization as the traditional family.10
In my view, it is important to pay closer attention to these gaps and
fissures within “conservative” political discourse. The conflations and
conflicts between these three visions of privatization hold key insights
into the family and welfare public policy debates and help explain the
partial privatization of American family law. Privatization as the
9. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of
American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization
of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443 (1992).
10. See infra notes 11-52 and accompanying text (explaining that two of these
three visions of privatization, although associated with conservative thought, actually
derive from classical liberalism). Further, the vision of privatization as private choice
is a position that many progressive thinkers adhere to as well. Id. My point is that
these three visions of privatization can be associated with positions often identified
with conservative politics.
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transfer of once public goods and services to the family is sometimes
supported by and other times constrained by privatization as private
choice and privatization as the restoration of the traditional family.
The privatization of support obligations has occurred only to the
extent that it can be made consistent with the social conservative
vision of the family. Where these visions of privatization converge
(child support), the scope and content of family law obligations have
been expanded.
But, where these visions diverge (same-sex
marriage), the continuing discursive power of the social conservative
vision of privatization has precluded any such expansion. The story of
public policy reform is then as much a story of the conflicts between
and among conservatives, as it is a conflict between liberals and
conservatives.
The paper begins with an exploration of the theoretical differences
between these different visions of the family and the contradictory
implications for the regulation of the family. It illustrates the extent
to which these divergent approaches to family and privatization
correspond to fiscal and social conservative political philosophies, and
their fundamental differences in assumptions about family, gender
and dependency. The paper then turns to consider three issues in
the federal legal regulation of the family as concrete instantiations of
the contradictions: child support, welfare reform, and marriage. First,
it examines federal legislative efforts to strengthen child support
obligations and enforcement. The paper argues that initial efforts
were primarily motivated by a fiscal impulse of privatizing the costs of
supporting families by shifting responsibility from the state to
individual families—specifically, to fathers. However, more recent
public policy initiatives have begun to place greater emphasis on
promoting “responsible fatherhood,” a vision more consistent with
the social conservative restoration of the traditional family. Secondly,
the paper analyses the restructuring of welfare eligibility and
entitlements for single mothers. It traces a similar shift from fiscal
conservative emphasis on reconstituting dependent single mothers
into self-reliant workers to a social conservative emphasis on
promoting marriage and the traditional family as a solution of welfare
dependency. Thirdly, it explores federal initiatives to defend the
traditional definition of marriage from the challenges by same-sex
couples. In contrast to both child support and welfare entitlements,
public policy debates regarding marriage are overwhelmingly
dominated by social conservatives, and there is virtually no discussion
of the potential fiscal advantages of broadening the scope and content
of family obligations in the context of same-sex relationships.
Although no one model of the family has emerged as dominant, the
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analysis of each of the three areas suggests that the social conservative
model appears to be in ascendance. The paper argues that it is the
discursive power of this social conservative vision that has to a large
extent precluded broader definitions of family and a more robust
privatization of support obligations in accordance with the goals of
fiscal conservatism or the promotion of private choice in accordance
with the goals of libertarianism.
I. CONTESTING VISIONS OF PRIVATIZATION
A. Privatization as Transfer of Public Goods and Services to the
Private Sector
The privatization literature in the United States defines
privatization, at its most general, as the transfer of public goods and
services to the private sector.11 It is described as including a broad
array of policies. Jody Freeman, for example, suggests “a broad range
of arrangements that may constitute privatization, including: “the
complete or partial sell-off (through asset or share sales) of major
public enterprises; (2) the deregulation of a particular industry; (3)
the commercialization of a government department; (4) the removal
of subsidies to producers; and (5) the assumption by private operators
of what were formerly exclusively public services through, for
example, contracting out.”12 For the most part, the literature has
11. See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE
MEANS 5-12 (1989) (explaining that the definition of privatization in the United
States is quite different than privatization in the rest of the world); E.S. SAVAS,
PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT 3 (1987) (terming privatization “the
act of reducing the role of government, or increasing the role of the private sector, in
an activity or in the ownership of assets”); Nancy Ehrenreich, The Progressive
Potential in Privatization, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1235, 1236 (1996) (describing
privatization as “returning traditional government functions to the private sphere”);
Minow, supra note 4, at 1230 (defining privatization as “the range of efforts by
governments to move public functions into private hands and to use market-style
competition”); Julie A. Nice, The New Private Law: An Introduction, 73 DENV. U. L.
REV. 993, 995 (1996) (terming privatization “New Private Law” and describing it as
deregulation, decentralization, privatization, and contractualization); Paul Starr, The
Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6, 14 (1988) (suggesting that
“privatization has come primarily to mean two things: (1) any shift of activities or
functions from the state to the private sector; and, more specifically, (2) any shift of
the production of goods and services from public to private”).
12. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2003) (noting that the last arrangement constituting
privatization is the most commonly used in the United States); see also Cass, supra
note 4, at 456-62 (describing privatization as consisting of four basic types of policies:
divestiture, contracting out, deregulation and vouchers and tax reductions/user fees);
Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1741 (2002) (describing privatization). This concept is:
[A] cluster of related developments and proposals. The term ‘privatization’
encompasses such diverse policies as creating school voucher programs,

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss3/1

8

Crossman: Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of D

2005]

CONTESTING CONSERVATISMS

423

focused on the transfer of once public goods and services to the
private sphere of the market, increasing the role of private
enterprise.13 It generally involves a marked preference for market
ordering and private choice over government regulation and public
norms. More recently, the literature has also included considerable
attention to the transfer of public goods and services to the voluntary
or charitable sector.14 But little attention has been directed to a third
sector within the private sphere, namely, the family. While some of
the privatization literature mentions this sector in passing,15 there has
been very little analysis of the transfer of once public goods and
services to the family.
To the extent that the family has been discussed at all in the
privatization literature, it has generally been in relation to the
deregulation of intimate relationships. A number of writers have
attempted to reveal the progressive potential of privatization through
the deregulation of personal relationships.16 But, the idea of
privatization operating in these works is somewhat different from the
more general emphasis on the transfer of once public goods and
services to the private sphere. Rather, in this context, privatization
contracting out the delivery of services, selling off governmental assets such as
public housing and hospitals, replacing the Social Security system with
individual retirement accounts, and creating private entities, such as
homeowners’ associations or business improvement districts, endowed with
powers traditionally associated with local government.
Id.
13. But see, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD 1-5 (2002) (demonstrating that not all of this literature depicts the
public/private distinction as unproblematic). Rather, many writers recognize the
constructed and shifting nature of the distinction. Id.
14. See Panel Discussion, Living with Privatization: At Work and in the
Community, 28 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 1397, 1412-13 (2001) (explaining that the role of
charitable organizations in privatization has continued to intensify with the
establishment of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives by
the Bush Administration in 2001, which is intended to further promote the provision
of social services by faith-based organizations).
15. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1324. Privatization is defined as
meaning:
[R]elying more on the private institutions of society and less on government
to satisfy public needs. Society’s private institutions include: (1) the
marketplace and organizations operating therein; (2) voluntary associations
of all kinds; and (3) the family, which is, after all, the Original Department of
Health, Department of Education, Department of Housing, and Department
of Social Services.
Id. His subsequent, admittedly brief, discussion, however, focuses exclusively on
markets and private enterprise. Id. at 1324-25.
16. See Ehrenreich, supra note 11, at 1242-43; see also Beermann, supra note 4,
at 1530-31 (commenting on the deregulation of intimate relationships through the
shift to no fault divorce and an increased willingness of the courts to enforce private
contracts); Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not
Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107 (1996).
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denotes a shift in government regulation to encourage private choice.
It is an understanding of privatization that draws more heavily on a
very different understanding of privatization found in the family law
literature, discussed in the next section below.
This conflation of privatization and deregulation is also somewhat
problematic in so far as the transfer of public goods and services to
the private sector is not always commensurate with deregulation.
While some of the literature emphasizes the idea of deregulation as
an important component of privatization,17 others have suggested
that privatization often involves an increase or shift in modes of
regulation. Some commentators have suggested that privatization is
better characterized as “re-regulation.”18
As Daniel Farber as
observed, “privatization, after all, is another form of regulation.”19
This observation is particularly salient in the context of the legal
regulation of the family where the transfer of once public goods and
services to the private sphere involves a shift rather than a decrease in
regulation. For example, the increase in child support obligations
and enforcement that has accompanied the retraction of social
welfare has involved intensification in the regulation of individual
family members. Drawing parallels between the deregulation of
certain sectors of the economy and the transformations in the legal
regulation of the family fails to capture the ways in which privatization
as the transfer of public responsibility to the private sphere has been
operating within the family.
While the idea of privatization as reconstituting once public goods
and services as more appropriately provided by the family remains
under theorized in general discussions of privatization, it does appear
in some feminist work, as well as in the literature on the expansion of
17. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 4, at 459-60 (identifying deregulation as one of the
four categories of privatization). Deregulation is defined as reducing or eliminating
the public regulation of private actors. Id. It often involves an effort to increase
competition in once heavily regulated sectors of the economy. Id.; see also
Beermann, supra note 4, at 1528-35.
18. See PRIVITIZATION, supra note 1, at 20; Sol Picciotto, Liberalization and
Democratization: The Forum and the Hearth in the Era of Cosmopolitan PostIndustrial Capitalism, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (2000); see also Freeman,
supra note 12, at 1285.
Instead of seeing privatization as a means of shrinking government, I imagine
it as a mechanism for expanding government’s reach into realms traditionally
thought private.
In other words, privatization can be a means of
‘publicization,’ through which private actors increasingly commit themselves
to traditionally public goals as the price of access to lucrative opportunities to
deliver goods and services that might otherwise be provided directly by the
state.
Id.
19. See Daniel A. Farber, Whither Socialism?, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1011 (1996).
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child support obligations and the dismantling of social welfare. For
example, Martha Fineman’s work on the legal regulation of family has
highlighted the role of family law in privatizing dependency,20 as well
as the extent to which “privatization is increasingly seen as the
solution to complicated social problems reflecting persistent
inequality and poverty.”21 Similarly, the discourse of public policy
reform has identified the privatization of support obligations as an
explicit objective of welfare reform, and many commentators have
observed the extent to which this reform constitutes a privatization of
public responsibility.22 Anna Marie Smith, for example, has detailed
the ways in which recent welfare reform has both “expanded
governmental presence into the private sphere” while sharply
reducing “the sphere of public responsibility.”23 According to Smith,
“[t]he collective obligation to support poor mothers and their
children is being transformed into a private familial debt . . . .”24
Laura Morgan has similarly argued that the child support provisions
of welfare reform have sought to privatize the once public
responsibility of supporting poor families.25
20. See, e.g., Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of
Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2205 (1995) (“In the societal division of labor
among institutions, the private family bears the burden of dependency, not the public
state. Resort to the state is considered a failure. By according to the private family
responsibility for inevitable dependency, society directs dependency away from the
state and privatizes it.”); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, The Inevitability of
Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 89 (1998).
21. Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Core, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403,
1405 (2001).
The rhetoric surrounding many current policy debates urges previously
public concerns to be transferred to the magic realm of the private solution.
From welfare reform to the construction of ideal educational or prison
systems, the assertion is that the private market can better address historically
public issues than can the public government.
Id. However, Fineman notes the unique position of the family within those debates
about privatization, since dependency is already seen as the responsibility of the
family. Id. “Therefore, the public nature of dependency is hidden, privatized within
the family, rendering decisions about public responsibility unnecessary, except for
those stigmatized families that ‘fail’ in meeting their responsibilities.” Id. at 1405-06.
22. See generally Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L.
REV. 229 (2000); David L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues
and Perils of Child-Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575 (1995); Deborah
Harris, Child Support for Welfare Families: Family Policy Trapped in Its Own
Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 619 (1987/1988); Roger J.R. Levesque,
Targeting “Deadbeat” Dads: The Problem with the Direction of Welfare Reform, 15
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1 (1994); Laura W. Morgan, Family Law at 2000: Private
and Public Support of the Family: From Welfare State to Poor Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 705
(1999); Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary
Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121 (2002).
23. Smith, supra note 22, at 211.
24. Id. at 212.
25. See Morgan, supra note 22, at 708-09 (noting that the government more
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B. Privatization as Private Choice in Intimate Relationships
In the context of family law, the dominant conception of
privatization is one of the increasing emphasis on private decisionmaking over public norms. As Jana Singer argued in her influential
article aptly entitled The Privatization of Family Law, “[o]ver the past
twenty five years, family law has become increasingly privatized. In
virtually all doctrinal areas, private norm creation and private decision
making have supplanted state-imposed rules and structures for
governing family-related behavior.”26 In her view, this “preference for
private over public ordering” has included both the substantive and
procedural dimensions of the legal regulation of the family.27 In
terms of substantive law, the once sharp line between marriage and
non-marital cohabitation has been blurred; illegitimacy has been
largely abolished, unmarried cohabitants have been provided with
some remedies on the breakdown of their relationships through the
use of express and implied contract doctrine, and there has been an
increasing recognition of domestic partnership regimes.
The
consequences of marital breakdown have similarly seen an increase in
the ability of spouses to define their own relationships with the shift
from fault to no-fault divorce and the ability to alter the obligations of
marriage by contract.
Singer suggests that this increasing preference for private over
public ordering reflects a number of broader social trends in the legal
regulation of the family including an increase in notions of individual
privacy and autonomy.28 She notes that while individual privacy has
long been important in American legal thought, in the context of the
legal regulation of the family, the idea of privacy was generally
ascribed to the family as a unit, rather than to its individual
members.29 This idea began to change in the 1970s, as the Supreme
stringently enforces child support awards in order to shift the cost of raising children
from the federal government back to parents).
26. Singer, supra note 9, at 1444.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 1446 (noting that the other factors include an emphasis on gender
equality, the increasing influence of law and economics, and the dissociation of law
and morality).
29. See id. at 1509.
While this notion of family privacy insulated from public oversight certain
sorts of decisions and activities that took place within families, it did not
support private choices regarding the formation or dissolution of family
relationships. Indeed, the traditional notion of family privacy may have
reinforced public control over the definition and composition of families,
since only certain sorts of intimate groupings were considered worthy of the
degree of autonomy that the tradition provided . . . . In this sense, the
traditional notion of family privacy represented not a commitment to private
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Court “transformed the traditional notion of family privacy into a
doctrine that focused directly on individual choice and that elevated
to constitutionally protected status a wide range of individual
decisions regarding marriage, parenthood and procreation.”30
Marriage came increasingly to be viewed as a private relationship
intended to promote individual happiness, which in turn supported
an approach to legal regulation that emphasized privacy and
decisional autonomy: individuals should decide for themselves when
and how to enter into and exit from relationships.
This privatization is part of a more general transition of family law
from status to contract, and the increasing emphasis on individualism
in the legal regulation of the family.31 The formal status of marriage
has become less important in determining individual rights and
responsibilities within the family, as greater latitude is given to
individual choices. Yet, it is a process that remains incomplete.32
Singer, amongst others, has observed that this privatization of the
family, with its emphasis on the private contractual nature of
marriage, has been uneven, citing, for example, the increased
government involvement in the legal regulation of domestic violence
and child support.33 The law continues to impose limits on how far
spouses can contract out of the rights and responsibilities once
associated with the status of marriage.
The normative evaluation of this privatization of the family is
ordering of family behavior, but rather the substitution of the family for the
state as the relevant source of public norms.
Id.
30. Id. at 1510.
31. See, e.g., SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE
EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (Ashley Montagu
ed., 1986) (originating the idea of the transformation of marriage from status to
contract); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 43
(1981) [hereinafter GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY] (“Maine was more right than he
knew. . . . [S]ince the 1960s, the law in the countries discussed here has come
increasingly to emphasize the individuality of the members of the conjugal family as
well as to facilitate their independence from it and each other.”). See generally
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTHCENTURY AMERICA (1985); MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF
INTIMACY (1993); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of
American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985); Singer, supra note 9.
32. See REGAN, supra note 31, at 39-41 (explaining that formal recognition of
relationships has become less important, and the law increasingly recognizes
individuals); see also JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM
(2002).
33. See Singer, supra note 9, at 1555 (observing that “although the law today
generally accords spouses great latitude in structuring their post-divorce financial
affairs, this latitude does not extend to agreements regarding child support or child
custody.”); see also Theodora Ooms, The Role of the Federal Government in
Strengthening Marriage, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 163 (2001).
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divided.
Some commentators have argued strongly for the
progressive potential of this privatization.34 Both Martha Ertman and
Nancy Ehrenreich, for example, have suggested that the increasing
emphasis on private choice through the privatization of marriage
might have positive effects for gays and lesbians.35 Jack Beerman has
similarly commented on the deregulation of intimate relationships
through the shift to no-fault divorce and a greater willingness on the
part of the courts to enforce intimate contracts, as well as the
potential for the further deregulation of marriage as part of the
process of privatization.36
Others have argued against this
privatization. Communitarians, for example, have been highly critical
of the increased emphasis on individualism and private choice law.37
Some of these critics argue for a reversal of this process of
privatization and a return to status.38 Others, including Singer, take
the position that this privatization of the family is ambivalent,
producing both advantages and disadvantages.39 But, the idea of the
privatization of the family as a preference for private over public
ordering is a theme that runs throughout this literature.
C. Privatization as the Re-articulation of the Traditional Family
A third vision of privatization of the family that underlies
contemporary public policy debates involves a return to the
“traditional family” and the sanctity of marriage.40 In this social
34. See Martha Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private
Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001) (arguing that the privatization of
family law helps undermine traditional sex, gender, race and class hierarchies that
marginalize a range of intimate relationships); See generally Ehrenreich, supra note
11; Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing
the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453 (1998) (arguing for more private choice in
the structuring of marital relationships); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott,
Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998).
35. See Ertman, supra note 34; Ehrenreich, supra note 11.
36. See Beermann, supra note 4, at 1530-31 (noting that the deregulation of
marriage may expand the possibilities for the meaning of marriage and increase
individuals’ privacy rights).
37. See, e.g., Bruce Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The
Waning of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing that the increased
emphasis on private choice and autonomy in family law undermines the family as a
site of community, relationship and belonging). “In family law, as in family life, the
individualistic cultural currents of the past quarter century have eroded the mortar of
personal commitment that traditionally held the building blocks of family life—
people—together in intimate relationships.” Id. at 2; see also REGAN, supra note 31,
at 89-117; Laura Weinrib, Reconstructing Family: Constructive Trust at Relational
Dissolution, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 207 (2002)
38. See REGAN, supra note 31, at 89-117.
39. See Singer, supra note 9, at 1531-67.
40. Admittedly, the proponents of this view do not generally describe their
position in the language of privatization. However, I believe that it is possible to cast
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conservative vision, the family with its highly gendered roles is
envisioned as the natural site for a range of care giving
responsibilities.41 This family needs to be restored to its once
privileged position. A host of social problems—rising crime rates,
domestic violence, abortion, welfarism, child poverty, high risk
behaviors—are ascribed to the decline of the traditional family.42
Social conservatives seek to reverse this decline by promoting
marriage and traditional family forms.43 Their many strategies
include an effort to reduce single motherhood by reducing both nonmarital births and high divorce rates. Non-marital births can be
reduced by promoting abstinence and, if that fails, marriage. High
divorce rates can be countered by reforming no-fault divorce laws,
replacing them, for example, with covenant marriage laws that impose
more onerous conditions for divorce.44
The trend toward
this social conservative attempt to resurrect the traditional family as a position on
privatization, returning the family to its purportedly natural and private form.
41. See Lynn Wardle, Relationships Between Family and Government, 31 CAL. W.
INT’L L.J. 1, 21 (2000) [hereinafter Wardle, Relationships] (“Fathers must selflessly
return to their role as providers and protectors of their families, and mothers must
return lovingly to nurture their children.”); see also Bruce C. Hafen, The Touch of
Human Kindness: Motherhood and the Moral Influence of Women, 67 VITAL
SPEECHES 1, (2001), 2001 WL 12792028 (urging women to return to their roles as
nurturers within the family).
42. See Lynn Wardle, Is Preference for Marriage in the Law Justified?, 1999
WORLD FAM. POL’Y FORUM 44, at http://www.worldfamilypolicy.org/New%20Page/
Forum/1999/Wardle.pdf (last visited July 31, 2005); Wardle, Relationships, supra
note 41 (describing the breakdown of marriage as leading to poverty, high risk
behaviors such as teenage pregnancy and drug abuse by children, increased crime
and broader social instability); see also DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA:
CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 25-48 (1995) [hereinafter
BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA] (insisting that separating children from their
fathers is a major cause of crime, emotional problems, teenage pregnancy, child
sexual abuse, and domestic violence towards women). See generally MAGGIE
GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE: HOW WE DESTROY LASTING LOVE (1996);
REBUILDING THE NEST: A NEW COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY (David
Blankenhorn et. al. eds., 1990); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE
(1996).
43. See David Blankenhorn, The State of the Family and the Family Policy
Debate, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 431, 436 (1996) (noting that conservatives may be
divided between those who seek to address the consequences of the decline of the
family by building more prisons, urban boarding schools, and orphanages and those
who seek to reverse the trend by “strengthening the institution of marriage and
seeking to create cultural change in favor of the idea that unwed childbearing is
wrong, that our divorce rate is too high, and that every child deserves a father”). See
generally PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA (David
Popenoe et al. eds., 1996); REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: AN AGENDA FOR STRENGTHENING MARRIAGE (Alan J. Hawkins et
al. eds., 2002).
44. See, e.g., Margaret Brinig & Steven Nock, Covenant and Contract, 12 REGENT
U. L. REV. 9, 24-26 (1999/2000); Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children:
Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547 (1998);
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal
Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 74-75 (1998); Lynn Wardle, Divorce Reform at the
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cohabitation can be reversed by greater support for and promotion of
marriage. Through the 1990s, the discourse of this social conservative
position has also been articulated more explicitly in terms of
children’s need for a two-parent family, and the problem of
“fatherless” children.45 The solution, then, is seen in terms of
promoting this two-parent family, and ‘responsible fatherhood’.
Moreover, in this social conservative vision, the traditional two parent
heterosexual nuclear marital family is to be supported to the
exclusion of all other family forms. Social conservatives thus oppose
any movement toward same sex relationship recognition as
representing a fundamental threat to the traditional family.
In this vision of privatization there continues to be a strong role for
government regulation. David Blankenhorn, a leading conservative
family policy critic has, for example, noted the distinction between
laissez faire approaches that identify government as the problem and
seek to dismantle the welfare state “so that families can form and
thrive on their own and in local communities, unharmed by the
policies of the welfare state,” and a more welfare state approach which
seeks to use the “instruments of government to meet human needs.”46
He explicitly rejects the laissez faire approach, arguing instead that
“society needs to use the tools of government and other tools at its
disposal to strengthen the basic institution of the civil society,
especially the institution of marriage, and to promote a cultural shift
an attitudinal changes toward the view that every child deserves a
father and that more children ought to be growing up with their two
married parents.”47
Similar themes are developed by Lawrence Mead, an influential
conservative critic, who advocates in favor of a “new paternalism” in
social welfare policy as a solution to the problems of poverty, welfare

Turn of the Millennium: Certainties and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 783, 790-91 (1999)
(arguing in favor of divorce reform and covenant marriage); see also Katharine T.
Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809 n. 7 (1998)
(observing that the divorce reform and the reintroduction of fault is also supported
“by some commentators representing a more progressive legal tradition”). The
author cited, among others, Margaret Brinig & Steven Crafton, Marriage and
Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869 (1994), and also those from a more liberal
tradition, such as Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and
Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 80-91 (1990), who urged enforcement of pre-commitment
contracts to limit the availability of divorce. Id.
45. See, e.g., BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA, supra note 42; DAVID POPENOE,
LIFE WITHOUT FATHER: COMPELLING NEW EVIDENCE THAT FATHERHOOD AND MARRIAGE
ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR THE GOOD OF CHILDREN AND SOCIETY (1996).
46. Blankenhorn, supra note 43, at 436-37.
47. Id. at 437; see also Hafen, supra note 37.
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dependency and the decline of the family.48 As Mead describes, this
paternalism is “pro-government. Far from reducing the welfare state,
as conservatives usually ask, paternalism expands it.”49 Mead contrasts
the new paternalism with traditional Republican or conservative
approaches: “The traditional Republic approach to poverty was simply
to cut back government programs and benefits and rely more on the
private sector to generate opportunities for the downtrodden.
Paternalism is a big-government form of conservatism, and this has
caused some in the GOP to reject it.”50 Mead notes that conservative
advocates of paternalism do not necessarily favor the privatization of
welfare, as understood as the transfer of government goods and
services to the private market or charitable actors:
Most of us think . . . it unlikely and undesirable that antipoverty
policy should be privatized. After all, one reason that public social
policies arose in the Progressive and New Deal Eras was that private
charity could not cope with the scale of urban poverty. The public
now expects that the most destitute will be cared for, whether or
not private aid is available, and for this a welfare state is
indispensable.51

Mead further argues that the private sector—particularly the
charitable sector—will be unlikely to provide the kind of supervision
required to change the behavior of the poor.52
D. Contradictory Relationships and Contesting Political Visions
These different visions of family and the contradictory pressures on
the legal regulation of the family reflect three very different political
normative visions: fiscal conservatism, libertarianism and social
conservatism.53 At times, analysts interchangeably use these terms to
48. See Lawrence Mead, The Rise of Paternalism, in THE NEW PATERNALISM:
SUPERVISORY APPROACHES TO POVERTY 1, 2 (Lawrence Mead ed., 1997); see also
Rebecca Maynard, Paternalism, Teenage Pregnancy Prevention, and Teenage Parent
Services, in THE NEW PATERNALISM: SUPERVISORY APPROACHES TO POVERTY 89, 90
(advocating paternalism as the best approach to reducing illegitimacy: “Not only are
more paternalistic policies crucial to maintaining public support for social programs
such as welfare, but they also offer the most promise for preventing teenage
pregnancy and mitigating adverse consequences when it does occur”).
49. Mead, supra note 48, at 11.
50. Id. at 12-13.
51. Id. at 10.
52. Id. (“Community organizations outside government cannot do much to force
the poor to follow a better lifestyle as long as public aid programs demand little.”).
53. MELVIN THORNE, AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT SINCE WORLD WAR II: THE
CORE IDEAS 97 n.28 (Bernard K. Johnpoll ed., Greenwood Press 1990) (noting, “it
should be remembered that these labels, libertarian conservative and traditionalist
conservative, fit arguments and positions better than they fit people.”). The
distinctions set out here serve to provide an analytical model, rather than a
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refer to the conservative policies of privatization, the dismantling of
the welfare state and the promotion of traditional (often family)
values, collapsed under the rubric of the “New Right.” This
conflation, however, obscures important differences between these
political philosophies and their respective adherents.54 Although
often cast within the language of conservatism (i.e. social
conservatives versus fiscal conservatives55) the divide is actually one
between conservatism and liberalism. Social or moral conservatives
are the true inheritors of a conservative political philosophy with its
emphasis on community, authority, social order and tradition.56 In
this philosophy, individuals are first and foremost members of
description of the views of particular individuals or groups. In practice, a particular
individual, organization or political party may (and often does) adopt a social
conservative position on one issue, and a fiscal conservative view on another. Many
Republicans, for example, may adopt a fiscal conservative stance on child support (in
favor of tougher laws cracking down on deadbeat parents), while adopting a
resolutely anti-gay position in terms of same sex marriage. Similarly, the Heritage
Foundation, a ‘conservative’ think tank committed to promoting the public policies
based on the principles of free enterprise, individual freedom and limited
government, also supports the promotion of ‘traditional American values’, which
includes the promotion of marriage and the traditional family. See About the
Heritage Foundation, available at http://www. heritage.org/about/ (last visited July
9, 2005). Nor are these positions exclusively adopted by Republicans. As the review
of Congressional debates below reveals, Democrats may similarly adopt fiscal and/or
social conservative positions. The analytical distinctions set out here help illuminate
the internal contradictions animating public policy debates, as well as the
contradictions that may inhere within individual actors, groups or parties.
54. See, e.g., Ernest Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1142, 1181-1202 (2002) [hereinafter Young, Judicial Activism]
(distinguishing between three categories of conservative politics: “situational or
‘Burkean,’ political, and institutional”); Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism:
Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 661
(1994) [hereinafter Young, Rediscovering Conservatism] (explaining that “American
conservatism is highly splintered,” such that the various factions cannot agree on one
direction for conservative constitutionalism); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
“Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 429, 447-51 (2002) (distinguishing between substantial, methodological and
institutional conservatism); Robin West, Progressive and Conservative
Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 654-59 (1990) (distinguishing between social
conservatives, legal conservatives and libertarian conservatives).
55. See, e.g., CHARLES DUNN & DAVID WOODARD, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM FROM
BURKE TO BUSH: AN INTRODUCTION 173 (1991).
An economic conservative, especially one with libertarian tendencies, wants
to have a very small government that interferes as little as possible in the lives
of Americans. A traditional or religious conservative, on the other hand, may
appreciate a larger government in order to protect its moral values as the
norms of society’s behavior.
Id.; see also THORNE, supra note 53 at 83-91 (discussing the distinction between
libertarian and traditional conservatism).
56. See Robert Nisbet, Uneasy Cousins, in FREEDOM AND VIRTUE: THE
CONSERVATIVE/LIBERTARIAN DEBATE 38-39 (George Carey ed., 1998) (explaining that
modern conservatism stems from Burkean ideals of rights of society and historical
groups [like families and churches] as a barrier to government control over the
individual).
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communities, united by common morals values and traditions.57
While conservatives are wary of arbitrary state power, they are not
adverse to the state but rather see it as a necessary component of
social order and the promotion of virtue.58 Within this vision, the
family is a basic unit of society, forging individuals together through
its moral authority, instilling children with moral values and
traditions.59
By way of contrast, both fiscal conservatism and libertarianism
derives from classic liberal theory.60 Within classical liberalism, the
individual is an autonomous, rational, self-interested actor, endowed
with free will, whose liberty to pursue his own interest merits
protection above all else.61 Individuals must be free to make their
own choices, and pursue their own conception of the good.62
According to classical liberal theory, this liberty thrives on the
economic liberty of a free market, and the political liberty of a
minimal state.63
These tensions between conservative and liberal political
philosophies have long been visible in American conservative politics.
Lipset and Raab’s study of the American Right, for example, found an
on-going alliance between these two groups – one drawn primarily
from lower income brackets, who follow the religious, non-economic
57. See id. at 45-46 (recounting that conservatives, from Burke forward, view
individuals as inseparable members of natural groups and associations with which
they live: “family, locality, church, region, social class, nation, and so on”).
58. See Russell Kirk, A Dispassionate Assessment of Libertarians, in FREEDOM AND
VIRTUE: THE CONSERVATIVE/LIBERTARIAN DEBATE 183-84 (George Carey ed., 1998).
[T]he conservative finds that the state is natural and necessary for the
fulfillment of human nature and the growth of civilization . . . . In Burke’s
phrases, “He who gave us our nature to be perfected by our virtue, willed also
the necessary means of its perfection—He willed therefore the state.”
Id.
59. See, e.g., DUNN & WOODARDS, supra note 55, at 170 (“The basic ties of the
family are the heart of society . . . and the very nursery of civic virtue.”).
60. See Nisbet, supra note 56, at 40 (tracing the “foundations of contemporary
liberalism, of classical liberalism” to the work of Locke, Smith, and J.S. Mill’s On
Liberty).
61. See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY 6-7 (1965) (finding
that in a classic liberal democracy, individuals become free to choose religions,
occupations, family arrangements, and economic strategies).
62. See id. at 7 (reporting that new liberalized democracies in fact forced
freedom on individuals).
63. See Nisbet, supra note 56, at 42-43 (providing that freedom from intrusive
government intervention and individual economic freedom are the anchors of classic
liberal theory). See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962)
(analyzing the relationship between economic and political freedom in the liberal
context); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960) (examining the
history and institutions of liberty through the lens of political philosophy and
application in modern economic society).
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issues of conservative politics, and the other drawn from higher
income brackets, a highly educated group, attracted primarily to the
economic issues of conservative politics.64 Conservative political
theorists have themselves long debated the relative merits of freedom
and authority, with more libertarian conservatives emphasizing the
primacy of freedom, and more social or traditional conservatives
emphasizing the primacy of authority and social order.65 These
tensions continue to be visible in the rise of the New Right in America
since the 1970s, and the resurgence of a number of different
conservative political philosophies.66 Ernest Young has observed,
“American conservatism is highly splintered,” encompassing a very
broad array of philosophical positions not easily united.67 Young
identifies six different strands of conservatism: economic
conservatives,68 libertarians,69 traditionalists,70 social/religious
conservatives,71 neo-conservatives72 and anti- communists,73 and
64. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & EARL RAAB, THE POLITICS OF UNREASON: RIGHTWING EXTREMISM IN AMERICA, 1790-1970 449-56 (1970) (parceling the extreme right
into two factions: one consisting of low status, under-educated, religious and
provincial peoples who espouse intolerance of minorities and diversity; the other
consisting of wealthier, privileged peoples who focus on economic conservatism).
Underlying both groups is a common thread of opposition to the welfare state and
state power. Id. at 449.
65. See DESMOND S. KING, THE NEW RIGHT: POLITICS MARKETS AND CITIZENSHIP 2
(1987) (defining two strands of thought within the New Right: “liberalism, which
comprises the restoration of the traditional liberal values of individualism, limited
government and free market forces; and conservatism, which consists of claims about
government being used to establish societal order and authority based on social,
religious and moral conservatism”). See generally FREEDOM AND VIRTUE: THE
CONSERVATIVE/ LIBERTARIAN DEBATE (George W. Carey ed., 1998) (contrasting
libertarian and social conservatives in order to discern their common ground).
66. See generally KING, supra note 65 (examining the contradictions and
accommodations between liberalism, libertarianism and conservatism in the rise of
the New Right in the United States and England in the 1970s and 1980s).
67. Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 54, at 661.
68. See Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 54, at 1192 (defining, in selfadmitted thumbnail sketches of complicated philosophies, economic conservatives as
those who emphasize individualism and private property, and are highly skeptical of
“government regulation and redistribution of wealth”).
69. See id. (“Libertarians take the economic conservative’s aversion to
government intervention in economic affairs and universalize it, advocating ‘[t]he
maximum reduction of social and government action . . . so that the greatest possible
room is left for each individual to act.’”).
70. See id. at 1193 (defining traditionalists as those who look back to Burke’s
emphasis on community and virtue, and who “typically combine the situational
conservative’s critique of rationalism and respect for prescriptive wisdom with more
substantive or ideational elements such as a belief in community and a religious
moral order.”).
71. See id. (defining social and religious conservatives of the 1980s New Right as
those who “shared the traditionalists’ concern for a religious moral order, although
they tended to be uninterested in the particular intellectual traditions espoused by
the traditionalists.”).
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argues that “[f]ew, if any, underlying themes unify these diverse
groups; indeed their basic assumptions tend to be more contradictory
than their surface policy prescriptions. Economic conservatives and
libertarians are highly individualistic, while traditionalists, neoconservatives and New Righters emphasize communities and
families.”74 Conservative critiques continue to disagree with one
another along this social/ fiscal, conservative/ libertarian axis.75
These differences are particularly salient in the context of family
and social welfare policy. Social conservatives see the welfare state as
responsible for breaking down the moral basis of society.76 These
conservatives hold the decline of the traditional family through
welfarism, day-care, divorce, affirmative action, abortion, and gay
rights, to name but a few of their favorite targets, responsible for the
political, economic and moral decay of society.77 Social conservatives
72. See id. at 1194 (describing neo-conservatives as “a loosely-affiliated group of
intellectuals who became an important ideological force in the aftermath of the
1960s”). Young describes them as particularly difficult to define because they started
out as liberals, accepting “in principle of the modern welfare state,” although they are
critical of particular liberal policies. Id.
73. See id.
Hostility to communism has been a critical unifying force among the
otherwise diverse strands of American conservatives, and for many
conservatives it was long the essential characteristic of conservative ideology.
The particular reason for opposing communism naturally varied according to
one’s affinities with the various sorts of conservatism already listed—that is,
an economic conservative might oppose the nationalization of industry, while
a traditionalist would abhor the destruction of traditional religions.
Id.
74. Id. at 1194-95; see also KING, supra note 65, at 160-61 (analyzing some of the
ways in which these contradictions have informed the public policy of the Reagan
administration, pursuing liberal economic policies and conservative social policies).
“Liberalism and conservatism . . . contradict one another on a number of important
issues including the role allocated to the state; the role of the individual; the nature
and scope of freedom; and the importance of religious and familial values in society.”
Id. at 24. “Implementing these liberal minimal state objectives has required an
activist government . . . . This paradox is especially apparent in the Reagan
Administration’s support for conservative issues: school prayer and anti-abortion, for
example, and opposition to affirmative action or the rights of minorities.” Id. at 161.
75. See, e.g., DUNN & WOODARD, supra note 55, at 173 (illustrating the
divergences between economic and social conservatives in the different positions of
William Buckley and William Bennett on the solution to American’s drug crisis).
While Buckley favors a libertarians’ approach of legalization, Bennett advocates a
social conservative approach of tougher sentences and more stringent enforcement.
Id. at 173-74.
76. See, e.g., GEORGE GILDER, SEXUAL SUICIDE 138 (1973) (“Our welfare program .
. . is tragic because, as currently designed, it promotes social disintegration”). See
generally PAMELA ABBOTT & CLAIRE WALLACE, THE FAMILY AND THE NEW RIGHT 22-36
(1992); BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA, supra note 42; Wardle, Relationships,
supra note 41.
77. See BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA, supra note 42, at 25-48; Wardle,
Relationships, supra note 41, at 10-14.
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believe that family breakdown and its resulting moral decay has been
caused by the nature of the extensive state intervention in the private
spheres of the family and the economy.78 Accordingly, the answer for
social conservatives is simple: strengthen the traditional family, and its
traditional, hierarchical gender roles.
An explicitly religious
dimension sometimes informs this social conservative vision.
According to this Religious or Christian Right, religious belief dictates
the privatization of the family with a need to restore the sacred nature
of marriage as a unity of man and woman in the eyes of the God.79
Fiscal conservatism (sometimes referred to in the literature as neoliberalism,80 thus making visible its historical antecedents) and
libertarianism identify the basic problem of modern society as the
“erosion of liberty” that has accompanied the growth of the Keynesian
welfare state.81 Individuals have lost their sense of economic initiative
and enterprise by over-reliance on the state. The answer for both
fiscal conservatives and libertarians is also simple—restore the
economic and political liberty of the individual through the
promotion of the free market and the radical reduction of the state.
The family does not feature as prominently as it does within the social
conservative vision. Its primary focus is on restoring the individual to
his (and now her) place as autonomous, industrious market actors.
But, against the backdrop of its concern with the impact of welfare
dependency, fiscal conservatism and libertarianism “promises to
restore the State’s distance from the family. In short, neo-liberalism
suggests and needs the family to take some responsibility for itself.”82
Fiscal conservatives and libertarians at times diverge, however, in
how to best accomplish this goal. One way of restoring the family to
the private sphere is through an increasing emphasis on private
choice, placing the family beyond the realm of appropriate state
regulation (corresponding to the privatization as private choice
approach).83 A second way is to transfer the public responsibility for
the meeting the needs of individual family members back to the
family (corresponding to the privatization as transfer of public goods
78. See generally ABBOTT & WALLACE, supra note 76; Rebecca Klatch, Coalition
and Conflict Among Women of the New Right, 13 SIGNS 671 (1988).
79. See DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTI-GAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE
CHRISTIAN RIGHT (1997).
80. See generally McCluskey, supra note 1 (providing a discussion of neoliberalism).
81. Klatch, supra note 78, at 676.
82. Vikki Bell, Governing Childhood: Neo-liberalism and the Law, 22 ECON. &
SOC’Y 390, 395 (1993).
83. See generally Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 34.
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and services to the private sector).84 Both of these approaches are
consistent with the tenets of classic liberalism – of reducing the role of
government in meeting the needs of individuals.85 The approaches
diverge, however, over the relative importance of individual choice
versus individual responsibility, with the former giving primacy to
choice, while the latter is sometimes prepared to override it in the
interests of reducing government spending and promoting
responsibility.86 It is important then to distinguish these two
approaches, with the private choice approach more closely
approximating a libertarian strand of liberalism, and the transfer of
public goods and services approach corresponding to the fiscal
conservative, deregulatory or neo-liberal strand of liberalism.
There is certainly some overlap between these three visions. For
example, social conservatives, fiscal conservatives and libertarians
share contempt for the welfare state agreeing that it is responsible for
a range of social and economic problems. All three agree that the
solutions to these problems lie in reducing and eliminating welfare
dependency. Further, while fiscal conservatism is itself morally
agnostic on the family, there is much in the social conservative
strategy of rearticulating familial ideology that supports the fiscal
conservative privatization project. The idea of the family as a natural
and timeless institution, responsible for the welfare of its members,
could provide ideological support for the renegotiation of the
public/private spheres of responsibility. The highly gendered roles
and responsibilities within the family could also help legitimate the
transfer of social and economic responsibilities from the public to the
private.
But, there are many ways in which the normative visions and
strategies of the social conservatives, fiscal conservatives and
libertarians diverge. Despite their mutual condemnation of welfarism,
their diagnoses of the particular ills of the welfare state diverge, as do
their prescriptions. Fiscal conservatives and libertarians emphasize
the way in which the welfare state has undermined individual initiative
and enterprise, while social conservatives emphasize moral decay and

84. See generally Fineman, supra note 21.
85. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 63; HAYEK. supra note 63; Nisbet, supra note 56.
86. This conflict does not arise as explicitly in the context of privatization as the
transfer of public goods and services to the private realm of the market, where it is
believed that individual private choice will then structure the distribution of goods
and services. However, as with the transfer of public goods and services to the family,
there remains significant albeit shifting forms of state regulation in the context of
market privatization, through a range of both public and private law. See
PRIVATIZATION, supra note 1, at 19-22.
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the undermining of the traditional family.87 Social conservatives are
not adverse to a continuing role for the state in promoting the
family,88 whereas libertarians deplore state intervention in the
“private” sphere.89 Social conservatives strive to reinscribe a highly
gendered world, in which women and men are naturally different,
and therefore perform naturally different roles and responsibilities.90
Fiscal conservatives and libertarians, by contrast, reject the relevance
of gender, and seek to promote an abstracted individual, a
disembodied market citizen. Both fiscal conservatives and libertarians
can support a broader definition of family, with fiscal conservatives
doing so on the basis of broadening the web of private
responsibilities, while libertarians would do so on the basis of
respecting private choice and individual autonomy.
Social
conservatives, by contrast, would categorically oppose any departure
from the traditional family.91
These very different underlying political philosophies thus produce
three very different privatization projects. Fiscal conservatism’s
project is primarily an economic one of reducing the role of the state,
and transferring public responsibilities to the private sphere
(Privatization I). Libertarianism’s project is to reduce the role of the
state by promoting private choice (Privatization II).
Social
conservatism’s project is one of reinscribing traditional familial
ideology, and with it, a traditional, hierarchical family structure
(Privatization III).
These three versions of privatization align
differently, depending on the particular public policy issue and the
nature of the regulation. For example, expanding the scope and
content of family law in conjunction with the retraction of public
responsibility for financial need (Privatization I) is consistent with the
emphasis on private decision-making (Privatization II) to the extent
that both of these approaches would recognize the voluntary
assumption of private responsibility beyond the traditional family.
Both of these approaches to privatization would recognize the
voluntary assumption of mutual responsibility within same sex
87. See generally BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA, supra note 42 (discussing
how welfare undermines the family); MICHAEL TANNER, CATO INSTITUTE, THE END OF
WELFARE: FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE CIVIL SOCIETY (1996) (discussing how welfare
undermines individual enterprise).
88. See HERMAN, supra note 79.
89. See CHARLES A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980
(1984) (arguing for the abolition of welfare); see also MICHAEL TANNER, CATO
INSTITUTE, WELFARE REFORM: LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE 1, Policy Analysis No. 473 (Apr.
1, 2003).
90. See generally Klatch, supra note 78.
91. See generally BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA, supra note 42.
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relationships. But, expanding the scope and content of family law
beyond such voluntary arrangements would run counter to the latter’s
emphasis on private decision making in family law. According to
privatization as private choice, private rights and responsibilities can
only be imposed if individuals have expressly chosen to assume them.
As a result, this vision of privatization would oppose the imposition of
rights and responsibilities on unmarried cohabitants, in the absence
of a contract in which the individual cohabitants expressly assumed
them.
The relationship between privatization as transfer of once public
goods (Privatization I) and privatization as the rearticulation of the
traditional family (Privatization III) is similarly contradictory. The
transfer of public goods and services to the family might be consistent
with social conservative emphasis on renaturalizing the family,
transferring responsibility for the financial welfare of family members
from the state to the family. However, this social conservative vision
would insist that private rights and responsibilities only fall on
married, heterosexual couples, and not unmarried cohabitants or
same sex couples. Thus, privatization as restoring the traditional
family would oppose any effort by privatization as the transfer of once
public goods to the family to expand the scope and content of family
law to non-marital, non-heterosexual couples as a way of broadening
private responsibility and reducing government responsibility. These
three versions of privatization of the family, their convergences and
contradictions, animate much of the public policy debate over the
legal regulation of the family. Their conflations and conflicts help to
explain the successes and failures, political stalemates and
compromises, shifting alliances and strategies that characterize a
range of public policy initiatives on the legal regulation of the family.
II. PRIVATIZING PROJECTS IN FAMILY/SOCIAL WELFARE LAW
In this section, this article examines the ways in which the tensions
and conflicts between these three visions play out in concrete
instantiations of public law and policy. These contradictions in the
privatization project surface in the context of three areas: (1)
legislative reforms to strengthen child support obligations and
enforcement, and the recent shift in public policy to promoting
‘responsible fatherhood;’ (2) the federal restructuring of social
welfare entitlements, particularly in relation to single mothers; and
(3) same-sex couples and the politics of marriage. By examining each
of these different issues, the goal is to highlight the very particular
ways in which fiscal conservative, libertarian and social conservative
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approaches to privatization diverge, and explore the how these
divergent discourses materialize in law.
A. Privatizing Public Costs in Welfare Reform: Child Support and
Social Welfare
In the last three decades, welfare dependency has occupied center
stage as a shared demon of fiscal conservatives, libertarians and social
conservatives alike. As part of more general attack on dependency,
each tells a tale of the need to reverse the demise of personal
responsibility.92
The story of welfare reform features two
protagonists—the single welfare mom and the deadbeat dad—both
cast as irresponsible citizens, culpable for spiraling welfare costs,
chronic welfare dependency and a host of related social problems.
While welfare reform has, each step of the way, developed policies
directed at both welfare moms and deadbeat dads with the shared
goal of reducing welfare dependency, it is useful to separate these two
sets of policies. Child support laws have targeted deadbeat dads, while
a host of eligibility and entitlement rules for welfare assistance target
welfare moms.93 This welfare reform has been an area where
privatization as the transfer of once public responsibilities to the
private sphere of the family has been most explicit. Both child
support and welfare eligibility reform share a basic objective of
92. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 26 (“In the brave new market-governed world,
dependence—reliance for support on someone else—signifies failure and the receipt
of unearned benefits.”); Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of
‘Dependency’: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309, 324 (1994)
(illustrating the extent to which dependency has been pathologized in social policy
debates: “With all legal and political dependency now illegitimate, and with wives’
economic dependency now contested, there is no longer any self-evidently good adult
dependency in postindustrial society. Rather, all dependency is suspect, and
independence is enjoined upon everyone.”). Fraser and Gordon examine the way in
which the pathologization of dependency has played out in the context of welfare
reform, undermining the legitimacy of single mother’s claim to social support. Id.;
see also Sanford Schram & Joe Soss, Success Stories: Welfare Reform, Policy Discourse
and the Politics of Research, in LOST GROUND: WELFARE REFORM, POVERTY AND BEYOND
64 (Randy Albelda & Ann. Withorn eds., 2002) (discussing the centrality of the
discourse and dependency on constructing a welfare crisis).
“Gradually,
permissiveness and dependency displaced poverty and structural barriers to
advancement as the central problems drawing attention from those who designed
welfare policy.” Id. According to Schram and Soss, dependency became a
“synecdoche for diverse social ills,” for “underclass pathology,” and a “basis for a
powerful crisis narrative in the 1980s and 1990s.” Id. at 64-65.
93. Yet, the two sets of policies intricately intertwine, in so far as child support
enforcement has become part of the eligibility rules. Welfare reform has increasingly
required that women participate in establishing paternity and child support
enforcement in order to qualify for welfare assistance. See Personal Responsibility
and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 333, 110 Stat. 2105
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (requiring applications for
assistance to cooperate with paternity establishment). The distinction is, therefore,
somewhat artificial.
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privatizing the costs of raising families, by transferring responsibility
from the state to the family.94 But, as the following sections reveals,
both sets of policies are also characterized by a range of internal
tensions and contradictions, as different normative visions of the
family and the privatization project contend for dominance in public
policy debates.
1. Toughening Child Support Laws
Beginning in the 1970s, and continuing through the 1980s, an
apparent consensus emerged on the issue of child support: parents
should be responsible for supporting their children.95 Liberals and
conservatives alike agreed that it was time to get tough on those
parents who attempted to evade their obligations.96 While the
differences between liberal and conservatives have been recognized,97
rather less attention has been directed to the differences between and
amongst conservatives. Yet, the conservative side of this apparent
consensus has been characterized by two divergent normative visions
of the family: a fiscal conservative vision that dominated the first
rounds of reform and a social conservative vision that has begun to
dominate more recent public policy debates. The private choice
emphasis of a libertarian position has had rather less resonance within
child support debates; the idea that individuals should be able to
structure their intimate relationships as they see fit simply does not
extend to child support obligations. Rather, there appears to be a
widespread belief in public policy debates that “people who bring
94. See generally Brito, supra note 22; Morgan, supra note 22, at 708-09; Smith,
supra note 22, at 210-211.
95. See Chambers, supra note 22, at 2588 (describing the bipartisan support for
toughening child support obligations).
96. See id.
Nearly everyone on the right and left . . . accepts President Clinton’s starting
point: people who bring children into this world must not walk away from
them. The duty that parents have to support their children rests, in our
culture, on the widely shared belief in each person’s responsibility for his
voluntary actions and in deeply rooted notions of what it means to be a
parent.
Id.
97. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 68-69 (quoting Edelman and describing how child
support developed bipartisan support in the 1970s).
‘Liberals (liked it) because stricter child support enforcement would make
mothers financially better off; conservatives because financially better-off
mothers would be less dependent on welfare; both sides, but especially
conservatives because unlike every other social program, child support, on
balance brought more money into government coffers than it spent and
helped defray welfare costs as a result.’ Both sides also agreed on principle
that absent fathers should support their children.
Id.
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children into this world must not walk away from them.”98 Individuals
are free to choose to have children, but cannot then choose whether
or not to support them.99
This section explores these differences between fiscal and social
conservative approaches to child poverty, welfare dependency and the
responsibilities of fathers. It illustrates the extent to which fiscal
conservatism has been the dominant voice in debates around the
Child Support Act of 1974,100 the Family Support Act of 1988,101 and
the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992.102 These reforms were very
much about the privatization of public responsibility, transferring
responsibility for the support of children from taxpayer to parent.
However, by 1996 a social conservative discourse and its emphasis on
promoting the traditional family was becoming more evident in the
public policy debates and the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996103 represents more of a
hybrid of fiscal and social conservatism. More recently, in debates
about welfare reauthorization, social conservatism has emerged as a
dominant voice, promoting marriage and responsible fatherhood.
a. Child Support, Welfare Reform and Divergent Visions of
Fatherhood
The federal government’s efforts to reform and enforce child
support obligations have for decades been associated with welfare
reform.104 There is, of course, nothing new about the connection
between welfare and support. Many commentators have observed a

98. Chambers, supra note 22, at 2588. Interestingly, the idea is itself cast in the
language of private choice and the autonomous actions of individuals. Individuals
can ‘choose’ to have children; individuals are ‘responsible’ for their ‘voluntary
actions’.
99. An element of libertarianism is at times evident in the oppositional rhetoric of
the father’s rights movement, which has often opposed efforts to toughen child
support obligations. However, the lack of resonance about the choice to support
one’s children has made the father’s rights movement more effective when it casts its
rhetoric in more anti-feminist terms opposing the alleged biases in the child custody,
support and access regimes in favor of mothers. Indeed, the father’s rights
movement is most effective when it focuses on trying to limit the choices of mothers
who are cast as unfairly denying custody and access to their children.
100. The Child Support Act, Pub.L.No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1974) (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-60 (1975)).
101. The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L.No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
102. The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1992).
103. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(overhauling the nation’s welfare system).
104. See Brito, supra note 22, at 254 (stating that the “history of child support law
represent[s] a literal joining of family law and welfare law”).
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similar trend going back to the Elizabethan poor laws.105 Since the
1960s, Congress has expressed its concern with rising welfare
dependency of women and children, and the extent to which their
economic need was a result of fathers who did not support these
families.106 For conservatives, the apparent consensus that emerged
in favor of getting tough on child support was born of a shared
contempt for chronic welfare dependency.107 The desire to reform
welfare to reverse the demise of personal responsibility animated both
fiscal and social conservatives. Both agreed that children should not
be forced to rely on welfare for their support. To differing degrees,
both have targeted the “deadbeat dad” as culpable for their children’s
poverty and welfare dependency, and both seek to promote personal
responsibility by enforcing the private support obligations of fathers.
But their normative agendas for these “deadbeat dads” diverge, as
do the particular ways in which they connect welfare dependency,
child support and fatherhood.
Fiscal conservative discourse aims to get tough on deadbeat dads by
forcing them to take financial responsibility for their children
following divorce or non-marital births. It targets these irresponsible
parents as the source of the problem of child poverty and welfare
105. See Harris, supra note 22, at 630 (“The desire ‘to keep the bill down’ has
continued to govern the dual system of family law ever since the Elizabethan Poor
Law.”); see also Morgan, supra note 22, at 706-07 (tracing the history of private
support for families to Elizabethan Poor Law). See generally LINDA GORDON, PITIED
BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994)
(arguing that child support was a key factor in the growth of the American welfare
state); WALTER TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL
WELFARE IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1979) (discussing the connection between support and
welfare in the history of American welfare).
106. See Brito, supra note 22, at 252-53 (noting that congressional concern
focused on the welfare need resulting from “voluntary absence—rather than the
death—of the non-custodial parent”); Harris, supra note 22, at 633 (reporting that in
the late 1960s, Congress began to require state welfare agencies to enforce child
support enforcement and to undertake paternity testing as conditions for receiving
federal funding for welfare).
107. See Roger J. R. Levesque, Looking to Unwed Dads to Fill the Public Purse: A
Disturbing Wave in Welfare Reform, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J.FAM. L. 1, 4 (1993/94)
(suggesting that the aspects of welfare reform that encourage un-wed fathers to take
responsibility for their children, such as providing information on how these
obligations can be met and listing those who fail to pay, are generally agreed to be
necessary steps in getting fathers involved with their children’s financial needs);
Stephan Sugarman, Financial Support of Children and the End of Welfare as We
Know It, 81 VA. L. REV. 2523, 2524-526 (1995) (arguing that the conservative view of
child support is centered on the notion that moral obligations attach to the decision
to have and raise a child); Catherine Wimberly, Deadbeat Dads, Welfare Moms and
Uncle Sam: How the Child Support Recovery Act Punishes Single-Mother Families, 53
STAN. L. REV. 729, 736-38 (2000) (indicating that new provisions in the Child Support
Recovery act are designed to impose harsher sanctions on those who fail to abide by
their child support obligations, while also discouraging reliance on federal funds to
meet these needs ).
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dependency, and emphasizes strengthening child support laws in
order to get tough on the private responsibilities of these individual
parents. Child poverty has been recast as an individual pathology, as a
problem of fathers who refuse to take responsibility for their children.
These ‘deadbeat dads’ are not only abdicating their moral obligations
to provide for their children, but are also demonized as bad citizens
for their flagrant abuse of the American taxpayer, who must subsidize
the resulting welfare dependency. If individuals could be made to
fulfill their responsibilities to their children, the problems would be
eliminated. The focus, then, is on individualizing the problem and
shifting the responsibility for this individual problem from the public
to the private sphere.108 Individual fathers must be made to assume
their personal responsibility by financially supporting their children.
And personal responsibility is cast in largely economic terms.
While social conservatives agree with the idea of promoting
personal responsibility, they seek to do so by promoting the
traditional family. Social conservatives aim to prevent dads from
becoming dead-beat, by encouraging marriage and preventing
divorce, thereby reducing the number of single parent families in
need of child support.109 Marriage should be encouraged to curb the
increase in children born out of wedlock.110 Divorce, it is said, should
be made more difficult, so that families—traditional families—can
remain intact.111 Fathers must become more involved in the lives of
their children not after a divorce, but during the marriage.112 And
the nature of this involvement is as a traditional father, responsible
not only for the child’s financial welfare, but also for providing a
108. See Morgan, supra note 22, at 709-10 (discussing the process of shifting
responsibility from public to private spheres by establishing firmer child support
guidelines for those obligated to pay); see also Brito, supra note 22, at 253-56
(indicating that although state control of reproduction is beyond the realm of reason,
the state should play a limited role in encouraging families to stay together and
imposing financial liability).
109. See Sugarman, supra note 109, at 2527-30 (arguing that the prevention of the
dissolution of marriage is a major theme in conservative constructions of child
support policies).
110. See id. at 2528 (indicating that although the government should not have the
right to dictate who may have children, it should provide incentives to ensure that
having children in wedlock is more attractive than having children outside of
wedlock).
111. See POPENOE, supra note 45, at 222-23 (arguing that divorce should be more
difficult for marriages with minor children).
112. See generally THE FATHERHOOD MOVEMENT: A CALL TO ACTION (Wade Horn et
al. eds., 1999); POPENOE, supra note 45 (suggesting that penalties and incentives for
paternal involvement in a child’s well-being would not be as effective if they only take
effect once the family has dissolved); BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA, supra note
42 (advancing the argument that a sustained paternal relationship during marriage
would encourage the father to assume a more supportive role in their child’s life).
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good, stable male role model for his children. Child poverty and
welfare dependency, alongside crime and other high-risk behaviors,
are seen as caused by single parent families and the solution is
therefore to promote a traditional two parent, marital family.113 For
social conservatives, then, personal responsibility is cast in explicitly
moral terms—it is about rearticulating traditional gender roles as a
way of reversing the moral decline of the family.
Since the 1990s, social conservatives have articulated an increasing
compassion for the difficulties that low income fathers encounter, and
sought to promote “responsible fatherhood” through a range of
employment training programs that will allow fathers to assume their
‘proper’ position as breadwinner of the family.114 The new emphasis
on responsible fatherhood is, in part, a reaction to the assault on
fatherhood in child support public policy debates. For example,
George Gilder writes, “[p]erhaps the most quixotic and perverse is the
effort of the welfare state, after systematically destroying marriage, to
replace it with so-called deadbeat dad crusades.”115 The crackdown is
seen by some as too severe, and not sufficiently emphatic to the needs
of low-income fathers. Ronald Mincy and Hillard Pouncy write that

113. See POPENOE, supra note 45 (discussing the link between welfare dependency
and the moral deterioration associated with other high risk behavior); Blankenhorn,
supra note 43 (arguing that the traditional family unit acts as an insulator against the
increasing trend of welfare dependency); see also The Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder, No. 1371, June 5, 2000 (discussing the negative effects of divorce on
children, including poverty, crime, mental and physical health risks, and arguing that
the federal government should therefore be promoting marriage and reducing
divorce).
114. See George W. Bush, A Blueprint for New Beginnings, Feb. 28, 2001
(developing a Fatherhood Initiative, designed to “make committed, responsible
fatherhood a national priority”), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
usbudget/blueprint/bud12.html (last visited July 9, 2005). President Bush pledged
his support for the promotion of Responsible Fatherhood. Id. The Blueprint states
that “[w]hile fathers must fulfill their financial commitments, they must also fulfill
their emotional commitments. Dads play indispensable roles that cannot be
measured in dollars and cents: nurturer, mentor, disciplinarian, moral instructor, and
skills coach, among other roles.” Id. Indicating a shift in approach to fathers, the
Blueprint states “[g]overnment’s traditional answer to the absence of fathers from the
lives of their children has been to focus on child support enforcement.” Id. While
this enforcement continues to be important, “research shows that a large portion of
fathers who do not pay child support are themselves poor. Many have limited
education and are unemployed or underemployed.” Id.; see also Wade F. Horn, Did
You Say “Movement”?, in THE FATHERHOOD MOVEMENT 7-9 (Horn et al. eds., 1999)
(explaining the core idea of the fatherhood movement is based on three
assumptions: “(1) responsible and committed fatherhood ought to be the norm of
masculinity; (2) fathers are different from mothers in important ways; and (3) the
father-child bond is important to the healthy development of children”).
115. George Gilder, Sex, Families, Race, Poverty, Welfare: A Symposium ‘Revisiting
the’ Moynihen Report of its Thirtieth Anniversary, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
MAGAZINE, Jan/Feb. 1995, available at http://www.taemag.com/issues/articleID.
16708/article_detail.asp (last visited June 4, 2005).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005

31

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1

446

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 13:3

“[i]t is not enough, experience has proven, simply to crack down on
‘deadbeat dads’. Disadvantaged fathers also need help to pay their
judgments. And at its frontier, child support policy actually can help
strengthen fragile families.”116 They argue that “the only real solution
of the child support problem is rebuilding the family. Only then do a
mother and her children get secure support . . . and only then does a
father get the emotional support that he needs to work steadily.”117
Social conservatives want fathers to be responsible—to pay for their
children—but they see the solution to child poverty and welfare
dependency to lie in the rearticulation of the traditional family with
the father at its helm.
The federal public policy initiatives to toughen child support laws
in the 1980s and early 1990s, while often cast in the language of
personal responsibility, were intricately tied to welfare rhetoric and
informed by a fiscal conservative rhetoric of reducing government
spending and the burden on the American taxpayer.
Social
conservative discourse, to the extent that it appeared in the public
policy debates, sought to encourage traditional family values and
discourage out-of-wedlock births. But, this general rhetoric did not
translate into concrete public policy initiatives in the child support
arena. Rather, the Child Support Enforcement Amendments Act of
1984,118 the Family Support Act of 1988,119 and the Child Support
116. See Ronald Mincy & Hillard Pouncy, Paternalism, Child Support
Enforcement, and Fragile Families, in THE NEW PATERNALISM: SUPERVISORY
APPROACHES TO POVERTY 130 (Lawrence Mead ed., 1997) (explaining a position that
this assertion is consistent with the new paternalism of Lawrence Mead, and with a
socially conservative agenda that supports the family). However, Mincy’s work on
fragile families, black fathers and social policy is more complex and nuanced, defying
any simple categorization as conservative or liberal. Id. For example, while
supportive of responsible fatherhood, Mincy is highly critical of the Bush
administration’s promotion of marriage, on the ground that it may actually
undermine efforts to bring unmarried black fathers back into relationships with their
children. Id.; see also Ronald Mincy, What About Black Fathers?, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT ONLINE, Apr. 7, 2002 (illustrating that responsible fatherhood projects may
be supported by liberals and conservatives alike), available at http://www.prospect.
org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=6235 (last visited June 4,
2005). The differences in family formation that occur in different cultures and races
could have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the Bush administration’s child
care policies. Id. While social conservatives have relied on some of Mincy’s work, it is
by no means consistent with the ideology of social conservatism. It highlights again
the extent to which the labels deployed in this paper describe positions better than
people, and may at times, not even do justice to positions.
117. See Mincy & Pouncy, supra note 116, at 157 (advocating a child support
regime that focuses on fragile families—that is, that treats the non-resident parent
and the resident parent as a single unit of intervention, and focuses on the “inner
problems of the fragile family”). “Family life among the seriously poor has
deteriorated so badly that mending it must become a priority as great as finding
economic support for poor families.” Id. at 152.
118. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98
Stat. 1305 (1984).
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Recovery Act of 1992120 were overwhelmingly cast in the fiscal
conservative discourse of reducing welfare dependency and
government spending by ensuring that parents not taxpayers assumed
the financial responsibility of providing for their children.
Some commentators have suggested that a strong social
conservative normative vision informed these child support
initiatives.121 In my view, however, this argument obscures and
flattens important normative differences and shifting alliances
between competing visions of the family. While it is true that social
conservatives seek to promote this vision of the family, it is not at all
clear that it was an animating vision of the early child support
initiatives between 1974 and 1992. However, this vision has become
evident in more recent shifts in emphasis in child support initiatives.
Beginning with debates around the Fathers Count Act, which was
never passed by Congress, and as now incorporated in the bills before
Congress reauthorizing TANF, the social conservative vision of
promoting traditional families has emerged in concrete public policy
terms.122
b. Federal Child Support Initiatives
The initial federal efforts to strengthen child support enforcement
were overwhelmingly animated by the goal of reducing federal
spending of welfare.123 In 1974, the federal government enacted the
Child Support Act, creating Title IV-D of the Social Security Act,
creating a federal Office of Child Support Enforcement and requiring
states receiving AFDC funds to establish child support offices to assist

119. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
120. Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1992).
121. See Wimberly, supra note 107, at 757-58 (arguing that the Child Support
Recovery Act was passed with the intent to “reaffirm the favored status of the nuclear
family by attaching punitive consequences to divorce” and the failure of some couples
to marry at all); see also Harris, supra note 22, at 651-52 (discussing the purported
‘social benefits’ of fatherhood, which include a decrease in welfare dependency and
crime).
122. See Fathers Count Act of 1999, H.R. 3073, 106th Cong. (1999) (indicating
that the proposed legislation was designed to promote better relationship skills
among fathers, curb aggressive behavior, teaching good parenting skills, building
relationships between fathers and their children, and helping them avoid welfare
dependency); Temporary Aid to Needy Families, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (1997)
(incorporating aspects of the Fathers Count Act into law by encouraging counseling
and parental responsibility over welfare dependency).
123. See Harry Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility
and the Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1, 6 (1990) (stating that Congress’s primary goal
in strengthening the enforcement of child support obligations was to reduce the
federal funds allocated for the AFDC program).
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parents in establishing and enforcing child support obligations.124 IVD programs included locating absent parents, establishing paternity
and obtaining and enforcing child support orders. Custodial AFDC
parents were required to assign their right to collect child support
payments to the state, and child support collected on behalf of AFDC
families was used to reimburse governments for welfare benefits paid
to the family.125 The primary goal of the Child Support Act was to
reduce the federal government’s spending on AFDC: “the more child
support collected, the less the cost of AFDC to the federal
government.”126 This objective, and the beginnings of rhetorical
attack on deadbeat dads, was made abundantly clear in the words of
Senator Long, a leading sponsor of the legislation:
Should our welfare system be made to support the children whose
father cavalierly abandons them—or chooses not to marry the
mother in the first place? Is it fair to ask the American taxpayer—
who works hard to support his own family and to carry his own
burden—to carry the burden of the deserting father as well?
Perhaps we cannot stop the father from abandoning his children,
but we can certainly improve the system by obtaining child support
from him and thereby place the burden of caring for his children
on his own shoulders where it belongs. We can—and we must—
take the financial reward out of desertion.127

It was, in other words, all about the privatization of welfare costs. As
Laura Morgan has observed, “[c]learly, Congress was seeking to shift
the burden of support from the public to the private sphere, and
would so through massive enforcement mechanisms.”128
While the original program was limited to AFDC families, in 1984
Congress expanded the program to include all families eligible for
child support with the Child Support Enforcement Amendment.129
124. See The Child Support Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660, § 651 (1975) (allocating
funds on the basis of enforcing support obligations, locating non-custodial parents,
establishing paternity, obtaining support, and assuring that assistance in obtaining
support will be available).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 657 (stating that the first fifty dollars of child support
payments is directed to the families, but all additional child support collected is
channeled directly to government).
126. See Morgan, supra note 22, at 708 (analyzing the historical shift from the
1970’s that began to put the burden on private support rather than public assistance);
see also Krause, supra note 123, at 6 (examining the growing emphasis on private
support).
127. Harris, supra note 22, at 634 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 8291 (1972) (statement
of Sen. Long)).
128. Morgan, supra note 22, at 708.
129. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-378 (“striking
out ‘and obtaining child and spousal support,’ and inserting in lieu, thereof,
“obtaining child and spousal support, and assuring that assistance in obtaining
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Congress also broadened the scope of the law to include automatic
wage withholding for overdue child support payments, impositions of
liens against property of defaulting parents, and the interception of
federal and state tax refunds. The amendments further required
states to develop advisory guidelines that could be used by courts in
setting child support awards.
In 1988, Congress once again expanded the scope of its child
support programs. The Family Support Act of 1988130 required that
all states implement mandatory presumptive child support guidelines
by 1994. The legislation also created the U.S. Commission on
Interstate Child Support to consider how the child support system
could be further improved. The Act provided for more immediate
wage withholding, as well as a new focus on establishing paternity.
The child support provisions were explicitly tied to the reduction of
welfare dependency, and in turn of government spending.
Representative Roukema, in the House debates on the Conference
Report, stated that the child support provisions
[A]re fundamental to lifting family after family from the welfare
rolls. Those states which have already enacted wage withholding
have seen dramatic increases in collection. Take Virginia for
example, in 1986 only 107 mothers on welfare got enough support
payments to get off welfare. The first [eight] months of 1988, after
wage withholding was enacted, about 3,100 have received enough
support to get off welfare.131

Representative Gunderson specifically linked the child support
provisions to fiscal savings, by stating, “[t]his legislation significantly
improves the Child Support Enforcement Program under welfare so
that within [four] years, child support collections should produce an
increase of about [two-hundred] million [dollars] per year in Federal
revenues and even more—about [fifty] percent more—in State
revenues.”132 The Senate debates similarly cast the objective of the
child support provisions as the reduction of welfare dependency
through the promotion of parental responsibility. Senator Cochran,
for example, stated:
This bill emphasizes parental support as the first line of defense
against public dependency. Vigorous child support enforcement
does more than simply extract financial support from absent
parents. It makes a statement abut what our society believes the
support will be available under this part to all children (whether or not eligible for
aid under Part A) . . . for whom such assistance is requested”).
130. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
131. 134 Cong. Rec. H9098 (1988) (statement of Rep. Roukema).
132. Id. (statement of Rep. Gunderson).
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role of parents to be. Parents should provide for their children,
and public policy should obligate parents to provide that support . .
. . These and other provisions are part of a new strategy for
strengthening family cohesion and responsibility and for breaking
the cycle of welfare dependency.133

Senator Bradley similarly stated:
[T]he Federal Government clearly has a major role in helping
families escape poverty, but Federal help must supplement the
primary responsibilities of families to help themselves. Parents have
a responsibility to care for their children. Sadly, too often,
noncustodial parents do not fulfill their responsibility. We, as a
nation, have a moral obligation to provide assistance to poor
families and their children—but only after parents shoulder their
own responsibilities.134

Parental responsibility is understood in these debates in fiscal
terms—individual parents must be made to provide financial support
for their children. The idea animating the child support provisions of
the Family Support Act was that the cost of supporting children
should be privatized to the fullest extent possible. Individual
parents—not the state—should have the primary responsibility for
supporting children. And doing so would produce significant fiscal
savings for the state.
In 1992, Congress passed the Child Support Recovery Act135
intended to address problems associated with interstate child support
enforcement by imposing criminal sanctions on non-custodial parents
who willfully fail to pay child support obligations owed to a child
living in another state.136 Criminalizing the evasion of child support
represented a continuation of federal efforts to shift the cost of raising
children from the federal government to parents.137 Throughout the
133. 134 Cong. Rec. S13639 (1988) (statement of Sen. Cochran).
134. 134 Cong. Rec. 26597 (1988) (statement of Sen. Bradley); see also 134 Cong.
Rec. 26578 (statement of Sen. Moynihen) (“We start out with the proposition that we
cannot abandon children in this country with impunity. You have a responsibility to
them and if you do not exercise it on your own, society will see to it that you do.”).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1992).
136. See id. (providing that the penalty for a first offense is a fine and/or
imprisonment for not more than six months). Subsequent offenses carry a penalty of
a fine and/or imprisonment for not more than two years. Id. The Act allows a court
to make an order for restitution in an amount equal to the past due support
obligations. Id. In addition, the Act gave federal courts the authority to make
compliance with child support obligations a condition of probation in any federal
criminal matter, and authorized ten million dollars in each of fiscal years 1994, 1995
and 1996 for grants for states and local entities for development/enforcement of
criminal interstate child support legislation.
137. See Morgan, supra note 22, at 709-12 (explaining that PRWORA radically
changed the nature of welfare, in part, because the federal government would not
“provide a guaranteed safety net of cash subsistence benefits”).
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Congressional debates, the objective of privatizing the costs of welfare
was readily apparent. Deadbeat dads were vilified not only for failing
to support their children, but also, for their abuse of the American
taxpayer. Representative Schumer, Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Crime and Criminal Justice, and a leading sponsor of the bill,
described the failure to pay child support as “a double robbery”:
First more than a million children are robbed of a cumulative
[eighteen] billion [dollars] in needed financial support . . . .
Second the American taxpayer—people with good families,
together families, nothing to do with child support themselves, are
directly affected, because the taxpayer is robbed of billions of
dollars when the children’s mothers can’t make ends meet and are
forced to rely on welfare.138

In the House of Representative debates, Schumer similarly stated:
Every year more than [five] billion [dollars] in child support goes
unpaid, forcing many families onto public assistance, especially
AFDC and Medicaid. And it is unfair to ask the American
taxpayers, Mr. Speaker, these people, the taxpayers who work so
hard to support their own families, insure their own bills, to carry
the burden of a deadbeat parent as well. We must help the States to
collect the support these children desperately need by taking the
incentive out of moving interstate to avoid payment.139

Senate debates similarly emphasized the need to shift the burden of
supporting children from taxpayers to fathers. Senator Shelby, a
leading sponsor of the Bill in the Senate, stated that child support was
a federal issue because “the non-payment of child support costs the
Federal Government, the taxpayer.”140 Further, Senator Shelby
stated, “Considering the role of poverty among families due child
support, the issue is not simply one of child poverty, it is also an issue
of concern to the American taxpayer.”141 According to Senator
Shelby, government spending on child support enforcement would
be offset by government savings:
[A]ny expenses incurred in enforcement and incarceration may be
recouped through savings in social expenditures like AFDC
138. Opening Statement to the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice,
Committee on the Judiciary: Hearings on HR 1241 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. (January 15, 1992) (statement of Rep. Schumer).
139. 138 Cong. Rec. H7324 (1992) (statement of Rep. Schumer); 138 Cong. Rec.
31121 (1992) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (indicating that the passage of the
Act will mean that “the deadbeat dads will end up paying the support rather than the
taxpayers.”); see also 138 Cong. Rec. 21402 (statement of Rep. Fazio) (asserting that
“[p]arents must be responsible for the financial welfare of their children”).
140. Statement Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (July 29,
1992) (Statement of Sen. Shelby).
141. Id.
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benefits, food stamps, and other forms of public assistance. The
$2,500 average support level added to the average income of
families owed by not receiving support could offset numerous social
expenses incurred by the State and Federal Government.142

While the language of personal responsibility ran through the
debates, the particular understanding of personal responsibility
animating the debates was largely fiscal conservative in nature,
emphasizing the privatization of financial support for children.
In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).143 While the legislation
is best known for its radical restructuring of welfare, eliminating
AFDC entitlements and replacing it with a block grant program know
Temporary Aid to Needy Families,144 it also introduced significant
reforms to child support enforcement. In order to qualify for a block
grant, a state must operate a Title IV-D child support enforcement
program. Title III sets the new child support enforcement measures
that states must implement to maintain eligibility. These include an
expansion of paternity establishment, enhanced access to information
and mass data collection, and increased enforcement remedies.
The paternity provisions attempt to bring a larger number of
potential parents within the scope of private child support obligations,
while enhanced access to information, data systems and remedies
provide public mechanisms to enforce these private obligations. The
debates on the child support provisions continued the theme of
cracking down on “deadbeat dads,” enforcing personal responsibility
and saving money. Senator DeWine stated, for example, that the bill
would strengthen the ability of states
[T]o go after the delinquent and deadbeat parents. It is absolutely
essential that we strengthen the ethic of personal responsibility in
this way. We need to make it absolutely clear—America demands
that parents be responsible for their children. Deadbeat parents
cannot be allowed to walk away from their responsibilities.145

This crackdown of deadbeat parents was at times in the debate
expressly tied to the fiscal conservative objective of reducing the

142. Id.
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1996) (demonstrating congressional intent to create
the Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act under the broader Social Security Act).
144. See Block Grants to States for Temporary Aid to Needy Families, 42 U.S.C. §§
601-19 (1997) (indicating that the substitution a block grant program for the old
AFDC entitlements was intended to increase the States’ flexibility in servicing the
needs of qualifying families).
145. 142 Cong. Rec. S9352 (1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss3/1

38

Crossman: Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of D

2005]

CONTESTING CONSERVATISMS

453

burden on the taxpayer.146 Representative Roukema, in the House
Debates on the Conference Report, noting that many mothers go on
welfare because they are not receiving support payments to which
they are legally entitled, stated, “[w]ith the current system spending
such a large portion of funding on these mothers, children are the
first victims, and the taxpayers who have to support these families are
the last victims.”147
The major objective of the child support provisions, as reflected in
the debates, was to get single mothers and their children off welfare
by enforcing outstanding child support obligations. Both critics and
proponents alike have thus observed that the major animus for the
reforms to child support was to reduce welfare costs.148 As Laura
Morgan describes, “it was the intent of Congress, by enacting
PRWORA to eliminate, so far as it could, the public support of the
family.”149 In the context of the paternity provisions in particular,
Tonya Brito has similarly observed,
The motivating factor here is simply the state’s fiscal concerns.
Whereas in the past it was a private matter, now the state is much
more involved in ensuring that paternity of nonmarital children is
established. States want to establish paternity to identify a child
support obligator so that they can collect support payments to offset
the costs of welfare.150

While this fiscal conservative objective of privatizing the costs of
raising families was undoubtedly a dominant animating factor in the
paternity provisions, and the child support provisions more generally,
a social conservative rhetoric was also evident in the PRWORA debates
and legislation. The stated purposes of the Act included reducing
illegitimacy and promoting marriage and a traditional two-parent
family; a classic social conservative vision of family. Similarly, the
findings portion of the Act focused considerable attention on high
rates of illegitimacy and its association with welfare dependency. The
congressional debates frequently focused on the objective of reducing
illegitimacy.
Senator Lieberman, for example, stated, “[t]he
146. See Laura Curran & Laura Abrams, Making Men into Dads: Fatherhood, the
State and Welfare Reform, 14 GENDER AND SOC’Y 622, 667 (2000) (analyzing the
paternity provisions in PRWORA and explaining the adverse affects of the law on lowincome fathers).
147. 142 Cong. Rec. H9392 (1996) (statement of Rep. Roukema).
148. See Morgan, supra note 22, at 712 (stating that it was Congress’ intent to
eliminate public support for families through the enactment of PRWORA); see also
Brito, supra note 22, at 259 (asserting that the motivating factor behind these welfare
reforms is the state’s fiscal concerns).
149. Morgan, supra note 22, at 712.
150. Brito, supra note 22, at 259.
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conference bill also holds the hope of protecting children and
reducing welfare spending by attacking the problem of unmarried
teen parenthood. Welfare will no longer encourage the proliferation
of single and uneducated parents by automatically and
unconditionally underwriting the mothers who bear children out of
wedlock.”151
While this concern with high rates of illegitimacy can be seen to
inform the provisions on establishing paternity, it is not clear that the
social conservatives’ objectives were very effectively translated into
concrete public policy. The paternity provisions do not expressly
promote marriage. Rather, they are intended to make women
“appropriately” dependent on the biological fathers of their children,
whether married or not, rather than the state.152 Like child support
following marital breakdown, the paternity provisions are a second
best solution for social conservatives, who as David Blankenhorn
explained above, are at times divided over recognizing the reality of
contemporary family formations and promoting a particular vision of
the family. The paternity provisions recognize the reality of the high
rates of illegitimacy and attempt to privatize the costs of this
illegitimacy. While forcing women to rely on the biological father is
better than relying on the state, it falls considerably short of actually
promoting marital families, thereby creating a tension for a social
conservative vision of the family.153 This tension characterizes the
hybrid nature of the PRWORA, which seeks to promote both a fiscal
conservative privatization of the once public costs of supporting
families and a social conservative vision of the traditional family by
reducing the number of births outside of marriage and promoting
marriage. Both agreed on the objective of promoting personal
responsibility, but their respective visions of that personal
responsibility were markedly divergent. For fiscal conservatives,
personal responsibility was cast in primarily financial terms, while for
social conservatives, it was also cast in moral terms. Yet, these very
different visions of fatherhood and family were submerged by the
151. 142 Cong.Rec. S9387-01 (1996) (statement of Sen. Lieberman).
152. See Ronald B. Mincy & Hillard Pouncy, There Must Be 50 Ways to Start a
Family, in THE FATHERHOOD MOVEMENT 97-98 (Horn et al. eds., 1999) (explaining
that one provision of PRWORA requires states to reduce a mother’s benefits if she
does not identify the father of her child as a means of establishing paternity and
thereby potentially collecting child support).
153. See 142 Cong. Rec. H9392 (1996) (statement of Rep. Meyers) (criticizing
PRWORA for failing to go far enough to reverse the rate of illegitimacy and promote
the two parent traditional family). “The link between our ever-increasing illegitimacy
rates and the growth in AFDC rolls are not casual. They are cause and effect. Why is
it too much to ask that children have two responsible adults or parents? Sadly we
continue to encourage the opposite.” Id.
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shared discourse of personal responsibility.
A stronger social conservative approach to child support,
fatherhood and family became evident in the debates surrounding
the introduction of the Fathers Count Act in 1999.154 The Fathers
Count Act, passed by the House, but not the Senate, would have
provided one-hundred and fifty-five million dollars in grants for
programs that promote marriage and ‘responsible fatherhood’. The
objective of the Act was, like the previous child support initiatives, to
reduce welfare dependency by privatizing the costs of supporting
families. However, the Act took a very different approach to realizing
this objective. Retreating from the demonizing rhetoric of deadbeat
dads, the Act sought to encourage fathers to become responsible for
their children. Funding would be available for programs to teach
parenting skills as well as enhance employability through job training
to allow fathers to fulfill their child support obligations.
The Fathers Count Act represents a significant normative shift in
the approach to child support, fatherhood and family. The approach
is one that seeks to assist fathers meet their responsibilities rather than
simply penalize them for failing to do so. Through the 1990s, the
responsible fatherhood movement successfully promoted its vision of
fatherhood, family and welfare dependency, resulting in an easing of
the demonization of fathers in federal public policy debates.155 The
new approach emphasized the importance of fathers in their
children’s lives, and the problem of welfare dependency was recast as
a social epidemic of illegitimacy and single-parent families. Women
and children on welfare did not just need money or jobs; they needed
fathers. The responsible fatherhood movement sought to restore
fathers to their rightful place at the helm of the family, and thereby
remedy the broad range of social problems that resulted from
154. H.R. 3073, 106th Cong. (1999).
155. See Mincy & Pouncy, supra note 152, at 96-101 (arguing that the success of
the responsible fatherhood movement was attributable, in part, to its strong roots in
the social conservative movement). This social conservative position has been
buttressed by the many studies and commentaries that have pointed out the limits of
federal child support enforcement as a solution to child poverty and welfare
dependency. The fiscal conservative approach of penalizing fathers has been
extensively criticized as failing to recognize the limits of these fathers. Many are
themselves poor, and do not have the financial resources to pay child support. The
limited amount that they can pay does not go very far in reimbursing the public
purse, particularly when the costs of the child support enforcement regime is taken
into account. Social conservatives have been able to align with these critics, as well as
fathers’ rights advocates who seek to minimize what they perceive to be the excessive
demands being made on fathers. The resulting vision of fatherhood is one that is
more sympathetic to the plight of unemployed and low-income fathers who do not
have the skills, financial or otherwise, to fulfill their responsibilities—sympathy that in
turn extends to the challenges facing all fathers.
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fatherless families. The discourse is one of promoting responsibility
and it is a decidedly gendered responsibility. Fathers are responsible
for financial support, and federal funding is to be made available to
assist fathers assume their rightful place as the breadwinners of the
family. In conjunction with the provisions promoting marriage, the
Fathers Count Act represented an attempt to rearticulate the
traditional family, with the father at its helm.156 Moreover, while
there remains a fiscal conservative concern with privatizing the costs
of supporting families, the Act would have involved significant
government spending and an expansion of government programs.
The Fathers Count Act represented a social conservative approach to
family that does not recoil from fairly extensive regulation in order to
promote a particular substantive vision of family.
While the Fathers Count Act was not passed into law, much of its
substance has been incorporated into the Personal Responsibility,
Work and Family Promotion Act of 2003.157 The bill would authorize
federal spending on state and local programs designed to promote
responsible fatherhood. The purposes of the program, as outlined in
the congressional findings, include promoting responsible
parenting,158 enhancing the financial ability of fathers to provide for
their children,159 improving fathers abilities to manage family
business affairs160 and encouraging healthy marriages and married
156. See Wimberly, supra note 107, at 747-48 (stating that services under this Act
promoted marriage “as an end in itself and the best way to keep women and children
off welfare”).
157. See Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2003, H.R. 4,
108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003) (re-authorizing of the TANF bill, which was passed by
the House on February 13, 2003 by a vote of 230 to 192, and is currently before the
Senate).
158. See H.R. 4 § 441 (stating that one of the purposes of the bill is “[p]romoting
responsible, caring and effective parenting through counseling, mentoring and
parenting education, dissemination of educational materials and information on
parenting skills, encouragement of positive father involvement, including the positive
involvement on non-residential fathers”).
159. See id. The purpose of the bill is to:
[E]nhanc[e] the abilities and commitment of unemployed or low-income
fathers to provide material support for their families and to avoid or leave
welfare programs by assisting them to take full advantage of education, job
training, and job search programs, to improve work habits and work skills, to
secure career advancement by activities such as outreach and information
dissemination, coordination, as appropriate with employment services and
job training programs . . . encouragement and support of timely payment of
current child support and regular payment toward past due child support
obligations in appropriate cases.
Id.
160. See id. (stating that a third purpose for the bill is to “[i]mprov[e] fathers’
ability to effectively manage family business affairs by means such as education,
counseling, and mentoring in matters including household management, budgeting,
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fatherhood.161 The responsible fatherhood provisions of the TANF
reauthorization bill represent a fiscal and social conservative hybrid,
promoting both the ability of low-income fathers to pay child support
and promoting a two parent family thereby avoiding the need for
child support in the first place, both of which are seen to reduce
welfare costs to the state. But, unlike previous federal child support
initiatives, the emphasis is clearly on the latter. Most of the provisions,
and the programs they would authorize, emphasize helping fathers
become responsible parents, which within the framework of the bill
means married, employed and financially supporting their family.
The shift in the discourse around child support initiatives should
thus be apparent. While the early reforms focused almost exclusively
on reducing welfare dependency by getting tough on deadbeat
fathers, the more recent debates have increasingly taken on the
promotion of traditional families by preventing the situations that give
rise to the need for child support—children born outside of marriage
and divorce. The fiscal conservative emphasis on reducing costs by
paying support, while still allowing individuals the choice to exit
relationships, has given way to an approach that seeks to reduce costs
by promoting the traditional two-parent family. The federal child
support initiatives illustrate the extent to which fiscal and social
conservatives agree on the overarching problem of welfare
dependency and the need to promote personal responsibility, but
diverge in their strategies and solutions. Fiscal conservatives seek
simply to privatize the costs. Social conservatives, by contrast, seek to
privatize the costs but only within the confines of the traditional
family. The two-parent, marital family with a breadwinner father is
cast as the appropriate solution to welfare dependency. Similarly,
while fiscal conservatives have few qualms about getting tough on
fathers—or anyone else defaulting on a private support obligation—
social conservatives, by contrast, have a very different vision of
fatherhood. They seek to empower fathers to assume their rightful

banking, and handling of financial transactions, time management and home
maintenance.”).
161. See id. A fourth purpose for the bill is to:
[E]ncourag[e] and support[] healthy marriages and married fatherhood
through such activities as premarital education, including the use of
premarital inventories, marriage preparation programs, skills-based marriage
education programs, marital therapy, couples counseling, divorce education
and reduction programs, divorce mediation and counseling, relationship
skills advancement programs, including those designed to reduce child abuse
and domestic violence, and dissemination of information about benefits of
marriage for both parents and children.
Id.
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position as the head of the family—a position that includes financial
support, but not exclusively so. Rather, fatherhood also includes
other dimensions of parenting—fatherly involvement in the lives of
their children, fatherly leadership of the family as a whole. For social
conservatives, financial support is but one of the many social benefits
of two-parent, marital families.
The policies may not appear to be entirely inconsistent. Fiscal
conservatism is not opposed to a two-parent, opposite-sex family; it is
simply agnostic. It seeks to reduce welfare dependency by increasing
the responsibility of fathers to support their children—either inside
or outside of marriage. The social conservative vision of responsible
fatherhood could be embraced by fiscal conservatism as one amongst
a number of viable strategies for achieving the objective of reduced
government spending. Indeed, the responsible fatherhood programs
are not replacing the child-support enforcement programs that have
been put in place at the state and federal levels, but are envisioned as
a supplement to these programs.
There are, however, some levels on which the visions of fiscal and
social conservatives are contradictory. The fiscal conservative vision of
the family is a highly individualized and degendered one. It largely
rejects the significance of gender, and seeks to promote an abstract
individual, a disembodied market citizen, who should be made to be
responsible for their individual children. While a claim is being made
on the family, it is a claim that is not invested in either gender or
marital status. Social conservatives, by contrast, are committed to
reinscribing a highly gendered world, in which women and men are
constituted as naturally different and therefore naturally assigned to
different roles and responsibilities.162 Social conservatives are making
a claim on—and seeking to reinscribe—a very particular, very
traditional conception of the family. The visions of family are thus
quite different, and arguably, inconsistent: individual versus collective,
hierarchical versus formally equal, gendered versus non-gendered.
While the child support strategies may have been pursued in a
conservative alliance, with different emphasizes at different moments,
the alliance is, at best, a precarious one, given their fundamentally
different visions of family.
2. Welfare Eligibility and Entitlements
The efforts to reform welfare eligibility and entitlements have
focused on the other irresponsible citizen in fiscal, libertarian and

162. See generally Klatch, supra note 78.
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social conservative stories of welfare: the single mother. This welfare
mother is cast as responsible for both a chronic drain on public
resources and the American taxpayer, and a national epidemic of
illegitimacy and all of its associated social evils. Fiscal conservatives,
libertarians and social conservatives have sought to demonize the
‘welfare mother’ to justify their assault on the welfare system. But, as
this section will explore, their prescriptions for the welfare mother are
somewhat different. Social conservatives want to eliminate the
phenomenon of illegitimacy and single motherhood, by reducing the
number of children born outside of marriage, and by making welfare
mothers ‘properly’ dependent on the father of their children.
Mothers are expected to find a father, marry him and make him
responsible for the financial wellbeing of his family. By contrast, both
fiscal and libertarian conservatives want to put the welfare mother to
work, redefining “single mother” as a potentially employable worker.
However, they have slightly different strategies for doing so. The
fiscal conservative will consider restoring the market through a range
of public and private regulation. The libertarian, by contrast, places
greater emphasis on the market and its mode of private regulation by
simply abolishing welfare. Social, fiscal and libertarian conservatives
each seek an end to the welfare mothers’ reliance on the state, but
their vision of her fate is radically different. This section will explore
these subtle differences between fiscal conservative, libertarian and
social conservative approaches to welfare mothers. It argues that
while fiscal conservatism dominated welfare reform in the 1970s and
1980s, social conservatism made considerable inroads in welfare
reform in the 1990s, and has become increasingly influential in the
current debates over TANF reauthorization currently before
Congress. Libertarian conservatism, although present in the public
policy debates, seems to have had rather less concrete impact in the
development of public policy.
The story of welfare reform is further complicated by the
underlying racialization of the public policy debates. As many have
argued, welfare reform in America has long been a racialized
subject.163 Many have sought to demonstrate the extent to which
163. See, e.g., Theda Skocpal, African Americans in U.S. Social Policy, in
CLASSIFYING BY RACE (Paul E. Pierson ed., 1995) (exploring the extent to which race
has played a crucial role in welfare reform in the Progressive Era, the New Deal, and
the War on Poverty). See generally MICHAEL BROWN, RACE, MONEY AND THE AMERICAN
WELFARE STATE (1999); KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM:
PLAYING THE RACE CARE AGAINST AMERICA’S POOR (2001); ROBERT LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING
THE COLOUR LINE: RACE AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (1998); FRANCIS FOX PIVEN
& RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE
(1993); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR
ON POVERTY (1994).
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welfare reform since the 1960s, the period under analysis in this
paper, has been informed and animated by racialized assumptions,
images and inequalities.164 Yet, as Soss has observed, this period of
welfare reform has been “marked by a racial discourse that is
truncated and skewed.”165 The Author further explained that “we
inhabit a discursive moment defined by a mixture of corrosive racial
sentiments, fears of being labeled ‘racist’, and uncertainties about
whether it is wise to speak of race at all. Too often, race now operates
by stealth, embedded in ostensibly neutral language.”166 Race all but
disappears in contemporary public policy debates over welfare
reform. The discourse of fiscal conservatives, libertarians and social
conservatives is, to a large extent facially neutral; it does not speak of
race in general nor of African Americans in particular. As such, a
discursive analysis of these public policy debates runs the risk of
collaborating in the erasure of race, and further obscuring the extent
to which contemporary welfare reform is very much about race in
America. The difficulty lies in attempting to decipher the underlying
differences between and among conservative discourses on the
question of race and the racialized subject of welfare reform, when
the discourses themselves no longer explicitly speak in the language
of race.
a. The Welfare Crisis and its Solutions
Since the 1970s, fiscal, libertarian and social conservatives have
waged a war on chronic ‘welfare dependency’, casting it as a chronic
problem in need of a radically new solution.167 In the 1960s, the size
164. See Michael K. Brown, Ghettos, Fiscal Federalism, and Welfare Reform, in
RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 58-61 (Sanford F. Schram et al. eds.,
2003) (explaining that, historically, racial policies surrounding public assistance have
shaped modern welfare reform). See generally BROWN, supra note 163; MARTIN
GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY
POLICY (1999); LIEBERMAN, supra note 163; QUADAGNO, supra note 163.
165. Introduction to RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 12 (Sanford F.
Schram et al. eds., 2003).
166. See id. (noting that “[m]any conversations take on a ‘we know what we’re
talking about feel, trading on race-coded euphemisms regarding ‘urban’ and ‘innercity’ problems, ‘cultural backgrounds,’ the need for ‘personal responsibility,’ the
troubles of the ‘underclass’”); see also Lisa Crooms, Don’t Believe the Hype: Black
Women, Patriarchy, and the New Welfarism, 38 HOW. L.J. 611, 613 (1995) (quoting
Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking “Welfare Dependency” from a Different Ground,
81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1966 (1993)) (“The racial sub-text of the rhetoric simply makes use
of the explicit rhetoric unnecessary. If ‘welfare is a fourth generation code word for
[black],’ then there is no need to differentiate between welfare recipients and
blacks.”).
167. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (striking down AFDC
residency requirements), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); see also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968) (striking down a state
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and cost of AFDC soared. The program grew from 3.5 recipients in
1961 to 11 million in 1971.168 Moreover, the composition of welfare
recipients changed significantly, as previously excluded single
mothers, particularly, African American and never-married women,
became entitled to AFDC.169 Congress attempted to tighten eligibility
and reduce benefits, but the costs and numbers continued to rise.170
“Welfare was now in ‘crisis.’”171
A consensus emerged between fiscal conservatives, libertarians and
social conservatives that it was time to break the cycle of welfare
dependency, and get welfare mothers off welfare. All three shared a
concern about moral hazard, that is, the idea that the availability of
AFDC to poor single mothers reduced their incentives to avoid the
costs of single motherhood and thereby created more dependents.172
Indeed, it was the attack on welfare as undermining personal
responsibility that helped to unite these divergent conservative
factions.173 But, a closer look at the discourses of family and
privatization reveal that fiscal, libertarian and social conservatives
often diverge in their prescriptions for the ills of welfare dependency.
Charles Murray, in his highly influential book Losing Ground,
substitute father provision that denied AFDC benefits to families on the grounds that
the mother had a sexual relationship with a man).
168. See GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE’S END 51-52 (1998) (explaining that the
continued growth of the welfare base will eventually make the program too costly to
support).
169. See Joel F. Handler, Transformation of the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 457, 488 (1987/88) [hereinafter Handler, Transformation] (explaining the
racial discrimination in obtaining AFDC benefits prior to the 1960s, and stating that
in many parts of the country AFDC rolls would close down when crops had to be
harvested, thus forcing entire families, including children, into the fields); see also
Tonya Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of
Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 415, 424 (1999) (stating that
“court decisions, civil rights lawyers, and welfare rights activists” in the 1960s led to
the end of arbitrary eligibility restrictions).
170. See Joel F. Handler, “Ending Welfare as We Know it”: The Win/Win Split or
the Stench of Victory, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 131, 136 (2001) [hereinafter Handler,
Ending Welfare] (arguing that congressional efforts to reform welfare have addressed
the underlying social issues contributing to its continued growth).
171. Id.
172. See McCluskey, supra note 1, at 807-808 (defining “moral hazard” in
economic terms and stating that those who are “insured” have no incentive to reduce
costs). In the welfare context, providing economic support to people in need
encourages fewer individuals to take action to avoid poverty. Id.
173. See Lucy Williams, The Right’s Attack on Aid to Families with Dependent
Children, 10 PUBLIC EYE 1, *7-8, 12-14 (1996) (tracing the emergence of this
coalition, noting its underlying ideological tensions and conflicts and stating that
“[t]he majority of New Right groups coalesced around this ideological formulation
that welfare causes the breakup of the American family, and decreases individual
initiative and personal responsibility”).
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argued that the welfare state actually created an underclass of chronic
welfare dependency. The availability of welfare created perverse short
term economic incentives. Young women no longer have to bear the
real economic costs of bearing children out of wedlock. Rather, they
might actually be financially better off having the children and going
on welfare than not having children and remaining in low paying
employment. Murray’s analysis was economic in nature, and his
proscription libertarian. The problem of welfare dependency could
only be solved by abolishing welfare altogether.
Fiscal conservatives shared the libertarian concern with reversing
escalating costs of social welfare, and reconstituting welfare
dependants into self sufficient individuals. The solution is an
economic one of reversing moral hazard through marketized
incentives. However, fiscal conservatives stopped short of proscribing
the complete elimination of welfare. For fiscal conservatives, welfare
recipients must be transformed into workers, and in particular, single
mothers dependent on welfare must be transformed into employable
individuals, self reliant within the paid labor force.174 The strategy is
an individualizing and degendering one—emphasis is placed on
individual self-reliance. Single mothers are thus being redefined as
employable individuals, and their dependency on welfare is no longer
a ‘natural’ feature of their status as mothers, but rather, a pathological
dependency that needs to be fixed.175 Their familial roles are being
rendered all but invisible, as single mothers are being reconstituted as
abstract, disembodied market citizens. Welfare dependency more
generally is recast as a temporary problem that can be fixed through a
restructured welfare system that provides appropriate work incentives,
training and employment opportunities.176 Thus, unlike libertarian

174. See DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 128155 (1988) (explaining that the expectation that single mothers on welfare can work
part-time jobs is problematic). Ellwood states that “mixing work and welfare is not
the answer” because of expenses such as child care. Id. at 155; see also IRWIN
GARFINKEL & SARAH MCLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN: A NEW
AMERICAN DILEMMA 174-175 (1986) (stating that although work requirements will
reduce the amount of government support provided, some of the reduction will
come not from the success of the program, but from single mothers who do not want
the “hassles that accompany fulfilling the work requirement”).
175. See Fraser & Gordon, supra note 92 (discussing the transformation of the
meaning of dependency from legitimate social condition to pathological personality
disorder).
176. See id.; Patricia M. Evans, Gender, Income Security, and the Welfare State, in
WOMEN AND THE CANADIAN WELFARE STATE (Patricia M. Evans and Gerda Wekerle eds.,
1997); Patricia Evans, Single Mothers and Ontario’s Welfare Policy: Restructuring the
Debate, in WOMEN AND PUBLIC POLICY (Janine Brodie ed., 1995); Martha Minow, The
Welfare of Single Mothers and their Children, 26 CONN. L. REV. 817 (1994); Fineman,
supra note 20.
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solutions, a fiscal conservative approach to welfare reform does not
eschew continued government regulation.
Social conservatives have a different emphasis and analysis of the
problems of welfare dependency. For social conservatives, single
mothers on welfare are responsible for spiraling rates of illegitimacy,
which is in turn cast as America’s single most devastating social
problem. The central goal of welfare reform is accordingly the
reduction of illegitimacy by preventing non-marital (particularly teenage) births and promoting marriage. Rather than transforming single
mothers into employable individuals, social conservatives seek to
prevent single motherhood in the first place.177 Women should be
encouraged not to have children outside of marriage. If the emphasis
on abstinence fails, then women should be encouraged to marry the
fathers of their children. Any and all incentives to the contrary must
be removed. Social conservative discourse, in accordance with its
emphasis on rearticulating the traditional family and traditional
gender norms therein, thus seeks to strengthen marriage and the twoparent family. The solution to moral hazard thus lies not in economic
incentives, but in moral regulation.178 In marked contrast to fiscal
conservatives, the social conservative strategy is a familializing and
gendering one. Whereas fiscal conservatives see the market as the
ultimate solution for single women’s poverty and chronic welfare
dependency, social conservatives see the solution in marriage and the
traditional family.
Once again, social conservative approach to welfare reform does
not shy away from government intervention in the intimate lives of its

177. See STUART BUTLER & ANNA KUNDRATAS, OUT OF THE POVERTY TRAP: A
CONSERVATIVE STRATEGY 146 (1987) (arguing that although promoting work and
responsibility is important, “work requirements within the welfare system do not
improve work incentives or opportunities for absent fathers; their effect is to
transform mothers into primary earners . . . . Thus, long-term welfare reform has to
focus on strengthening the two-parent family”); see also BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS
AMERICA, supra note 42 (explaining the differences between those conservatives who
seek to address the consequences of the breakdown of the family and those who seek
to reverse the trend by restoring the traditional family). Social conservatives do not
oppose the workfare approach. Rather, they agree with the underlying emphasis on
personal responsibility, and have supported welfare reforms that have encouraged
and/or mandated work. BUTLER & KUNDRATES, supra at 177. However, work appears
to be a secondary to their emphasis on the traditional family as the solution to welfare
dependency and poverty. Id. For social conservatives, transforming single women
into workers is an inadequate solution, in so far as it addresses the problem after the
fact. Id. Although it would reduce state expenditures on welfare, it would fail to
reverse the problem of illegitimacy and all its attendant social costs. Id.
178. See McCluskey, supra note 1, at 823-25 (describing the moral regulation
rationale as ‘communitarian’, which includes both progressive and conservative
critics, and the social conservative approach as corresponding to McCluskey’s
conservative communitarians).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005

49

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1

464

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 13:3

citizens. For example, Mead’s ‘new paternalism’ in social welfare
policy argues that the poor require not only financial assistance, but
also direction and close supervision.179 Individuals cannot be
assumed to maximize their own self-interest or that of society; they
must be made to do so through government intervention. Rather
than a change in the scale of government, this paternalism represents
a change in “the character of government,” whereby benefits are
linked to behavior.180
There are many ways in which these conservative politics appear to
coalesce. Fiscal conservatives, libertarians and social conservatives
sought to change the behavior of welfare recipients, and specifically,
of poor single women. Each sought to reverse the problem of moral
hazard created by AFDC. These women needed to be encouraged to
avoid the behavior that resulted in their welfare dependency, namely,
single motherhood. Each relied on the same underlying, racialized
image of this single mother—the poor unmarried black woman—yet
rarely spoke her name explicitly.181 Each sought to promote personal
responsibility.182 But, their understanding of personal responsibility
diverged.
For fiscal and libertarian conservatives, personal
responsibility was primarily economic in nature—these women should
work.183 For social conservatives, personal responsibility is primarily
179. See Mead, supra note 48, at 2.
180. Id. (emphasizing on a paternalist approach to promote work over the
traditional family values that are supported by social conservatives). Workfare is an
important part of Mead’s vision for reforming welfare. Id. This is yet another
example of individual positions not mapping perfectly onto the three conservative
positions, and of the “labels fitting arguments better than people.” Id.
181. See Crooms, supra note 166, at 622.
The image of the welfare queen was that of a poor black mother who first
became pregnant as a teenager. Her sexual irresponsibility resulted in her
dropping out of high school and joining AFDC rolls. Rather than marry the
child’s father and make the best of the situation, she chose to remain single,
to collect AFDC and to have more children by different fathers.
Id. This powerful image remains largely unspoken in welfare debates. Id.
182. Similarly, fiscal conservatism is not so much opposed to shifting dependency
from the state to the family as it is agnostic. The ultimate fiscal conservative goal is to
reduce welfare dependency. Although it pursues this goal with its normative vision of
the market as the primary mechanism for allocating wealth, it can accommodate
other strategies provided that these strategies help reduce welfare dependency. In
the context of child support, fiscal conservatism supported the individualization and
familiarization of support obligations in order to reduce welfare dependency. At this
level, however, fiscal and social conservative approaches to welfare reform may be
viewed as mutually reinforcing. However, at a deeper level, these distinct privatizing
strategies have contradictory implications.
183. While fiscal conservatives sought to achieve this reconstitution of single
mothers through government regulation and spending (for example, job training),
libertarians sought to accomplish this goal simply by eliminating welfare, and allowing
the market to restructure women’s choices.
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moral—these women should avoid pre-marital sex or marry the
fathers of their children. These differences in turn reflect a much
deeper ideological divide. Both fiscal conservative and libertarian
approaches to reforming welfare are eroding the significance of
gender and family, while social conservative approaches are
intensifying gender and family.
These distinctive approaches to welfare reform are evident in
federal welfare reform. On one hand, the federal government has
sought to redefine single mothers as employable through increasingly
strict workfare requirements. On the other hand, the federal
government has increasingly also sought to reduce the rates of single
motherhood by reducing out-of-wedlock births and promoting
marriage. Both policies share the objective of reducing welfare
dependency. But, beyond this shared objective, the political imaginary
and concrete strategies of these policies diverge.
b. Federal Initiatives
A dominant theme in welfare reform since the advent of the
‘welfare crisis’ in the 1970s has been to eliminate welfare dependency
by reintegrating welfare recipients into the labor market.184 This
emphasis on work represented a shift in official welfare policy. From
its inception in 1935 until the late 1960s, AFDC expected eligible
single mothers with young children to stay home to provide child
care.185 Women who engaged in paid employment had their
184. See Handler, supra note 169, at 467-70 (arguing that there is nothing new in
welfare policy’s emphasis on work since welfare and work have been intricately
connected since the formative period of welfare policy in the 1900s).
185. See id. at 476 (noting that historians of social welfare have illustrated the
extent to which the idea that single mothers should be able to stay at home to care for
their children was never realized by the vast majority of poor women). “While the
rhetoric of reform was the preservation of traditional patriarchy with the wife and
mother at home caring for the family full time, the reality for the vast majority of
poor women and mothers was work.” Id.; see also Joel Handler, Constructing the
Political Spectacle: The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization and Obligations
in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 919 (1990) (explaining that under
both the Aid to Dependent Children program enacted in 1911, and its successor, the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children enacted in 1935, highly restrictive
conditions disqualified many single mothers, and work remained their only option).
These maternalistic programs were primarily designed to benefit a subset of single
mothers, namely, widows—who were single due to no fault of their own. Id.
“Through the use of “suitable home” and “employable mother” policies, states were
able to exclude the unworthy, maintain labor markets, and reduce costs. Even under
the Social Security Act, ADC remained small and primarily for white widows.” Id. See
generally MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1988); LINDA GORDON, PITIED, BUT NOT
ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE (1994); ALICE KESSLER
HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES
(1982); Gwendolyn Mink, The Lady and the Tramp: Gender, Race and the Origins of
the American Welfare State, in WOMEN, THE STATE AND WELFARE (London Gordon
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earnings deducted from their assistance. In the 1960s, attitudes about
women’s roles began to change, with the dramatic increase in
women’s labor market participation. Some public policy reformers
began to argue that mothers on welfare should similarly be expected
to work. Work requirements were first established with the 1967
Work Incentive Program (“WIN”).186 In 1971, the program was
replaced by WIN II, which introduced somewhat harsher work
requirements and strengthened sanctions for non-compliance.187
While WIN had initially been mandatory for men, but voluntary for
women, WIN II required that women with children over the age of six
years participate in job training or employment programs in order to
qualify for AFDC.188 The amendments also shifted the focus from
education and training to placement in entry level programs.189
Neither WIN nor WIN II was particularly successful in reducing
welfare dependency.190
In 1981, the Reagan administration
introduced the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. The
amendments allowed the states to require welfare recipients to
participate in Community Work Experience (“CWEP”), effectively a
workfare program that would require recipients to work for public
agencies in order to qualify for assistance.191 The amendments also
allowed a number of states to experiment with work-relief programs.
These work requirements reflected an emerging fiscal conservative
vision of welfare reform that came to inform federal initiatives. The
objective of each of these programs was to transform AFDC into a
temporary assistance program that focused on rehabilitation through
job training and employment. Welfare mothers whose dependency
was once seen as a natural product of their roles as childcare
providers were being reconstituted as employable individuals.192
Despite the influence of Charles Murray in popularizing the attack on
welfare, the policy reforms owed more to fiscal than libertarian
conservatism. This fiscal conservative impulse culminated in the
Family Support Act of 1988, the first major welfare reform legislation
ed., 1990) (illustrating that social welfare programs were often highly racialized).
186. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. 90-248, Title II, 81 (Stat. 821).
187. Pub. L. No. 92-223, 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2435-39.
188. See Handler, Ending Welfare, supra note 170, at 188.
189. Handler, Transformation, supra note 169, at 490.
190. Id. at 491.
191. See generally Matthew Diller, Working without a Job: The Social Messages of
the New Workfare, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 19 (1998).
192. See I. GARFINKEL & S. MCLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE CHILDREN 181
(1986) (arguing that the AFDC should be transformed into a work-relief program for
single mothers that emphasized the values of work and independence).
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in decades.193 The primary objective of the Family Support Act was to
integrate welfare recipients into the workforce, by mandating that
single mothers work or train for work as a condition of eligibility. The
central plank of this strategy was the Job Opportunities and Basic
Skills (“JOBS”), a program that required welfare recipients to work,
while also offering opportunities for education, job training, skills
development and childcare.194 Recipients with children under the
age of three were exempt from participation in JOBS.195 In order to
maintain funding, the states had to enroll fifteen percent of their
AFDC caseload in a JOBS program by 1995.
Throughout the Congressional debate, the emphasis was on
breaking welfare dependency through work. Senator Armstrong, a
sponsor of the bill, highlighted the extent to which the Family
Support Act embraced two different approaches to the question of
work: “For many, education and training is the only way out of
poverty. For still many others, welfare ought to be conditioned on an
obligation to work. This bill is historic because these two philosophies
of welfare reform are brought together.”196 The Family Support Act
included provisions to promote work through both training and
education and workfare.197 While the emphasis is quite different—
government spending on training programs versus work as a
condition of eligibility—these different visions were united through a
shared objective of transforming welfare dependents into workers.198
Many, including Senator Armstrong, emphasized the normative value
of work:
[T]o me, the single most important reform in this bill is the work
requirement. It is, for the first time ever, conditioning the receipt
of welfare assistance with a requirement to work . . . . [I]nstalling
this principle in our welfare system is a historic step. Here is why I
believe that is so. First, I think it is simple justice. Most people fully
193. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343.
194. See Williams, supra note 173, at *3 (arguing that many conservative think
tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the Free Congress Foundation did not
support the job training programs of the Family Support Act, but rather were
advocating for mandatory workfare and stronger behavior modification programs);
see also Katz, supra note 1 (observing that some fiscal conservatives disliked job
training because they distorted labor markets and inflated wages); id. at 65-66
(discussing cuts to job training programs through the 1980s). See generally Diller,
supra note 191 (discussing general JOBS recipient requirements).
195. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(C)(iii). The states, however, had the option of
limiting the exemption to parents of children under the age of one.
196. 134 CONG. REC. S13639 (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
197. See The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat 2343; see
also Diller, supra note 191, at 20-23.
198. See The Family Support Act of 1988.
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share the view that those on welfare who are able to do so should
work in return for the subsistence and support society is providing
them. That is simple fairness, equity, and common sense. Second,
work is good in and of itself. By working, we gain dignity, a sense of
purpose and self-respect. We develop skills, become responsible,
and are able to advance in life to better serve our fellow man.199

The emphasis on work at times was linked explicitly with the fiscal
conservative objective of reducing government spending. Senator
Kerry, for example, speaking of the experience of welfare reform in
Massachusetts, stated: “In short, by offering people a hand up and a
way out. [sic] We can certainly expect to translate that experience to
commensurate savings for the U.S. Treasury and in all of our
States.”200 The link to the fiscal conservative objective of reducing
government spending was sometimes made in more subtle ways.
Representative Slattery stated: “The American taxpayer should be
proud of this welfare reform legislation. It makes use of Federal funds
by providing welfare recipients with the incentive to work and the
education, training and support services needed to help them regain
their place in society as productive, taxpaying citizens.”201 Rather
than claiming that the welfare reform would result in immediate fiscal
savings, the discourse advocated spending money to produce fiscally
responsible, tax-paying citizens, a goal which presumably, in the long
run, will reduce government spending.
In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”).202 The legislation,
famously described by President Clinton as “ending welfare as we
know it” ended the federal entitlement to AFDC and replaced it with
199. See 134 CONG. REC. S13639 (statement of Sen. Armstrong); see also id.
(statement of Sen. Packwood) (“The bill requires that certain of those recipients
work. That is a good four-letter word, Mr. President—work. We will try to educate
them so that they can work in today’s society at a job at which they, hopefully, can
work for the remainder of their life.”).
200. See 134 CONG. REC. S13639 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Kerry). But see 134 CONG. REC. H9098 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Archer) (asserting that the bill did not deliver sufficient savings to the taxpayer).
We should be able to say to taxpayers of this country that we have been able
to encourage and to remove welfare recipients from the roles so that it results
in a program which has fewer welfare recipients . . . . We should be able to
say to the working people of this country that the costs of this program will
result after [five] years in reduced taxes to pay for welfare. This bill fails on
both accounts . . . the CBO projections . . . are that the cost of the bill will
approach [one] billion [dollars] a year in extra spending at the conclusion of
a [five]-year transition implementation period.
Id.
201. 134 CONG. REC. 27180 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1988) (statement of Rep. Slattery).
202. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(implementing an overhaul of the nation’s cash welfare system).
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block grants to the states known as Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (“TANF”).203 TANF established a five-year lifetime limit on
welfare assistance and significantly toughened work requirements.204
Parents receiving assistance must have engaged in work after receiving
benefits for no more than 24 months.205 The legislation gave states
broad discretion in deciding how to spend the block grant, provided
that the expenditures promoted any of the four purposes of the
law.206 States became free to establish their own eligibility rules for
assistance.207 While federal law prohibits states from using TANF
funds to assist certain categories of people, a family no longer has an
entitlement to federal assistance, and, therefore, a state has no
requirement assist any family.208 A state must spend a certain
percentage of state money for benefits and services for “needy
families” with children.209 States also must meet a set of work and
participation rate requirements to avoid fiscal penalties.210 Most
states developed time-limited assistance programs with an emphasis
Congress eliminated many
on work-related requirements.211
educational opportunities under the FSA, as TANF came to
emphasize work over training.212
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at § 103.
See id. at § 103; see also Diller, supra note 191, at 23-25.
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 103.
See id.
See id.; see also Diller, supra note 191, at 24-25.
See MARK GREENBERG, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, BEYOND WELFARE: NEW
OPPORTUNITIES TO USE TANF TO HELP LOW INCOME WORKING FAMILIES, 1-2 (July 1999).
209. See MARK GREENBERG ET AL., CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, WELFARE
REAUTHORIZATION: AN EARLY GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 6 (July 2000) [hereinafter
GREENBERG, WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION] (noting a state’s maintenance of effort
(“MOE”) is eighty percent of the amount that the state spent in 1994 for a set of
federal programs, or seventy-five percent if the state meets TANF participation rates),
available at http:// www.clasp.org/publications/welfare_reauthorization_an_early_
guide.pdf (last visited July 20, 2005); see also MARK GREENBERG, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC.
POLICY, THE TANF MAINTENANCE OF EFFORT REQUIREMENT 2 (2002) (describing
possible ways for a state to support families in need by using MOE money as part of a
cash assistance program or for programs of providing assistance for child care,
education, job training, or paying administrative costs), available at
www.clasp.org/TANF/moerev.htm (last revised Apr. 5, 2002).
210. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 103;
see also Diller, supra note 191, at 24-25.
211. See GREENBERG, WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 209, at 6; see also
Jared Bernstein & Mark Greenberg, Reforming Welfare Reform, THE AM. PROSPECT,
Vol. 12, Jan. 1-15, 2001, at 10-16, (noting that most states elected a five year limit while
other opted for shorter limits), available at http://www.clasp. org/publications/
bernstein-j.html (lasted visted July 17, 2005).
212. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 326 (explaining that while unwed teen parents are
required to attend school to receive benefits, for adult recipients, education does not
fulfill work activity requirements, as the goal is quick entry into the labor force); see
also Diller, supra note 12, at 1755 (noting that welfare no longer has the purpose of
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Throughout the Congressional debates, legislators saw PRWORA as
a way to correct welfare dependency by making people work.213 The
discourse of the debates highlighted breaking dependency by
promoting work and personal responsibility.214 Many emphasized the
way in which welfare has undermined self sufficiency. Senator Shelby,
for example, stated:
The welfare system today encourages dependency, facilitates the
breakdown of the family, demoralizes the human spirit, and
undermines the work ethic that built our nation . . . . People have
become dependent on welfare because it completely destroys the
need to work and the natural incentive to become self-sufficient.215

PRWORA was then seen as reintroducing work incentives. As
Senator DeWine stated, “[t]his bill reestablishes the connection
between work and income, the time-honored idea that people should
work to get income.”216 Senator Burns similarly stated:
And it pleases me to no end that the tough and real work
requirements contained in this bill will get folks off the welfare rolls
and into a productive job, job training program or community
service. There is no doubt there will be exceptions, but the goal of
welfare reform is independence, not government reliance.217

The emphasis on work and individual self sufficiency was at times
expressly tied to the fiscal conservative objective of reducing
government spending. Senator Helms stated:
The welfare reform bill proposes to set welfare policy on the right
course. It requires welfare recipients to work; It promotes family
and the work ethic; and [i]t exercises sound fiscal responsibility . . .
. [T]his legislation is fair to taxpayers because it saves [fifty-five]
billion [dollars] of taxpayers’ money . . . . Taxpayers are sick and
tired of working hard, paying taxes and watching folks on welfare
get a free ride.218

The work-first emphasis of PRWORA further reinforced the
individualizing and degendering strategy of fiscal conservatism.
Congress removed government incentives that undermined individual
self-sufficiency, reconstituted single mothers as employable citizens
providing ongoing support for families but, rather, attempts to accomplish specific
outcomes related to work and self-sufficiency); ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 185, at 338
(noting the 1967 amendments made a dramatic shift by requiring women on welfare
to work rather than stay at home to care for children).
213. 142 CONG. REC. S9352 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996).
214. See id.
215. Id. (statement of Sen. Shelby).
216. Id. (statement of Sen. DeWine).
217. 142 CONG. REC. S9387 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Burns).
218. Id. (statement of Sen. Helms).
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like any other, and cast the job market as the solution to welfare
dependency.219 However, much of the political rhetoric around
PRWORA—the stated objectives, the Congressional findings, and the
Congressional debates—simultaneously reflected a social conservative
shift.220 Three of the four main objectives of TANF involve the
promotion of traditional families:
(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be
cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end
the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by
promoting job preparation, work and marriage; (3) prevent and
reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish
annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence
of pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation of two-parent
families.221

The Congressional findings similarly emphasized the importance of
the traditional family and focused on the increase in illegitimacy and
the resulting social harms. The Act states, “(1) Marriage is the
foundation of a successful society; (2) Marriage is an essential
institution of a successful society which promotes the interests of
children; [and] (3) Promotion of responsible fatherhood and
motherhood is integral to successful child rearing and the well-being
of children.”222
PRWORA included a number of provisions designed to promote
this social conservative vision of the traditional family. In terms of
reducing illegitimacy, the Act included an illegitimacy bonus of twenty
million dollars to states that show the greatest decline in out of
wedlock births without an increase in abortion rates.223 It allocated
fifty million dollars a year for five years in block grants to states for
219. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 324-25 (discussing the extent to which PRWORA
reflected a market model by focusing on work and eliminating the moral hazard
created by welfare entitlement).
220. See MARY PARKE, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, MARRIAGE-RELATED PROVISIONS
IN RECENT WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION PROPOSALS: A SUMMARY 2 (2004) (noting that
while Congress designed some substantive provisions with the objective of reducing
illegitimacy and directed a few substantive provisions specifically towards the objective
of promoting marriage, the shift was a result of increased flexibility given to states to
spend their TANF block grants in accordance with the purposes of the legislation).
Thirty-five states, however, used the increased flexibility they received to determine
TANF eligibility to enable two-parent families to qualify for assistance more easily. Id.
States such as Oklahoma and Michigan have chosen to spend TANF funds on
activities intended to strengthen marriages. Id.
221. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 103.
222. Id. (including in the note section Congressional findings demonstrating a
detailed discussion of the alleged harms of illegitimacy by comparing the experiences
of illegitimate children with the well-being of children raised in two-parent families).
223. See id. at § 403(a)(2).
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abstinence only education programs.224 The programs had to adhere
to specific guidelines advocating sexual abstinence outside of
marriage and delineate harms to individuals, society, and children.225
PRWORA denied federal assistance to some minor parents.226
PRWORA effectively precludes states from spending TANF funds to
assist unmarried, minor, custodial parents who do not participate in
school or training rules, and who do not live with a parent, guardian
or other relatives.227 While Congress ultimately rejected proposals to
prohibit states from providing additional assistance for children born
in welfare families, the block grant structure nevertheless permitted
states to implement programs or related practices.228 The states that
had established a family cap under an AFDC waiver prior to 1996 were
now free to implement a cap without seeking waivers.229
During the congressional debates senators, more often than not the
same individuals who applauded the welfare to work strategies of fiscal
conservatism, repeatedly stressed the objective of reducing
illegitimacy. Senator Burns, for example, stated in classic social
conservative terms:
224. See id. at § 912.
225. See id. (defining sexual abstinence education). It is an educational program
or motivational program that:
(A) has as its exclusive purpose, teaching the social, psychological, and health
gains to be realized by abstaining from sexual activity; (B) teaches abstinence
from sexual activity outside marriage as the expected standard for all school
age children; (C) teaches that abstinence from sexual activity is the only
certain way to avoid out-of-wedlock pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases,
and other associated health problems; (D) teaches that a mutually faithful
monogamous relationship in context of marriage is the expected standard of
human sexual activity; (E) teaches that sexual activity outside of the context
of marriage is likely to have harmful psychological and physical effects; (F)
teaches that bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have harmful
consequences for the child, the child’s parents, and society; (G) teaches
young people how to reject sexual advances and how alcohol and drug use
increases vulnerability to sexual advances; and (H) teaches the importance of
attaining self-sufficiency before engaging in sexual activity.
Id.
226. See id. at § 103.
227. See id. (allowing for some limited exceptions in which a parent, legal
guardian, or other adult relative is not available, or when such a placement could
result in harm to the minor and/or her child). In these circumstances, a minor may
be required to live in an adult-supervised living arrangement. Id. While it is the duty
of the state to assist the individual in locating an appropriate adult supervised setting,
a state could determine that a minor’s independent living arrangement is
appropriate, and that it is in the best interest of the minor to make an exception. Id.
228. See GREENBERG, WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 209, at 13.
229. See generally JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN & SHELLEY STARK, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC.
POLICY, EXCLUDED CHILDREN: FAMILY CAP IN A NEW ERA (Feb. 1999) (noting that
approximately twenty states established a family cap under an AFDC waiver prior to
1996, three more did so by 2000), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/
excluded_children.pdf (last visited July 20, 2005).
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The bill also contains provisions to strengthen families and personal
responsibility, something I think is essential to getting at the root of
our welfare problems. In a scant few decades, we have seen the
demise of families and family values in our country. And
illegitimacy rates are rising to almost dangerous levels. These are
the things that are contributing most to the decline in our society.
More and more children are growing up without a father, without a
solid family to support them, and crime statistics show that kids who
are raised without a father commit more crimes . . . . It is clear that
our present welfare system encourages young mothers to have
children, and many of these children are not being cared for.230

Senator Helms similarly stated:
[T]he human devastation caused by rising illegitimacy rates and the
breakdown of the family is even more troubling than the cost of
welfare programs . . . . For [thirty] years, the welfare system
rewarded idleness and illegitimacy and there has been a marked
increase in both . . . . [T]his bill takes a step in the right direction
in helping reduce the rising illegitimacy rates by providing funds
for abstinence education, and by allowing States the option of
denying benefits to welfare recipients who already have children
living on the public dole.231

PRWORA thus represents a hybrid between fiscal conservatism’s
emphasis on work, libertarianism’s emphasis on eliminating welfare
(‘the end of welfare as we know it’) and social conservatism’s
emphasis on family as the solution to welfare dependency.232
Fiscal and social conservatives were able to unite, again under the
sign of personal responsibility, yet their respective visions of this
personal responsibility was measurably different.
The fiscal
conservative vision cast personal responsibility in economic terms.233
Welfare mothers were expected to transcend their economic
dependency by becoming self-reliant market citizens.234 Libertarians
230. 142 CONG. REC. S9387 (statement of Sen. Burns).
231. Id. (statement of Sen. Helms).
232. See Ann Marie Smith, The Politicization of Marriage in Contemporary
American Public Policy: The Defense of Marriage Act and the Personal Responsibility
Act, 5 CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 303, 315 (2001) (describing PRWORA as a hybrid between
the religious right (social conservatives) and neo-conservative (fiscal conservative)
discourse). “The PRA expresses a remarkable hybrid discourse: it appropriates both
the religious rights’ moralistic emphasis on patriarchal and heterosexist ‘family’
values and the neo-conservative emphasis on downsizing government and exposing
the impoverished individual to the corrective rigors of the market.” Id.; see also
KATZ, supra note 1, at 326 (observing similarly the potential conflict between the
visions of the religious right and neo-conservativists). “Whether the two policy
objectives—reversing out-of-wedlock births and supporting single mothers in their
transition to word—would co-exist or collide no one yet knew, or had asked.” Id.
233. See generally Crooms, supra note 166.
234. See id. at 623-26 (relating that according to the social sub-text of the welfare
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similarly cast personal responsibility in marketized terms of restoring
individual initiative.235 But, in the social conservative vision, personal
responsibility was cast in moral terms. The vision expected welfare
mothers to modify their sexual and familial behavior.236 They were to
avoid out-of-wedlock pregnancies, preferably by avoiding pre-marital
sex and choosing marriage. For both fiscal conservatives and
libertarians, the problem was one of the welfare state having
undermined individual initiative and self-reliance.237 The solution,
then, lay in restoring that initiative, and allowing women to become
completely self-sufficient. But for social conservatives, the problem
was that the welfare state had undermined the traditional family; the
solution, then, lay in its restoration.238
The social conservative vision of welfare reform has become more
evident in the recent debates surrounding the reauthorization of
TANF currently before Congress.239 Many believed that the family
reform rhetoric, this claim is about changing the behavior of black women by making
them work; thus playing on the stereotype of the black single mother on welfare as
lazy and lacking in work ethic, and its strategy as one of forcing her to work).
235. See MURRAY, supra note 89; see also TANNER, supra note 89.
236. See Crooms, supra note 166, at 612-13 (discussing the efforts of welfare
reform to make mothers more responsible and the racialized stereotyping that
welfare recipients are black, single, urban mothers). Welfare reform punishes the
black single mother on welfare because of her sexual promiscuity, her fertility and
her moral failure for not marrying the father of her child. Id. at 625. Crooms wrote,
Like the matriarch, who does not submit to her man’s authority the welfare
dependent single mother is a ‘bad’ woman whose dominance wrecks the
natural order of things within the family and is responsible for the lack of
values within her dysfunctional community. Like Jezebel who is overtly
sexual and lascivious, the welfare dependent single mother’s hyper-sexuality
is responsible for her anti-patriarchal child bearing. Like the breeder, whose
owner imposed on her a duty to procreate, the welfare dependent single
mother’s extramarital childbearing is a learned response to the financial
incentive provided by AFDC. The welfare dependent single mother
represents the point of which promiscuity and fecundity meet, and her
childbearing is pathological compared to that of those ‘true’ women to whom
proper motherhood within the traditional two-parent family is essential.
Id. at 626.
237. See Charles Murray, Family Formation, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 159160 (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds, 2001) (arguing that for libertarians, the
AFDC’s restructuring was little more than homage to the idea of ending welfare).
Libertarians, like Murray, wanted the total elimination of AFDC and other welfare
benefits. Id.
238. See, e.g., Robert Rector, How Poor are America’s Poor? (Heritage
Foundation, Backgrounder No. 791, 1990) (describing the ‘destruction of families’ as
a major consequence of welfare spending), available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/PoliticalPhilosophy/BG791.cfm (last visited July 20, 2005); see also Patrick
F. Fagan et al., Marriage and Welfare Reform: The Overwhelming Evidence that
Marriage Education Works ? (Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 1606, 2002),
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/bg1606.cfm (last visited July
20, 2005).
239. According to PRWORA, the TANF program required Congressional
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formation objectives of PRWORA had not been realized, and that it
was time to put the promotion of marriage at the top of the
reauthorization agenda.240
In February 2002, the Bush
Administration put forward its vision of the reauthorization plan, and
declared that promoting healthy marriages would be one of its top
priorities, committing up to three-hundred million dollars to “strong
marriages and stable families,” which “are incredibly good for
children.”241 The Bush Administration proposal also sought to
dramatically increase work requirements and limit state flexibility.242
On May 16, 2002 the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4737, the
Personal Responsibility, Work and Family Promotion Act, which
closely followed the Bush administration vision, and included among
others, substantial funds for the promotion of marriage. The Bill
included three substantive programs for the promotion of

reauthorization by September 2002. Congress has approved several temporary
extensions of TANF, while they debate the substance of the reauthorization. On
September 30, 2004, President Bush signed H.R. 5149 into law as Pub. L 108-308,
which was another six-month TANF extension. This most recent enactment was the
eighth extension since the authorization for the TANF program was originally to
expire. Several TANF reauthorization bills have been drafted and debated in
Congress, but Congress has not supported any bill yet. See SHAWN FREMSTAD ET AL.,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, SUMMARY COMPARISON OF TANF
REAUTHORIZATION PROVISIONS: BILLS PASSED BY SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND RELATED PROPOSALS (noting that several TANF
reauthorization proposals have come before Congress, including the following: H.R.
4737 that the House passed on May 16, 2002, a Democratic substitute for H.R. 4737
that Rep. Cardin offered on the House floor, a list of provisions that a bipartisan
group of Senate Finance committee members agreed to, a bill that Senator
Rockefeller introduced [S. 2052], a bill that Senators Bahy and Carper introduced [S.
2524] and H.R. 4, passed by the House in 2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/72-02tanf.pdf (last visited July 17, 2005); see also SHAWN FREMSTAD ET AL., CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, REVISED SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF FAMILY FORMATION
PROVISIONS IN TANF REAUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION (comparing the current law to
the various proposals Congress has considered), at http://clasp.org/publications/6-502tanf3.pdf (last visited July 17, 2005).
240. See generally SHAWN FREMSTAD & WENDELL PRIMUS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, STRENGTHENING FAMILIES: IDEAS FOR TANF REAUTHORIZATION (2002)
(quoting Rep. Wally Herger, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee’s
Human Resources Subcommittee as stating, “During the first phase of welfare reform,
we made sure we were putting people to work. I believe that now is the time to stress
the importance of marriage.”); Wade Horn, Wedding Bell Blues: Marriage and
Welfare Reform, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 2001; Robert Rector, Using Welfare
Reform to Strengthen Marriage, AM. EXPERIMENT QUARTERLY, Summer 2001.
241. See News Release, The White House, President Announces Welfare Reform
Agenda (Feb. 26 2002) [hereinafter President Announces], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020226-11.html (last visited
July 31, 2005); see also Liz Schott, The Congressional Divide Over TANF
Reauthorization, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 427, 428-29; Mark Greenberg, Bush’s
Blunder, THE AM. PROSPECT, July 15, 2002.
242. See President Announces, supra note 241 (indicating that the proposal would
increase the number of hours that TANF recipients must work, and further limit the
range of activities that would count towards meeting the work requirements).
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marriage.243 The Health Marriage Promotion Grants would have
created a program of competitive grants in the amount of twohundred million dollars annually over five years to be used on a
specified list of marriage related activities.244 The Marriage Research
and Demonstration Funds would have allocated $100 million annually
over five years for research demonstration and technical assistance
grants to be used primarily for marriage related activities.245 Finally,
the Promotion and Support of Responsible fatherhood and Healthy
Marriage Grants program would have allocated $20 million annually
over five years to fund marriage and fatherhood promotion
activities.246 H.R. 4737 would also have amended the purpose
243. See generally PARKE, supra note 220, at 2. See generally JODIE EVEN-EPSTEIN
ET. AL, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, SPENDING TOO MUCH, ACCOMPLISHING TOO LITTLE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FAMILY FORMATION PROVISIONS OF H.R. 4737 AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (2002), available at http://www.clasp.org/
publications/HR_4737_family_form
_analysis_061102.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
244. H.R. 4737, 107th Cong. § 103 (2002) (providing that that funds may be used
to support specified activities). The activities are:
(1) Public advertising campaigns on the value of marriage and the skills
needed to increase marital stability and health; (2) Education in high schools
on the value of marriage, relationship skills, and budgeting; (3) Marriage
education, marriage skills, and relationship skills programs, that may include
parenting skills, financial management, conflict resolution, and job and
career advancement, for non-married pregnant women and non-married
expectant fathers; (4) Pre-marital education and marriage skills training for
engaged couples and for couples interested in marriage; (5) Marriage
enhancement and marriage skills training programs for married couples; (6)
Divorce Reduction programs that teach relationship skills; (7) Marriage
mentoring programs which use married couples as role models and mentors
in at-risk communities; and (8) Programs to reduce the disincentives to
marriage in means-tested aid programs, if offered in conjunction with any
activity described in this subparagraph.
Id.
245. Id. at § 115.
246. Id. at § 441 (indicating that grants under this program must be designed to
accomplish four objectives). The objectives are:
(1) Promoting responsible, caring, and effective parenting through
counseling, mentoring, and parenting education . . . information
[dissemination] . . . positive involvement . . . and other methods; (2)
Enhancing the abilities and commitment of unemployed or low-income
fathers to provide material support for their families . . . by assisting them to
take full advantage of education, job training, and job search programs; to
improve work habits and work skills, to secure career advancement by
activities such as outreach and information dissemination, coordination . . .
with employment services and job training programs . . . encouragement and
support of child support payments, and other methods . . .; (3) Improving
fathers’ ability to effectively manage family business affairs by means such as
education, counseling, and mentoring on matters including household
management, budgeting, banking, and handling of financial transactions,
time management, and home maintenance; and (4) Encouraging and
supporting healthy marriages and married fatherhood through such activities
such as premarital education . . . inventories, marriage preparation programs
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language of TANF. It would have changed the focus of the purpose
to “improve child wellbeing,” replaced a reference to “parents” with a
reference to “families” in purpose (2), and added a focus on healthy
married families and responsible fatherhood in purpose (4).247 H.R.
4737 would also have required states to establish annual, specific
numerical performance goals and improvement plans with respect to
each of the four TANF purposes, including the promotion of healthy
marriages.248
The Senate Finance Committee Proposed legislation with similar
marriage provisions to H.R. 4737, but with lower funding levels and a
broader list of allowable activities.249 While the Senate Finance
Committee passed the legislation, it never reached the Senate floor
for a vote. In 2003, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4, the
Personal Responsibility, Work and Family Promotion Act of 2003.250
H.R. 4 is substantially the same as H.R. 4737. It includes the same
three programs for marriage promotion and responsible
fatherhood.251 H.R. 4 was referred to the Senate Finance Committee,
. . . marital therapy, couples counseling . . . [and] skills enhancement
programs, including . . . reduc[tion of] child abuse and domestic violence,
and dissemination of information about the benefits of marriage.
Id. Authorized projects under this program would include:
(1) Demonstration service projects that address all four objectives, and
annual limited purpose grants under [twenty-five thousand dollars] that
address at least one objective; and (2) Two multi-city demonstration projects,
one of which must test services delivered by married couples; and (3) Other
projects such as a national information clearinghouse, a national media
campaign, technical assistance, and evaluation.
MARY PARKE, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, MARRIAGE-RELATED PROVISIONS IN WELFARE
REAUTHORIZATION PROPOSALS: A SUMMARY 8 (2004), available at http://www.clasp.
org/publications/ marr_prov_upd.pdf (last visited July 17, 2005).
247. H.R. 4737, 107th Cong. (2002) (changing the fourth purpose to read
“encourage the formation and maintenance of healthy two-parent married families,
and encourage responsible fatherhood”).
248. Id. at § 113.
249. See PARKE, supra note 220, at 1; see also SHAWN FREMSTAD ET AL., CTR. ON
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, ONE STEP FORWARD OR TWO STEPS BACK? 18-20 (2002)
(noting that the Senate Finance Bill would also have prevented states from
discriminating against two-parent families in their TANF programs), available at
http://www.clasp.org/publications/doc_13reasons.pdf (last visited July 17, 2005). In
terms of the work requirements, the Senate Finance Bill would also have maintained
the work requirement at thirty hours and had a broader list of activities that would
count toward the primary twenty-four hour work requirement. Id. at 5-6.
250. See H.R. 4, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
251. The primary difference between H.R. 4 and H.R. 4737 is that most of the
funding in H.R. 4 is for six years instead of five years. It allocates two hundred million
dollars annually for six years to the Healthy Marriage Promotion Grants, one
hundred million dollars annually for six years to the Marriage Research and
Demonstration Funds and twenty million dollars annually for five years to the
Promotion and Support of Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Marriage Grants.
The list of allowable marriage activities is virtually the same as in H.R. 4737. See
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which held hearings in February and March 2003. In its Report of
October 3, 2003, the Finance Committee recommended that the bill
(PRIDE) be passed, as amended.252 At the time of writing, the PRIDE
version of H.R.4 is under consideration by the Senate.
Thus, the current TANF reauthorization proposals place very
considerable emphasis on family formation goals, with the
Administration, House and Senate only disagreeing on questions of
the appropriate amount of funding and the extent of state flexibility.
Promoting marriage and, to a slightly lesser extent, responsible
fatherhood, has become part of the mainstay of welfare reform. This
recent round of reform is witnessing a further welfarization of family
law, insofar as many of the programs for marriage promotion and
responsible fatherhood do not require that the funds be specifically
directed towards TANF recipients or low-income populations
generally.253 The reform proposals thus reflect the social conservative
view that the family formation purposes of TANF are its most
fundamental and must be central in its reauthorization.254
While the social conservative critique of welfare reform appears to
be emerging as dominant in current federal public policy debates
around reauthorization, a libertarian critique of welfare reform
remains visible. For example, Michael Tanner of the Cato Institute
argues:
The long term answer to poverty and dependency does not lie with
any government program, no matter how well intentioned.
Congress needs to go beyond proposals that simply tinker with
welfare and begin to phase out government assistance in favor of

generally, PARKE, supra note 220, at 3-9.
252. S. REP. NO. 108-164 (2003).
253. See H.R. 4737, 107th Cong. (2002) and H.R. 4 (mentioning low income
populations in only two of the eight marriage-related activities). Similarly, the
fatherhood and marriage promotion grants focus primarily on promoting married
fatherhood and are not specifically directed towards low-income fathers. Id.; see also
LEVIN-EPSTEIN & STARK, supra note 229, at 10-11. See generally Brito, supra note 22
(arguing that the wall separating the family law of welfare and general family law is
crumbling and that welfare law is taking the dominant role).
254. See Murray, supra note 237 at 137-168 (arguing that emphasis on work
requirements would be ineffective without first addressing the illegitimacy problem);
Robert Rector, Comment, in THE NEW WORLD ORDER 264-69. See generally JANICE
PETERSON, INST. FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON TANF
REAUTHORIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO KEY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE OF WELFARE
REFORM (2002) (noting that at the same time, it is important to not overstate H.R. 4 as
an exclusively social conservative welfare reform), available at http://www.iwpr.
org/pdf/e511.html (last visited July 17, 2005). The bill includes provisions to
increase work participation rates and raise the hours for core activities, which will
toughen the work requirements of TANF. Id. The bill also includes provisions for
increased spending on child care and expanding state flexibility. Id.
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private charity.255

According to Tanner, although welfare reform has had some
success in reducing welfare dependency, it has been less successful in
requiring welfare recipients to work, in reducing out of wedlock
births, and in making individuals self-sufficient.256 The policy
position, then, is virtually the same as Charles Murray’s prescription in
the 1980s: “when it comes to welfare, we should end it, not mend
it.”257
We should . . . begin to remove the incentives that contribute to out
of wedlock birth. That means phasing out the availability of welfare
benefits to young women who make untenable life decisions. No
other reform will go as far in reducing welfare dependency or
poverty. That approach will almost certainly be more effective than
current proposals that the federal government spend as much as
[three hundred] million [dollars] on promoting marriage.258

In Tanner’s analysis, the problem of moral hazard—understood in
decidedly economic terms—can and must be reversed by eliminating
the availability of welfare. The solution lies not in more government
regulation (promoting marriage), but in less (eliminating welfare).259
255. See TANNER, supra note 87 (arguing that Congress should instead focus on
job creation and economic growth), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/
pa473.pdf (last visited July 20, 2005); see also LISA OLIPHANT, CATO INSTITUTE, FOUR
YEARS OF WELFARE REFORM: A PROGRESS REPORT (Policy Analysis No. 378, 2000),
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa378.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2005). See
generally MICHAEL TANNER, THE END OF WELFARE: FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE CIVIL
SOCIETY (1996).
256. See TANNER, supra note 87 (stating that the reduction of the number of
individuals receiving welfare was as much due to the impact of economic growth and
job creation as it was welfare reform). Individuals who left welfare in the period after
PRWORA were the individuals who were most likely to have left even if welfare had
not been reformed. Id. at 11.
Studies of people leaving welfare since reform suggest that the majority are
part of the easiest-to-place, least-dependent group of recipients. While they
may have left more rapidly under reform, they were not the people most at
risk for long-term dependency. As a group, the first wave of those leaving
welfare has had better education, higher levels of basic skills, and more
previous experience in the labor market than those remaining on the rolls . .
. . On the other hand, those remaining on the welfare rolls are most likely to
be families headed by unmarried women under the age of [thirty] and
increasingly concentrated in high poverty areas.
Id.
257. See Murray, supra note 237, at 159 (reiterating his argument advocating the
elimination of welfare benefits for young women who have children out of wedlock).
258. See TANNER, supra, note 87, at 30-31, 34-35; see also OLIPHANT, supra note
255, at 30-35 (arguing similarly that PRWORA has failed to reduce out of wedlock
births, and that the only solution lies in eliminating the availability of welfare for
single mothers).
259. See, e.g., Michael Tanner, Wedded to Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at
A23 (criticizing the Congressional and White House marriage promotion initiatives,
which is described as another example of conservatives deviating from their
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While this critique remains visible in conservative public policy circles,
it does not appear to have permeated the Congressional debates or
hearings, and rather like Murray’s critique in the 1980s, it does not
seem to be having a concrete effect on public policy formation.
Federal public policy initiatives on welfare reauthorization continue
to be heavily influenced by social conservative visions of promoting
the traditional family, not libertarian visions of limited government
and private choice.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that the fiscal
conservatism of earlier welfare reform has certainly not disappeared
in this round of reform. The basic structure of TANF is expected to
remain intact, with its bloc grants, five-year entitlement limits, and
work requirements.
The emphasis on transforming welfare
dependents into self-employed market citizens remains a central
objective of the legislation. The new social conservative emphasis on
family formation goals is a supplement, rather than replacement, for
the fiscal conservative goals of individual self-sufficiency. Once again,
as in the area of child support, these objectives are being pursued in
tandem. In some respects, the initiatives are not entirely inconsistent.
Fiscal conservatism is not so much opposed to shifting dependency
from state to two-parent, opposite-sex family as it is agnostic. Its
primary goal is to reduce welfare dependency, and its primary strategy
is to increase the self-sufficiency of welfare dependents primarily
through an emphasis on market work. Similarly, social conservatism
is certainly not opposed to individual self-reliance and market work.
Rather, it simply seeks to address what it views to be the cause of
chronic welfare dependency, namely, illegitimacy and the decline of
the traditional family.
Yet, at a deeper level, there are some contradictions between the
visions of fiscal and social conservatives. The strategies of fiscal
conservatives are both individualizing and degendering. Single
mothers are reconstituted as potentially employable market citizens.
The strategies of social conservatives, by contrast, are familialing and
gendering. They seek to increase the role of the family in addressing
commitment to small government). The program is unlikely to be of any assistance
to poor single mothers on welfare, since there are few marriageable men, the
beneficial effects of marriage on low-income women will be small—since many
already live with the child’s father—and women may be in fact be encouraged to have
a second child, furthering their inability to become self-sufficient. Id.; see also KIMBLE
FLETCHER AINSLIE, CATO INSTITUTE, IS THE PRESIDENT’S MARRIAGE PROPOSAL DOA?
(Apr. 3, 2002) (describing President Bush's proposal as “a patchwork of poorly
thought out and voluntary components begging the states to come on board” and as a
“low impact fiscal effort” with little substance), available at: http://www.cato.org/
dailys/04-03-02.html (last visited July 17, 2005).
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dependency, and to reconstitute single mothers as appropriately
dependents, namely, married mothers dependent on wage earning
husbands. The fiscal conservative strategy is one that erodes the
significance of gender and family, while the social conservative
strategy is one that intensifies gender and family. Once again,
although these strategies are being pursued in tandem, their alliance
is a precarious one.
B. Fiscal, Libertarian and Social Conservatives on Same-sex Couples
and the Politics of Marriage
While fiscal and social conservatives have been able to work towards
compromise and coalition in child support and welfare reform,
notwithstanding the underlying tensions and contradictions in their
positions, their normative visions and privatizing projects could be
expected to be more difficult to reconcile in the context of same-sex
couples and the challenge to marriage. Social conservatives are
unequivocally opposed to same-sex marriage on moral grounds.
Libertarians should support same-sex marriage on the basis of private
choice. Fiscal conservatives would engage in a cost benefit analysis to
determine whether same-sex marriage is fiscally responsible. These
differences might be expected to produce a serious schism on the
issue of same-sex marriage, dividing libertarian, fiscal and social
conservatives.
In fact, such a divide has occurred between
conservatives in other jurisdictions, and both fiscal conservative and
libertarian arguments about fiscal responsibility and private choice
have contributed to the increasing recognition of same-sex
relationships.260 However, in public policy debates regarding samesex marriage in the United States, these differences have largely
disappeared. The debate has, until very recently, been cast almost
exclusively in terms of a classic liberal/conservative divide, with
260. In Canada, fiscal conservative arguments about cost saving and fiscal
responsibility have been part of the public policy discourse and have contributed to
the recognition of same-sex relationships. See M. v. H., [1999] S.C.R. 3 (striking
down an opposite-sex definition of spouse in relation to spousal support as a violation
of the equality rights of same-sex couples in Canada). The Court explicitly referred
to “alleviation of the burden on the public purse by shifting the obligation to provide
support for needy persons to parents and spouses who have the capacity to provide
support to them” as an objective of the legislation that would be furthered if same-sex
couples were included with the definition. Id. For a fiscal conservative and
libertarian argument in favor of same-sex marriage in Canada, see Andrew Coyne,
How Far Do We Take Gay Rights, SATURDAY NIGHT, Dec. 1995 (debating neoconservative David Frum on same-sex relationship recognition), available at
http://www.andrewcoyne.com/Essays/index.html (last visited July 17, 2005). For a
similar argument in England, see Opinion, Let Them Wed, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 4,
1996, at 13, available at http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.
cfm?story_id=2515389 (last visited July 17, 2005).
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liberals arguing in favor of same-sex marriage and conservatives
arguing against it. Fiscal conservative arguments are largely absent
from the debate, and when they do appear, they are often collapsed
with social conservative positions, arguing that same-sex marriage
would dramatically increase government expenditures.
Lone
libertarian voices in favor of same-sex marriage in the academic and
public policy literature have been largely drown out by the dominance
of social conservatism, particularly in the legislative forum where the
latter continues to reign. However, more recently, a private choice
approach has begun to make some modest inroads, primarily in the
judicial forum but also in broader public policy circles.
1. Dissipating Differences: the Discursive Power of the Social
Conservative Vision
Social conservatives oppose the recognition of gay and lesbian
rights, in general, and same-sex spousal rights, in particular, at any
cost. The rearticulation of the traditional nuclear, and above all
heterosexual, family goes to the very heart of the social conservative
vision. No group poses a greater threat to that traditional family for
social conservatives than gays and lesbians.261 Social conservatives are
unmoved by fiscal arguments about potential cost saving by
expanding the definitions of spouse to include same-sex couples. The
issue is not economic, but moral, in which gay men and lesbians
represent all that is wrong with the permissive culture of liberalism
and the demise of the traditional moral order.262 In this vision,
marriage is not a private contract between private individuals, but
rather, a public institution that promotes a range of public goods,
including reproduction and child rearing, the stability of the family as
society’s most basic social unit, and democracy.263 In their view, not
261. See generally HERMAN, supra note 79.
262. See John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation”, 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1049, 1070-73 (1994) (offering a natural law argument against homosexuality
and same-sex marriage).
263. See, e.g., Lynn Wardle, Multiply and Replenish: Considering Same-Sex
Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
771, 779-80 (2001) [hereinafter Wardle, Multiply] (noting that there are at least eight
different societal interests for marriage).
These include: (1) safe sexual relations; (2) responsible procreation; (3)
optimal child rearing; (4) healthy human development; (5) protecting those
who undertake the most vulnerable family roles for the benefit of society,
especially wives and mothers; (6) securing the stability and integrity of the
basic unit of society; (7) fostering civic virtue, democracy, and social order;
and (8) facilitating interjurisdictional compatibility.
Id.; see also George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL.
581, 582 (1999) (identifying the public interest in marriage as child rearing,
socializing adults, and promoting individual happiness); Maggie Gallagher, What is
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only does same-sex marriage not promote these public goods, but it
threatens to undermine them.264
By contrast, neither fiscal conservatism nor libertarianism is in
principle opposed to gay and lesbian rights. A general concern with
promoting the liberty rights of individuals and a minimalist state
would lead libertarians to oppose any rules and regulations that would
impose special burdens on gay men and lesbians.265 Those who favor
the shift towards private choice in family law would similarly support
the state’s removal of status-based prohibitions on marriage.266 Fiscal
conservatism could support a similar conclusion on the basis of a
different set of concerns.
Given its general impulse towards
privatizing costs of social reproduction, fiscal conservatism could be
expected to support an expanded spousal definition that contributed
to the privatization of these costs, while opposing any expanded
definition that increased the public responsibility for these costs. The
question is largely answered by a cost-benefit analysis, in which fiscal
conservatives weigh the relative costs and benefits of expanding
Marriage For? The Public Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773 (2002)
(arguing against a private choice vision of marriage and in favor of marriage as a
public institution about reproduction and child rearing).
264. See Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal
Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 314-18 (1995) (arguing that the sexual acts of same-sex
partners can only provide mere individualized sexual gratification and, thus, are
harmful to integrity). Therefore, the authors argue, the government should not
institutionalize same-sex relationships. Id. at 320; see also Wardle, Multiply, supra
note 263, at 797 (arguing that “[l]egalizing [s]ame-[s]ex [m]arriage [w]ould
[u]ndermine the [s]ocial [i]interests in [r]esponsible [p]rocreation and the
[i]nstitution [t]hat [h]as [b]est [p]rotected [t]hose [i]nterests[.]”); Dent, supra note
263, at 628-38 (arguing that recognizing gay marriage would damage traditional
marriage and would lead to other changes in the law such as the legalization of
polygamy, endogamy, artificial reproduction and baby selling, child marriage,
“[b]estiality, etc.”).
The “etc.” apparently includes “necrophilia, nudity and
performance of sex acts in public.” Id.at 237.
265. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From Jim Crow
to Same-Sex Marriages, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2456 (1994) [hereinafter Epstein, Caste];
Richard A. Epstein, Liberty, Equality, and Privacy: Choosing a Legal Foundation for
Gay Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73 (2002) [hereinafter Epstein, Liberty].
266. See Ehrenreich, supra note 11, at 1242-43 (arguing that the extent to which
the increasing emphasis on private choice through the privatization of marriage
would support same-sex marriage); Ertman, supra note 16, at 1167-68 (asserting that
progressives favor private law because it provides an avenue to legalize same-sex
marriage); see also David Boaz, Privatize Marriage: A Simple Solution to the Gay
Marriage Debate, SLATE (Apr. 25, 1997), at http://slate.msn.com/id/2440 (last
visited June 14, 2005).
‘Privatizing’ marriage can mean two slightly different things. One is to take
the state completely out of it. If couples want to cement their relationships
with a ceremony or ritual, they are free to do so. Religious institutions are
free to sanction such relationships under any rules they choose. A second
meaning of ‘privatizing’ marriage is to treat it like any other contract: The
state may be called upon to enforce it, but the parties define the terms.
Id.
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spousal definitions given the overall project of privatizing social costs.
While a private choice position has been articulated in the
academic debates, even here sometimes otherwise fiscal conservative
and libertarian voices have at times seemed to succumb to the
contrary influence of social conservatism. For example, law and
economics guru Richard Posner does not argue in favor of same-sex
marriage.267 He concludes that even if “[t]he benefits of [same-sex]
marriage may outweigh the costs[,] [n]onetheless . . . the public
hostility to homosexuals in this country is too widespread to make
homosexual marriage a feasible proposal even if it is on balance costjustified . . . .”268 As some commentators have suggested, Posner
effectively allows social conservative disapproval of homosexuality to
infuse his analysis, and fails to consistently apply law and economics
principles, with its emphasis on individual preference, private
contract, rational choices, and market efficiencies.269 Darren Bush
has argued that a law and economics analysis of same-sex marriage
should exclude such moral disapprobation and, in contrast to Posner,
that such a cost-benefit analysis would support same-sex marriage.270
Richard Epstein has made a stronger argument in favor of same-sex
marriage from a libertarian perspective.271 In his view, the fact that
267. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 311-13 (1992) (arguing that
permitting same-sex couples to marry would impose a “stamp of approval on
homosexuality” by sanctioning same-sex marriage as a desirable, even noble
condition). In his view, same-sex marriage will confuse the meaning of marriage and
the information it conveys, may be abused by homosexuals as a way of obtaining the
benefits of marriage, and might have a detrimental effect on children. Id.
268. Id. at 313.
269. See Darren Bush, Moving to the Left by Moving to the Right: A Law &
Economics Defense of Same-Sex Marriage, 22 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 115, 125-34
(2001) (highlighting the inconsistencies in Posner's analysis of same-sex marriage
under the law and economics theory); see also Ryan Nishimoto, Book Note, Marriage
Makes Cents: How Law & Economics Justifies Same-Sex Marriage, 23 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 379, 384 (2003) (reviewing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS
QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW (2002), and noting that law and
economics theorists have been “unjustifiably reluctant” to view same-sex marriage
through an economic lens); Jordon Herman, The Fusion of Gay Rights and
Feminism: Gender Identity and Marriage After Baehr v. Lewin, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 985
(1995) (observing that “Posner’s pragmatism stops short, reincorporating moral
values and sacrificing libertarian principles when they lead to unpopular results”).
270. See Bush, supra note 269, at 116 (describing Bush’s argument that “favoring
non-intervention in marriage generally while accepting (or approving of)
prohibitions on same-sex marriage is a fundamentally inconsistent position when
viewed from an economic perspective”). In his view, a law and economics cost benefit
analysis would reveal that same-sex marriage actually reduces externalities, and the
recognition of same-sex marriage is consistent with a more general position in favor
of a more contractual, non-interventionist approach to marriage. Id. at 137.
271. See generally Epstein, Caste, supra note 265, at 2460 (advocating a rejection
of prohibitions against same-sex marriage because they contradict the basic principles
of freedom of association and a liberal society); Epstein, Liberty, supra note 265
(concluding that although same-sex marriage can fit into the context of either privacy
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many people find same sex-marriage offensive cannot be used to
prevent same sex couples from “normalizing their relationships by
contract” nor to allow the state to deny them the opportunity “to
introduce into their relationships the same level of permanence and
stability that state sanctions give to marriages between couples of
different sexes.”272 Yet, he too is prepared to stop short of using the
word “marriage,” preferring, like Posner, to use the term “domestic
partnership.”273 Posner’s and, to a lesser extent, Epstein’s slippage is
illustrative of the influence of the social conservative vision of family.
While they both seek to broaden relationship recognition in a way
that respects private choice, which not incidentally would have the
effect of privatizing the costs of supporting families, both do so in
ways that stop short of recognizing same-sex marriage. Moral
opposition to same-sex marriage operates to limit their economic and
libertarian analysis.
Stronger conservative arguments have been made in favor of samesex marriage. Andrew Sullivan, a leading “gay-con,” has argued in
favor of same-sex marriage, deploying fiscal conservative, libertarian,
and occasionally even more traditional social conservative
arguments.274 Similarly, the Log Cabin Republicans, an organization
of Republicans committed to the promotion of gay and lesbian rights,
has made libertarian and fiscal conservative arguments in favor of
same-sex marriage.
Its principles are consistent with a more
libertarian and fiscal conservatism, describing itself as committed to
“limited government, individual liberty, individual responsibility, free

rights or equal protection, the important point is that it is constitutional).
272. Epstein, Caste, supra note 265, at 2473-74 (asserting that same-sex couples
receive the same rights and benefits as heterosexual couples, from immigration to
inheritance rights).
273. See Epstein, Liberty, supra note 265, at 101.
Here the issue is one of ‘confusion’ . . . . Many people may be rightly upset
that the similarity in names will lead to an erosion of support for the
traditional institution. So at this point, the use of the term ‘domestic
partnership’ helps eliminate the confusion while allowing gay individuals to
enjoy certain status benefits . . . that they could not acquire simply by a
contract arrangement between themselves.
Id.
274. See JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR
STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA 55-103 (2004) (describing how gays, straights, and
the concept of marriage will benefit by legalizing same-sex marriage); see also Andrew
Sullivan, American Conservatism: The State of Our Unions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2003,
at A24 (using the fiscal argument that allowing same-sex couples to marry would
relieve the state’s burden of providing welfare for single people without family
support). See generally ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
HOMOSEXUALITY (1996) (arguing, amongst other things, that same-sex marriage
would help curb promiscuity among gay men).
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markets, and a strong national defense . . . .”275 It argues that these
principles “are consistent with the equal protection of laws for gay and
lesbian Americans.” The Log Cabin Republicans support the legal
recognition of same-sex relationships and oppose legislative initiatives
intended to block same-sex marriage.276 Log Cabin Republicans tend
to emphasize the principles of both libertarianism (individual choice,
privacy, and protection from government intervention277) and fiscal
conservatism (the assumption of individual responsibility and gays
and lesbians as responsible tax payers seeking tax fairness) in their
support of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships.278
275. Brief of Amici Curiae Log Cabin Republicans and Liberty Education Forum at
*2, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102 ) (stating that the moral
values that underlie their principles are consistent with equal protection for gays and
lesbians); see also Liberty Education Forum (describing its mandate as working
“toward achieving freedom and fairness for all Americans, regardless of sexual
orientation”), at http://www.libertyeducationforum.org/lefcontents/aboutus/ (last
visited July 9, 2005).
276. See Sean Bugg, Right Here, Right Now: Interview with Log Cabin Republican
Executive Director Patrick Guerriero, METROWEEKLY, July 10, 2003 (quoting Patrick
Guerriero, the Executive Director of the Log Cabin Republicans), available at
http://www.metroweekly.com/feature/?ak=543 (last visited July 31, 2005). He speaks
of the need to:
[C]hange the language around the so-called marriage issue. We should be
talking about fairness via a civil contract, which is what marriage really is.
When people use the word marriage it brings up connotations of intervening
in religious ceremonies and institutions. That is not at all what gays and
lesbians are asking for. We’re asking for the right to have a piece of paper
that recognizes our tax-paying, loving relationships, that offers us tax fairness
in America.
Id.; see also LOG CABIN REPUBLICANS, A MESSAGE FROM LOG CABIN REPUBLICANS, Aug. 6,
2003 [hereinafter Message from LCR] (declaring that Log Cabin Republicans’ efforts
for civil recognition aim to obtain legal and financial responsibilities that come with
establishing a life-long relationship) (on file with the Journal of Gender, Social Policy
& the Law); Press Release, Log Cabin Republicans, Log Cabin Republicans of New
York Joins National Campaign Against Constitutional Amendment Targeting Gay
Families (Sept. 5, 2003) [hereinafter LCR Press Release] (attacking the proposed
constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage as a distortion of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights) (on file with the Journal of Gender, Social Policy
& the Law).
277. See, e.g., LCR Press Release, supra note 276 (sending a message against the
Constitutional Amendment banning same-sex marriage, by stating, “[t]he Founders
drafted the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to protect the rights of individuals
from the intrusive forces of government . . . . The federal marriage amendment
attacks the very premise of our founding document”). Further, the Press Release
argued that the constitutional amendment “seeks to take the rights of selfgovernment away from these families and place the power to define the institution of
marriage, which the Founders prudently entrusted to the states, with a distant federal
government.” Id.
278. See id. (supporting its opposition against the proposed constitutional
amendment with the statistic that over 594,000 gay and lesbian couples live in each
county in the U.S.); see also Message from LCR, supra note 276 (stressing that gays
and lesbians want the same rights as other Americans, such as tax fairness and the
legal structure to make their families stable and secure); News Update, Log Cabin
Republicans, Log Cabin Challenges Frist (R-TN) on Anti-Gay Constitutional
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Yet, as the next section illustrates, these theoretical differences
have, until very recently, largely disappeared in the public policy
debates surrounding same-sex marriage. In the legislative forum
these libertarian and fiscal conservative voices have been
overshadowed by social conservatism, which has been the dominant
conservative voice in federal public policy debates about same-sex
marriage. However, a more libertarian discourse has begun to
emerge as a challenge to the dominance of social conservatism.
2. Federal Initiatives: From the Defense of Marriage Act to the
Federal Marriage Amendment
Over the past decade, gay and lesbian rights activists have begun to
challenge the exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of
marriage with some success.279 In May 1991, three same-sex couples
filed a lawsuit against the state of Hawaii challenging the
constitutionality of the opposite-sex requirement of marriage.280
While the trial court rejected the challenge, the Hawaii Supreme
Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the
state had a compelling state interest that could justify discrimination
against same-sex couples.281 In 1996, the trial court found that the
state had not met its burden of justifying the marriage law
discrimination.282
Shortly thereafter, the Hawaii legislature
responded by placing a constitutional amendment on the 1998 ballot
that would give the legislature the power to restrict marriage to
opposite-sex couples only.283 They also passed the Reciprocal
Amendment, June 30, 2003 [hereinafter LCR Challenges Frist] (contending that the
“real threat to traditional marriage” is not homosexuals but the fifty percent divorce
rate in the United States) (on file with the Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the
Law), available at http://www.lcrga.com/archive/200306301204.shtml (last visited
July 31, 2005).
279. But see Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974) (holding that the
state's denial of a marriage license to a gay couple was required by state statutes and
was permitted by both the state and federal constitutions); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971) (holding that a Minnesota statute governing
marriage did not authorize marriage between persons of the same sex and was not
unconstitutional).
280. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48-49 (Haw. 1993) (challenging the
constitutionality of § 572-1 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, which restricted marriage
to a male and a female).
281. See id. at 63 (presuming unconstitutional laws based on suspect classes unless
the government can show a compelling interest).
282. See Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)
(requiring the government to show prejudice to the public in order for the public to
claim a compelling interest in withholding the marriage right from same-sex
couples).
283. See HAW. CONST., art. I, § 23 (1998) (granting the legislature the power to
restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples); see also 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 2883
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Beneficiaries Act, which allowed same-sex couples and others
excluded from marriage to register as reciprocal beneficiaries, and
thereby be subject to a limited range of the rights and responsibilities
enjoyed by married couples.
But, in the aftermath of the Hawaii Supreme Court decision and
the subsequent trial court ruling, many believed that Hawaii was on
the cusp of recognizing same-sex marriage. Opponents feared that if
Hawaii did so, other states would be forced to recognize the validity of
Hawaii marriages.284 Beginning with Utah, states began to pass laws
defining marriage as a union between opposite sexes and limiting the
recognition of same-sex marriage.285 Over the next six years, thirtyfour states followed Utah’s example, legislating against the
recognition of same-sex marriages.286
Congress also responded to the Hawaii challenge to traditional
marriage. In May 1996, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was
(ratifying an amendment that permits the state to withhold marriage rights from
same-sex couples in November 1998); Baehr v. Miike, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, *8
(1999) (holding that the marriage amendment placed Hawaii Revised Statutes § 5721 beyond the scope of the state’s equal protection clause and thereby rendered the
challenge to the statute prohibiting same-sex marriage moot).
284. See ROBERT LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 221 (4th ed. 1986)
(stating that the marriage’s place of celebration ordinarily determines the validity of
marriage); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (2004) (presuming
that marriages valid where they were celebrated will be recognized elsewhere, unless
the marriage violates public policy); Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the
Defense of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1997).
In the United States, public policy has often been invoked to deny
recognition to incestuous, underage, or interracial marriages. Unless a
restriction violated some substantive constitutional prohibition [as, it was
eventually held, the prohibition of interracial marriage did], states have never
been constitutionally prevented from withholding recognition from foreign
marriages where those marriages violated their own strong public policies.
Whether any particular marriage need be recognized is, then, primarily a
question of state rather than federal law.
Id.; see also Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in
Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1101
(1994) (contending that states should recognize same-sex marriage because it
eliminates both discrimination based on prejudice and state interference with
personal relationships); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and
Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998). But see Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island
of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment on Same-Sex Marriage and Federalism
Values, 16 QUINNIPAC L. REV. 191, 200 (1996) (analogizing same-sex marriage to
incest or polygamy to conclude that states can prohibit types of marriage based on
strong public policy).
285. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 27 (2002) (recounting that Utah initially amended its marriage
law to declare same-sex marriages invalid and later amended it so that state courts
would not recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages).
286. See id. at 27-28 (comparing Utah to other states’ responses, which passed a
variety of laws, from redefining marriage to refusing to recognize any contractual
rights created by same-sex marriages).
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introduced in the Senate. A parallel bill was introduced in the House
by Representative Robert Barr and others. The bill passed in the
House by a vote of 342-67 on July 12, 1996, and in the Senate by a
vote of 85-14 on September 10, 1996.287 President Clinton signed
DOMA just after midnight on September 21, 1996.288 DOMA defines
marriage as “only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife,” and “spouse” as “only . . . a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife.”289 The law permits states to ignore
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution in relation to
same-sex marriages by authorizing the states to refuse to recognize
“any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . .
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State . . . .”290
Congressional debates on DOMA overwhelmingly reflected a social
conservative vision of family, in which same-sex marriage is seen to
threaten the very fabric of American society.291 As the following
excerpts from Congressional debates illustrate, the political discourse
was one that emphasized the hallmarks of social conservatism. Many
defended the opposite-sex definition of marriage on the basis of
tradition. Senator Don Nickles stated, “[t]he definitions of [DOMA]
are based on common understanding rooted in our Nation’s history,
our statutes, and our case law. They merely reaffirm what Americans
have meant for 200 years when using the words marriage and

287. 142 CONG. REC. 17094 (1996) (listing the names of Representatives against
the bill, for the bill, and not voting); 142 CONG. REC. S10129 (1996) (discussing
whether the states should retain the exclusive right to legislate on whether to
recognize same-sex marriages valid in other states).
288. See, e.g., Clinton Campaign Pulls Ad After Outcry, S.F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 23,
1996, at A10 (stating that the gay and lesbian community were angered when
President Clinton signed DOMA and referred to him as a “fair-weather friend”).
289. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C) (restricting the federal definition of marriage to one between a
man and a woman while permitting states to develop their own definition).
290. Id. (adding a section to ensure that states preserved their right to legislate
independently on family law and marriage).
291. See, e.g., Charles J. Butler, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress’s Use of
Narrative in the Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841 (1998)
(claiming that during Congress’ debates on DOMA, it used anecdotes to reinforce
the apprehensions of permitting same-sex marriages and to justify the statute); James
M. Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment of Fundamentalist
Christianity, 4 MICH, J. GENDER & L. 335, 338 (1997) (criticizing the intent of the
Defense of Marriage Act for lacking secular goals and thus violating the Establishment
clause of the Constitution); Alec Walen, The “Defense of Marriage Act” and
Authoritarian Morality, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619, 619 (1997) (categorizing
Congressional arguments against same-sex marriages into six parts: “:(1) politics and
economics; (2) history and tradition; (3) religion; (4) the essential nature of marriage
and the family; (5) social decay; and (6) morality”).
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spouse.”292
Many also focused on the procreative nature of marriage. The
House Report noted, “[s]imply defined, marriage is a relationship
within which the community socially approves and encourages sexual
intercourse and the birth of children. It is society’s way of signaling to
would-be parents that their long-term relationship is socially
important—a public concern, not simply a private affair.”293 Senator
Robert Byrd stated,
The purpose of this kind of union between human beings of
opposite gender is primarily for the establishment of a home
atmosphere in which a man and a woman . . . bring into being
children for the fulfillment of their love for one another and for
the greater good of the human community at large.294

Some commented on the threat of social chaos that the destruction
of the traditional family would produce.
Representative Asa
Hutchinson stated, “[O]ur country can survive many things, but one
thing it cannot survive is the destruction of the family unit which
forms the foundation of our society. Those among us who truly desire
a strong and thriving America for our children and grandchildren will
defend traditional heterosexual marriage . . . .”295
Senator Byrd argued, “Much of America has lost its moorings.
Norms no longer exist. We have lost our way with a speed that is
awesome.”296 Some also emphasized the religious basis of marriage.
Representative Hutchinson stated, “[M]arriage is a covenant
established by God wherein one man and one woman are united for
the purpose of founding and maintaining a family.”297
Representative Charles Canady declared, “[T]he traditional family
structure—centered on the lawful union between one man and one
woman—comports with nature and with our Judeo-Christian moral
tradition.”298
292. 142 CONG. REC. S10103 (1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles) (arguing that
DOMA does not interfere with the States’ ability to define marriage how it chooses).
293. H.R. REP. 104-664, at 15 (1996) (justifying society’s interest in safeguarding
traditional marriage on the connection between marriage and children).
294. 142 CONG. REC. S10109 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (basing his view that
only the relationship between a man and a woman is worthy of legal recognition and
protection on history and culture).
295. 142 CONG. REC. 16970 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hutchinson) (stating that
the majority of people would reserve marriage for a man and a woman).
296. 142 CONG. REC. S10111 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (defending the
traditional definition of marriage based on the institution laid out in the Bible).
297. 142 CONG. REC. 16970 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hutchinson) (contending
that the bill “simply restat[es]” the traditional view of marriage as set out both by the
United States and State Supreme Courts).
298. 142 CONG. REC. H7441 (1996) (statement of Rep. Canady) (restricting
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Many focused on questions of morality. Representative Bob Barr
noted, “The flames of hedonism, the flames of narcissism, the flames
of self-centered morality are licking at the very foundations of our
society: the family unit.”299 The House Report further stated, “Civil
laws that permit only heterosexual marriage reflect and honor a
collective moral judgment about human sexuality. This judgment
entails both moral disapproval of homosexuality and a moral
conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality.”300 Relatedly, a strong current
of disapproval of homosexuality also ran through the debates,
sometimes erupting in explicit condemnation. Representative Tom
Coburn explained, “I come from a district . . . who has very profound
beliefs that homosexuality is wrong.”301
While this social conservative discourse of tradition, morality and
religion dominated the Congressional debates, fiscal conservative
arguments also appeared intermittently in the debate. Interestingly,
however, these arguments were deployed not to expand the definition
of marriage and spouse to include a broader range of individuals and
thereby broaden the scope of private responsibility. Rather, the fiscal
arguments were deployed by the proponents of DOMA, asserting that
the expansion of marriage and spouse would increase public costs.
Senator Phil Gramm, for example, argued:
A failure to pass this bill, if the Hawaii court rules in favor of samesex marriage, will create . . . a whole group of new beneficiaries—no
one knows what the number would be—tens of thousands,
hundreds of thousands, potentially more—who will be beneficiaries
of newly created survivor benefits under Social Security, Federal
retirement plans, and military retirement plans. It will trigger a
whole group of new benefits under Federal health plans. And not
only will it trigger these benefits for the Federal Government, but
under the full faith and credit provision of the Constitution, it will
impose—through teacher retirement plans, State retirement plans,
State medical plans, and even railroad retirement plans—a whole
marriage to a relationship between a man and a woman); see also 142 CONG. REC.
H7486 (1996) (statement of Rep. Buyer) (“We as legislators and leaders for the
country are in the midst of a chaos, an attack upon God’s principles. God laid down
that one man and one woman is a legal union. That is marriage, known for
thousands of years. That God-given principle is under attack.”).
299. 142 CONG. REC. H7480-05 (1996) (statement of Rep. Barr) (criticizing
“extremists” for forcing a “tortured view of morality” on the United States people).
300. H.R. REP. 104-664, at 15-16 (defending the traditional view of marriage by
asserting that approving same-sex marriage would not only be illegitimate, but also
trivialize the legitimacy of traditional marriage).
301. 142 CONG. REC. H7444 (1996) (statement of Sen. Coburn) (describing his
District’s view that homosexuality is based on perversion and lust).
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new set of benefits and expenses which have not been planned or
budgeted for under current law.302

Similarly, Representative Barr stated, “[I]f you do not believe it is
fiscally responsible to throw open the doors of the U.S. Treasury to be
raided by the homosexual movement, then the choice is very
clear.”303 Other representatives in the House agreed with Senator
Gramm. Representative Dave Weldon stated, “I think it would be
wrong to take money out of the pockets of working families across
America and use those tax dollars to give Federal acceptance and
financial support to same-sex marriages.”304
These fiscal conservative arguments were made notwithstanding the
fact that no study was conducted regarding the impact of the
recognition of gay marriage on state and federal benefits programs.305
The House of Representatives turned back an amendment to DOMA
that would have “commissioned a General Accounting Office study of
these and related questions.”306 Thus, Congress failed to consider the
relative costs of benefits of expanding the marriage; in fact, the idea
of saving money through potential privatization of public costs did
not enter the political discussion. Rather, the political discourse—
overwhelmingly influenced by a social conservative vision of the family
that is anything but agnostic on same-sex marriage—simply deployed
the rhetoric of fiscal costs in support of its traditional family agenda.
DOMA did not put an end to the constitutional challenges to
marriage by same-sex couples. The battle over same-sex marriage
subsequently moved to Vermont, where the state Supreme Court of
Vermont held that the opposite sex definition of marriage violated
the common benefits provision of the state constitution.307 But,
rather than redefine marriage to include same sex couples, the Court
handed the issue back to the Vermont legislature to craft an
302. 142 CONG. REC. 142 Cong. Rec. S10100-02 (1996) (statement of Sen.
Gramm).
303. 142 CONG. REC. H7488 (1996) (statement of Rep. Barr) (suggesting that only
those who believe that the beliefs of the American public are meaningless would
oppose DOMA).
304. 142 CONG. REC. H7493 (1996) (statement of Rep. Weldon) (expressing
concern that a State’s recognition of same-sex marriages would affect federal policies
such as Social Security benefits).
305. See Donovan, supra note 291, at 356-57 (describing and refuting the Senate’s
concern that same-sex marriages would overtax the current programs allowing for
spousal benefits).
306. See id. at 358 (concluding that the failure to conduct a study while debating
the bill was intentional) (citing 142 CONG. REC. H7503-05 (daily ed. July 12, 1996)).
307. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (rejecting the State's
arguments that the State's interest in furthering procreation and traditional childrearing warrants a ban on same-sex marriages).
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appropriate remedy.308 After considerable and heated debate, the
Vermont legislature enacted the Civil Unions Act, which established a
parallel regime whereby same sex couples could register their civil
unions, and thereby be subject to the same rights and responsibilities
as married couples.309
Same sex marriage challenges have continued apace. In November
2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found the opposite sex
definition of marriage to be in violation of the state Constitution and,
in a subsequent reference, held that a civil unions law would also be
in violation of the equality rights in the state Constitution.310 A
similar same-sex marriage challenge is still pending in New Jersey.311
And same sex marriage challenges have proliferated beginning with
the actions of Mayor Newsom of San Francisco who began issuing
marriage licenses to same sex couples in February, 2004.312
With these same-sex marriage challenges pending and the Supreme
Court striking down Texas’ sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas, social
conservatives have once again placed their opposition to same-sex
marriage squarely on the federal public agenda.313 In May 2003,
Representative Marilyn Musgrave proposed an amendment to the

308. See id. at 886-87 (imagining that the legislature could devise a system to
define marriage as heterosexual marriage while still protecting the common benefits
rights of same-sex couples).
309. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1201-1207 (2004) (extending the benefits of
marriage to same-sex couples).
310. See Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003)
(finding that the State’s interest in creating an environment to further procreation
did not constitute a rational basis for banning same-sex marriage); see also Cheryl
Wetzstein, States Lining Up to Outlaw Same-Sex 'Marriage', WASH. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2004, at A03 (noting that Massachusetts state legislature subsequently agreed to
amend the state constitution to allow civil unions and ban same sex marriage).
311. See Lewis v. Harris, 2003 WL 23191114, at *7-8 (N.J. 2003) (rejecting samesex marriage benefits as a fundamental right embedded in the Federal or State
constitution).
312. See Dean E. Murphy, California Attorney General is Pressed on Gay Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A19 (discussing judicial and political challenges to San
Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom's directive to allow same-sex couples to legally
marry).
313. See 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down a Texas sodomy law that
prohibited gay sex because it violated the right to privacy protected by the Due
Process Clause). In his classically social conservative dissenting opinion, Justice
Antonin Scalia warned of the dire consequences of the majority:
The Court today pretends that it possesses a . . . freedom of action, so that we
need not fear judicial imposition of homosexual marriage, as has recently
occurred in Canada. Do not believe it . . . . Today’s opinion dismantles the
structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made
between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition
in marriage is concerned.
Id. at 604 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage in the United States.314
As initially drafted, the Federal Marriage Amendment (“FMA”) read:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a
man and a woman. Neither this Constitution nor the constitution
of any state under state or federal law shall be construed to require
that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
314. See Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. RES. 56, 108th Cong. (2003)
(proposing a constitutional amendment that would define and limit marriage to one
between a man and a woman). The Federal Marriage Amendment is a bipartisan
proposal, whose sponsors include Collin Peterson (D-MN), Mike McIntyre (D-NC),
Ralph Hall (D-TX), Marilyn Musgrave (R-CO), Jo Ann Davis (R-VA) and David Vitter
(R-LA). Id.; see also Press Release, Alliance for Marriage, Introduction of the Federal
Marriage Amendment in Congress (May 15, 2002) (noting that the Alliance for
Marriage, a racially diverse organization “dedicated to promoting marriage and
addressing the epidemic of fatherless families in the United States,” has spearheaded
the campaign for the constitutional amendment for several years), available at
http://www.allianceformarriage.org/site/PageServer?pagename=mac_coalition_state
ment (last visited July 24, 2005). The Alliance for Marriage is committed to a range
of neo-conservative public policy reforms to promote the traditional family. Id. On
the proposed constitutional amendment, the organization states, in classically social
conservative terms:
For several decades, America has been wandering in a wilderness of social
problems caused by family disintegration. And an overwhelming body of
social science data has established that America's greatest social problems -violent crime, welfare dependency, and child poverty -- track more closely
with family disintegration than they do with any other social variable,
including race and income level. Tragically, as bad as our current situation
may be, it could soon become dramatically worse. This is because the courts
in America are poised to erase the legal road map to marriage and the family
from American law. In fact, the weakening of the legal status of marriage in
America at the hands of the courts has already begun. . . . The institution of
marriage is so central to the well being of both children and our society that
it was, until recently, difficult to imagine that marriage itself would need
explicit constitutional protection. However, our country's time-honored
understanding that the very essence of marriage is the union of male and
female has come under fire in the courts.
Id. The Alliance for Marriage concludes that the only way to protect the institution of
marriage from its disintegration at the hands of the courts is through a constitutional
amendment. Id.; Necessary Amendment: On Gay Marriage, NAT’L REV., Aug. 11,
2003, at 15 (objecting to judges and states deciding whether or not to legalize samesex marriage), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/11aug03/editors
081103a.asp (last visited July 31, 2005); Robert P. George, The 28th Amendment,
NAT’L REV., July 23, 2001, at 3234 (concluding that because the judiciary is eroding
the concept of marriage, a national campaign to preserve the institution must be
mounted quickly); Robert H. Bork, Stop Courts From Imposing Gay Marriage: Why
We Need a Constitutional Amendment, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2001, at A14 (blaming the
courts for leading the “radical redefinition of marriage” while the majority of
Americans do not want to special rights for homosexuals); Maggie Gallagher, Do We
Need a Federal Marriage Amendment?, TOWNHALL.COM, July 18, 2001 (arguing that
the Federal Marriage Amendment would not prohibit legislatures and private
corporations
from
extending
benefits
to
unmarried
couples),
at
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/maggiegallagher/mg20010718.shtml
(last
visited July 25, 2005). But see Todd Hertz, Christian Conservatives Split on Federal
Marriage Amendment, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, June 17, 2002 (criticizing the Alliance for
Marriage for not going far enough to prevent states from recognizing same-sex
marriage), available at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2002/123/43.0.html
(last visited June 16, 2005).
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unmarried couples or groups.315

The proposal was referred to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
the Constitution the day before the Supreme Court ruling in
Lawrence. The Senate debated the need for a constitutional
amendment such as the FMA in subcommittee hearings in September
2003.316 Senator Allard subsequently introduced a Senate version of
the FMA and referred it to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. A
Senate version of the FMA was subsequently introduced by Senator
Allard, and referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.317 On
March 23, 2004—the day before the Senate Subcommittee hearings
on the FMA—Senator Allard and Representative Musgrove
introduced an amended text:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a
man and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution
of any State, marriage shall be construed to require that marriage
or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other
than the union of a man and a woman.318

The amendment was largely in response to the criticism that the
FMA, as originally drafted was so broad that it would prohibit
individual states from introducing civil union or other partnership
recognition legislation. The revised text is intended to narrow the
FMA to prevent a conflict with any such state legislation.
In the intervening period, same sex marriage challenges continued
apace, adding further momentum to the social conservative resolve to
move forward with their anti-same sex marriage agenda.
In
November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down the
opposite sex definition of marriage as violating the state constitution,
and held that same sex marriages would begin to be recognized in six
months. On a reference from the Massachusetts legislature, the
Supreme Court subsequently stated that a civil union regime would
not be consistent with the state constitution. Then, in a somewhat
unexpected development, in February 2004, the Mayor of San
Francisco told city officials to begin issuing marriage licenses to same
315. H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing a constitutional amendment to
be ratified by the States).
316. See generally What is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan Defense of Marriage
Act of 1996: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. of the Constitution, Civil Rights and
Property Rights, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Bipartisan Defense Hearing]
(debating whether there was a need for a constitutional amendment banning samesex marriage).
317. See Federal Marriage Amendment, S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003)
(proposing a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage throughout the
United States).
318. S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. (2004).
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sex couples. Indeed, it has been these developments that have
brought the issue squarely within the federal limelight. While
President Bush initially hinted at his support for the constitutional
amendment,319 in both the State of the Union 2004, and even more
explicitly in a press conference on February 24, 2004, he specifically
stated his support for a constitutional amendment banning same sex
marriage.320
The Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, and the House Subcommittee on the
Constitution each held hearings in March 2004. Those who have
testified at the hearings in favor of the FMA have cast their arguments
in social conservative terms. However, as an analysis of the hearings
reveals there are also some marked departures from the political
debate surrounding DOMA a decade earlier. Four discrete and
recurrent themes are evident in the FMA hearings to date: the decline
of the family,321 the need to protect children within traditional
319. See Neil A. Lewis, From the Rose Garden: Same-Sex Marriage; Bush Backs Bid
to Block Gays from Marrying, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A1 (quoting President
Bush’s appeal to social conservatives and religion in his 2004 State of the Union
Address).
[W]e’re all sinners. . . . On the other hand, that does not mean that
somebody like me needs to compromise on issues such as marriage. And
that's really where the issue is headed here in Washington, and that is the
definition of marriage. I believe marriage is between a man and a woman,
and I believe we ought to codify that one way or the other and we have
lawyers looking at the best way to do that.
Id.; see also Robert Pear & David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush Plans $1.5 Billion Drive for
Promotion of Marriage, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 14, 2004, at A1 (quoting President Bush’s
response to whether he would support a constitutional amendment against gay
marriage and gay civil unions).
If necessary . . . I will support a constitutional amendment which would
honor marriage between a man and a woman, codify that, and will—the
position of this administration is that whatever legal arrangements people
want to make, they're allowed to make, so long as it's embraced by the state,
or does start at the state level.

Id.

320. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004)
[hereinafter State of the Union Address] (reprimanding “activist judges” for creating
law allowing same-sex marriages while declaring support for DOMA), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html (last visited
June 17, 2005); President George W. Bush, Presidential Press Conference, President
Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage, Feb. 24, 2004
(recommending a constitutional amendment because “activist” courts could strike
down an ordinary law), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2004/02/20040224-2.html (last visited June 17, 2005).
321. See 150 Cong. Rec. H7895-02 (statement of Rev. Richard Richardson,
Assistant Pastor) (“The dilution of the ideal—of procreation and child-rearing within
the marriage of one man and one woman—has already had a devastating effect on
our community. We need to be strengthening the institution of marriage, not
diluting it.”); see also 150 Cong. Rec. S7876-01 (2004) (statement of Hon. Orrin
Hatch, Chairman).
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marriage,322 and the need to protect democracy from activist
judges.323 A fourth theme evident throughout the hearings has been
in response to the critics of the FMA, and argues that the FMA is not
discriminatory.324
Of the six themes identified in the DOMA debates—tradition,
procreative nature of marriage, destruction of the traditional family,
religion, morality and condemnation of homosexuality—only the first
three remain evident throughout the FMA debates. Religion is rather
less in evidence in the hearing. Some of the supporters of the FMA
articulated their position in more explicit religious discourse. For
example, the American Center for Law and Justice submissions to the
House Subcommittee on the Constitution began their discussion of
marriage with a quote from Genesis.325 President Bush has at times
deployed religion in his support for FMA, although most of his
support is articulated in terms of tradition and the sanctity of
The bedrock of American success is the family, and it is traditional marriage
that undergirds the American family. The disintegration of the family in this
country correlates to the many serious social problems, including crime and
poverty. We are seeing soaring divorce rates. We are seeing soaring out-ofwedlock birth rates that have resulted in far too many fatherless families.
Weakening the legal status of marriage at this point will only exacerbate these
problems, and we simply must act to strengthen the family.
Id.; Bipartisan Defense Hearing, supra note 316 (statement of Rev. Dr. Ray
Hammond II, Pastor) (claiming that an acceptance of same-sex marriages will further
exacerbate the difficulties already faced by American families); id. (statement of
Maggie Gallagher) (contending that legalization of same-sex marriage asserts the
government’s belief that children no longer need mothers and fathers); id.
(statement of Michael Farris, President, Patrick Henry College) (indicating that the
potential for judge-made law to undermine the traditional definition of marriage is
too great to be tolerated).
322. See 150 Cong. Rec. H7897 (2004) (statement of Rev. Richard Richardson,
Assistant Pastor) (“We firmly believe that children do best when raised by a mother
and a father. . . . It is not just society—it is biology, it is basic human instinct. We
alter those expectations and basic human instincts at our peril, and at the peril of our
communities.”); see also Oversight Hearing on the Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement of Vincent McCarthy, Am.
Ctr. for Law and Justice) (arguing that “claims that raising children within a
homosexual union [are] not damaging to the children are entirely impeached by
flawed constructions and conclusions”).
323. See A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Preserve Traditional Marriage:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter
Proposed Constitutional Amendment] (statement of Prof. Katherine Spaht)
(supporting the Federal Marriage Amendment to prevent the issue from being
decided by the courts).
324. See 150 Cong. Rec. H7895-02 (statement of Rev. Richard Richardson) (“The
traditional institution of marriage is not discrimination. And I find it offensive to call
it that. Marriage was not created to oppress people. It was created for children.”).
325. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 322 (statement of Vincent McCarthy, Am.
Ctr. for Law and Justice) (quoting Genesis 1:26-27 about the creation of man, and
more specifically, the creation of male and female in support of the constitutional
amendment).
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marriage.326 However, both the American Center for Law and Justice
and President Bush have overwhelming cast their support in terms of
the traditional family.
The themes of immorality and the
condemnation of homosexuality are, however, conspicuously absent
in the political discourse of the hearings. Arguably, the discursive
terrain has shifted sufficiently in the intervening period that the social
conservatives are now forced to confront the argument that the FMA
is discriminatory. The idea that discrimination against gay men and
lesbians is wrong was simply not part of the social conservative
conversation in the DOMA debates. Social conservative discourse
simply presumed that gay men and lesbians, and same sex
relationships were morally inferior—indeed defective—and deserving
of condemnation, not equality. It would appear that this kind of
explicit condemnation of gay men and lesbians has lost some of its
political legitimacy.327 Social conservatives must instead refute the
allegation of discrimination.
Yet, much of the social conservative discourse is enduring. The
decline of the traditional and the resulting harm to children remains
foundational to their claims, and consistent with their political
discourse in other dimensions of the legal regulation of the family.
Strong government intervention is required to reverse this decline.
Indeed, it is a claim to the kind of government intervention that many
conservatives
typically
oppose—federal
and
constitutional
intervention in an issue that falls squarely within state jurisdiction.
The FMA then not only runs counter to libertarian conservative
claims for minimalist government, but also for local and state
governance over federal. To the extent that it is even addressed,
social conservative supporters of the FMA attempt to justify this
intervention in terms of the importance of the interest at stake.
326. See Lewis, supra note 319 (indicating that Bush’s statement that “we’re all
sinners” in his 2004 State of the Union address was mix of tolerance with his
conservative policy); see also, State of the Union Address, supra note 320 (“The same
moral tradition that defines marriage also teaches that each individual has dignity and
value in God's sight.”).
327. See Alan Cooperman, Santorum Angers Gay Rights Groups, WASH. POST, Apr.
22, 2003, at A04 (quoting Senator Rick Santorum’s disparagement of homosexual
acts, “If the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual (gay) sex within
your home, then you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you
have the right to adultery”). The political furor that erupted around these
comments, comments which were utterly commonplace during the DOMA debates,
suggests that the terrain of legitimate debate and comment around gay and lesbian
issues is shifting. But see Press Release, Concerned Women for America, CWA
Condemns “Gay Thought Police” Attacks on Sen. Santorum (Apr. 22, 2003)
(implying that the shift must not be overstated because many individuals and
organizations
continue
to
oppose
homosexual
acts),
available
at
http://www.cultureandfamily.org/articledisplay.asp?id=3817&department=CFI&categ
oryid =cfreport (last visited June 17, 2005).
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While libertarian arguments have been largely ignored, some
witnesses have attempted to address and reject these concerns. For
example, Katherine Shaw Spaht, a witness before the Senate Judiciary
Committee hearings, attempted to justify the intrusion into states’
rights on the basis of the importance of the interests at stake.328
Spaht also argued that the courts have reinterpreted (and in her view,
misinterpreted) liberty rights as a “radical right of individual
autonomy without the tempering language of ‘the common
good.’”329 It is an argument of liberty going too far; of liberty coming
unhinged from its foundations in the “country’s history and
tradition.”330 It is an argument that appeals to the social conservative
emphasis on authority over freedom, social order over individual
liberty. In a similar rejection of more libertarian ideas, Maggie
Gallagher, a witness before the Senate Subcommittee on the
Constitution Hearings in September 2004, specifically considered and
rejected the private choice arguments in favor of same-sex
marriage.331 In her view, the interest of children in opposite-sex
parents far outweighs any right of individuals to make intimate
choices.
While this social conservative rhetoric remains the dominant
conservative voice around same sex marriage, a more libertarian
discourse has begun to emerge in federal political debates beyond the
few lone voices of the Log Cabin Republicans. A private choice
approach to the question of gay and lesbian rights has begun to
328. See Proposed Constitutional Amendment, supra note 323 (statement of Prof.
Katherine Splaht).
State experimentation as fifty individual laboratories has not been permitted
when the question is as fundamental as what is marriage . . . . We don’t
permit a state to experiment with socialism or printing its own currency.
Denying such experimentation is especially prevalent if there is concern for
the welfare of children . . . . Children’s welfare is central and at stake in a
common understanding of marriage.
Id.
329. Id. (expressing concern that the courts’ interpretation of liberty has rendered
the definition of marriage unpredictable in the future).
330. Id.
331. See Bipartisan Defense Hearing, supra note 316 (statement of Maggie
Gallagher).
Two ideas are in conflict here: one is that children deserve mothers and
father (sic), and that adults have an obligation to at least try to conduct their
sexual lives to give children this important protection. That is the marriage
idea. The other is that adult interests in sexual liberty are more important
than “imposing” or preferring any one family form: all family forms must be
treated identically by law if adults are to be free to make intimate choices.
This is the core idea behind the drive for same-sex marriage. And it is the
core idea that must be rejected if the marriage idea is to be sustained.
Id.
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emerge from within the judicial forum with the United States
Supreme Court decision in Lawrence, and a similar libertarian
sensibility is beginning to make its way into the political realm as
conservative opposition to the FMA. In Lawrence, the United States
Supreme Court in striking down the Texas sodomy law, articulated a
strong right to liberty that encompassed the right of gays and lesbians
to enter into consensual, sexual relationships in the privacy of their
homes free from government intervention. It described the sodomy
laws as “touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”332 According
to the majority opinion, the State should not attempt
[T]o define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries
absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter
upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.333

While the significance of this passage and the decision for same-sex
marriage will be debated for years to come,334 it does represent a
strong statement of a right to be free from government intervention
in the personal sphere of privacy. In contrast to the legislative forum,
where social conservative arguments remain dominant, Lawrence
represents a significant incursion of a private choice approach in
which a libertarian sensibility trumped the social conservative
argument in favor of the legal prohibition of same-sex conduct.335
While it is too early to tell, it is possible to speculate that the discursive
332. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (concluding that the Court failed to appreciate the
liberty rights at issue in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), before overruling
the previous decision).
333. Id. (counseling against the government’s attempts to limit the types of
relationships a person may legally enter into).
334. Compare id. at 578 (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter.”), with id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion
dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be
made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in
marriage is concerned.”). According to Scalia, once “moral disapprobation of
homosexual conduct” is removed as a justification for limiting marriage to opposite
sexes, little other justification remains. Id. at 604-05.
335. See generally Randy Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s libertarian Revolution:
Lawrence v. Texas, CATO SUPREME CT. REV. 21, 36 (2002-03) (arguing that Kennedy
has endorsed a “presumption of liberty” that places the burden on the government to
justify a restriction on freedom rather than a burden on the citizen to establish the
liberty is fundamental).
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power of liberty in the judicial forum may be beginning to displace, or
at least challenge, the hold of social conservatism on issues of gay and
lesbian rights. While the private choice arguments in relation to
same-sex couples still finds little support in the legislative forum, the
Supreme Court ruling in Lawrence is illustrative of the ways in which
the law operates to mediate and select amongst competing
discourses.336 In affirming this private choice approach, the Supreme
Court discourse is forced onto the legislative stage of governments
otherwise committed to a more social conservative vision. While there
may be significant limitations on the ability of the judiciary to do so in
the future, given its precarious ideological balance and the politically
contested nature of judicial appointments, it is worth observing that
the discursive power of liberty is powerful in law. When a social
conservative vision collided with a private choice one, moderate
conservatives, like Justices Kennedy and Souter, sided with the
discourses of liberal legalism, allowing private choice to trump moral
regulation. Lawrence may represent the beginning of a cleavage
between libertarian and social conservative voices in judicial
discussions of same-sex issues.
Quite arguably, the criminalization of gay sex represents a more
egregious violation of private choice than the prohibition on same-sex
marriage. While libertarians would unanimously condemn the
former, they might take a different position of the latter. For
example, some might be wary of the judiciary finding a constitutional
right to same-sex marriage and imposing that right on a recalcitrant
state. Others might be more inclined to see the state get out of
marriage entirely.337 It is thus not a foregone conclusion that the
private choice approach endorsed in Lawrence would be extended to
same-sex marriage.
However, some conservative voices have increasingly articulated
their discomfort with the social conservative position on same-sex
marriage. Several prominent Republicans appeared before the
Senate and House committee hearings to speak against the FMA.
They have not cast arguments to support the concept of same-sex
marriage, but because they see the marriage amendment as an undue
intervention in state and individual rights.338 Former Republican
336. See HERMAN, supra note 79, at 137-69.
337. See David Boaz, Privatizing Marriage, SLATE (Apr. 25, 1997) (arguing that the
legal regulation of intimate relationships should be left to the parties to structure
according to their own private choices), available at http://www.slate.com/
toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2440 (last visited June 17, 2005).
338. See Bipartisan Defense Hearing, supra note 316 (statement of Prof. Dale
Carpernter) (arguing that since the Constitution, states have retained the authority to
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Congressman Bob Barr, an author of the Defense of Marriage Act, has
opposed the constitutional amendment stating that, “A constitutional
amendment is both unnecessary and needlessly intrusive and
punitive.”339 In Barr’s view, “marriage is a quintessential state
issue.”340 It is, in his view, a conservative vision:
As conservatives, we should be committed to the idea that people
should . . . be free to govern themselves as they see fit. State and
local governments provide the easiest and most representative
avenue to this ideal . . . . In the best conservative tradition, each
state should make its own decision without interference from
Washington.341

Barr acknowledges social conservative fears about the demise of the
family, and endorses the need to return stability to the American
family.342 But, in his view, “homosexual couples seeking to marry did
not cause this problem, and the Federal Marriage Amendment cannot
be the solution.”343 He thus distinguishes his position on same-sex
marriage from other social conservatives.
Former Republican Senator Alan Simpson has similarly stated his
opposition to the FMA in the language of state rights and individual
legislate on all matters not reserved to the federal government and have traditionally
controlled the area of family law).
339. See Bob Barr, Leave Marriage to the States, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2003, at A23
(asserting that DOMA goes as far as the federal government needs to go in defining
the legal parameters of marriage).
340. See Preserving Traditional Marriage: A View From the States: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (2004) (statement of Hon. Bob Barr, Chairman)
(stating that he spend efforts to ensure the traditional institution of marriage in his
home state of Georgia but would not advise Alaska or California how to define
marriage).
341. Id. (noting, cautiously, but explicitly, his opposition to same-sex marriage:
“To be clear, I oppose any marriage save that between one man and one woman.
And, I would do all in my power to ensure that such a formulation is the only one
operative in my home state of Georgia.”). However, in his view, individual states are
entitled to make their own decisions. Id. Barr also opposes the FMA on the grounds
that the Constitution should not be easily amended. Id. He fears that amending the
Constitution for this purpose would be a dangerous precedent which could lead to
liberal activists modifying the Second Amendment, or banning tax cuts. Id. In his
view, the Constitution should not be used to promote particular political ideologies
and a constitutional amendment is unnecessary in light of DOMA and the legislation
in thirty-eight states prohibiting same sex marriage. Id.
342. See id.
I worry, as do many Americans, about the erosion of the nuclear family, the
loosening influence of basic morality, and the ever-growing pervasiveness of
overtly sexual and violent imagery in popular entertainment. Divorce is at an
astronomical rate—children born out of wedlock are approaching the
number born to matrimony. The family is under threat, no question.
Id.
343. Id. (emphasizing the need for solutions to restoring family values and stability,
but refusing to endorse the constitutional amendment as an effective answer).
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liberty.344 In his view, the FMA would undermine the basic principles
of federalism.345 “[I]t is surely not the tradition in this country to try
to amend the Constitution in ways that constrict liberty.”346 He
further argues that the FMA would not be consistent with Republican
values of “respecting the rights and dignity of the individual.”347
Many of the witnesses quoted with approval the words of Vice
President Cheney, although the Vice President has subsequently
distanced himself from this position:
The fact of the matter is we live in a free society, and freedom
means freedom for everybody. That means people should be free
to enter into any kind of relationship they want to enter into . . . . I
think we ought to do everything we can to tolerate and
accommodate whatever kind of relationships people want to enter
into.348

This statement goes farther than a mere assertion of state rights; it
comes closer to a libertarian assertion of the rights of individuals, and
the rights of gay men and lesbians in particular to make their own
private choices about how to structure their private lives.
The conservative opposition to the FMA, while falling short of
supporting same-sex marriage, reflects a libertarian sentiment about
private choice and limited government. These republican voices join
Log Cabin Republicans who have similarly voiced their opposition to

344. See Alan Simpson, Missing the Point on Gays, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2003, at
A21 (explaining that “Republicans have always believed that government actions that
affect someone’s personal life, property and liberty—including, if not especially
marriage—should be made at the level of government closest to the people.”); Press
Release, Republican Unity Coalition, Why RUC? (opposing the Federal Marriage
Amendment based on federalism and the Republican belief in limited government),
available at http://www.republicanunity.com/background.html (last visited June 17,
2005); see also Deb Price, Gerald Ford: Treat Gay Couples Equally, DETROIT NEWS,
Oct. 29, 2001, at 11A (contending that former president Gerald Ford, another
prominent member of the RUC, has publicly stated he is in favor of treating gay
couples the same as married couples).
345. See Simpson, supra note 344 (suggesting that the proposed constitutional
amendment would undermine federalism and achieve nothing to strengthen
American families).
346. Id. (contrasting the proposed amendment to past constitutional amendments,
which the legislature has consistently designed to expand freedom and liberty).
347. See id. (stressing that the real threats to American family values are “divorce,
out-of-wedlock births and infidelity,” not homosexuality).
348. Vice President Dick Cheney, The Lieberman-Cheney Vice Presidential Debate
(Oct. 5, 2000) (responding to the moderator’s question concerning whether
homosexuals in America deserve equal rights), available at http://www.debates.org/
pages/trans2000d.html (last visited June 17, 2005). Vice President Cheney has
subsequently stated that he will support whatever decision President Bush makes on
the issue. See Alan Cooperman, Mary Cheney Urged to Fight a Ban on Same-Sex
Marriage, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2004, at A03. However, Cheney’s original statement
has been cited with approval by many of the conservative opponents to the FMA.
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the FMA,349 articulating their position in the language of individual
autonomy, freedom from government intervention and tax fairness.
These statements are indicative of the beginnings of a more
libertarian inspired private choice discourse entering into public
policy debates on same-sex marriage. While the social conservative
position remains dominant (and the fiscal conservative lays dormant),
this libertarian approach represents the emergence of a fissure within
conservative politics on the question of same sex marriage, a fissure
that could produce very different positions not only on the FMA, but
on same sex marriage itself. While the libertarian position, as
articulated within federal public policy debates, has stopped well short
of supporting same-sex marriage, a position that advocates private
choice and limited government could be expected to eventually
endorse the Log Cabin Republican position in favor of same sex
marriage.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with a question about the partial privatization of
dependency in American law and policy. The analysis has sought to
reveal the extent to which the conflicts and contradictions within
conservative political discourse has been partially responsible for this
partial privatization. While a fiscal conservatism would endorse a
more robust privatization of dependency, broadening the scope and
content of family support obligations with broader definitions of
family, both libertarian and social conservatism place constraints on
this privatization. Libertarian conservatives are concerned about the
imposition of obligations in the absence of choice, and seek to
maximize private choice within the legal regulation of the family.
Social conservatives, by contrast, are concerned about promoting the
traditional family and are opposed to broader definitions of family
that would undermine this ideal. Both of these conservatisms oppose,
for entirely different reasons, an expansion of support obligations and
the privatization of dependency beyond the marital unit. For
libertarians, support obligations outside of marriage would be to
impose obligations in the absence of choice. For social conservatives,
support obligations outside of marriage would be to encourage the
demise of the traditional family.
Federal public policy in the legal regulation of marriage has been
349. See LCR Challenges Frist, supra note 278 (advocating for a type of “civil
contract providing tax fairness and family stability” for same-sex couples, without
infringing on religious values); LCR Press Release, supra note 276 (seeking rights for
same-sex couples, such as the right to visit a partner in the hospital and the right to
control the partner’s remains).
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characterized by an ebb and flow in the relative power of fiscal and
social conservatism, with libertarian conservatism making but a rare
appearance in public policy debates. In the reform of child support
and social welfare in the 1970s and 1980s, fiscal conservatism
informed the restructuring of welfare encouraging single mothers to
work and the broadening of child support obligations to include
unmarried parents. As the discursive power of social conservatism
grew in the 1990s, public policy initiatives promoting responsible
fatherhood and marriage have increasingly sought to reverse the ways
in which these earlier developments may have weakened the
traditional family. While child support laws continue to impose broad
support obligations on married and unmarried parents, the new
initiatives seek to promote the married over the unmarried variety,
and the two parent over the one parent variety.
Libertarian emphasis on private choice has had little resonance in
the area which has been the most intense privatization of
dependency, namely, child support. Individuals are not given a
choice about whether or not to assume responsibility for their
children. Similarly, in the restructuring of welfare, choice simply does
not resonate. Individuals are not to be given the choice to go on
public assistance. According to the critique of moral hazard, it was
the existence of this choice that has resulted in women making bad
choices and not assuming the costs of single motherhood. Choice is
simply not extended to deadbeat dads and welfare mothers.
But the idea of private choice has begun to have some, albeit still
limited, resonance in the area of same-sex marriage. While social
conservatism remains the dominant conservative voice in
contemporary debates about same-sex marriage, a libertarian
conservatism that emphasizes the importance of the choice to marry
has become audible in public policy debates. In striking contrast,
fiscal conservatives are virtually absent in this arena. Unlike in other
jurisdictions where fiscal conservatives have supported the expansion
of definitions of family to include same-sex couples explicitly on the
basis that it will help privatize dependency and relieve the burden on
the public purse, federal debates about the legal regulation of samesex couples has not included a significant fiscal conservative voice. To
the extent that fiscal conservatism has even been audible in earlier
debates about DOMA, these arguments were used against the
recognition of same-sex marriage, rather than in support.
The continuing, indeed escalating power of social conservatism has
operated to limit the privatization of dependency beyond more
traditional family forms.
According to social conservatives,
dependency can and should be privatized, but only within the
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traditional family. Social conservatism has similarly operated to
preclude a more libertarian privatization of the family, in terms of the
expansion of private choice. According to social conservatives,
individuals are free to make choices within the family – provided they
are the right individuals and they make the right choices. The
continuing discursive power of the social conservative vision of the
family has to a large extent precluded the emergence of a broader
definition of family, and a more spirited privatization of support
obligations capable of promoting the goals of either fiscal
conservatives or libertarians.
At the same time, it is important to recognize that both fiscal
conservatism and libertarian conservatism place constraints on social
conservatism. The continuing influence of fiscal conservatism is
evident in the on-going enforcement of child support obligations and
workfare requirements of welfare. The promotion of responsible
fatherhood and marriage by social conservatives is intended to
operate to supplement the existing child support and welfare laws,
not to override them. Similarly, in the area of same-sex marriage,
libertarian conservatism is placing limitations on the kinds of
arguments that social conservatives can make, or at a minimum, on
the kinds of arguments to which they are forced to respond. Social
conservatives are being forced to answer the allegation of the
restriction of state rights, and to a lesser extent, the violation of
individual privacy rights. The constraining influence of the clash
between these contesting conservatisms thus cut in multiple
directions. It is not simply a matter of the dominance of social
conservatism. Rather, it is the clashes and contradictions between and
amongst these divergent visions of family and privatization have been
an animating force in public policy debates, initiatives, and legislation,
all constraining and enabling different regulatory possibilities at
different moments.
Moreover, the continuing discursive power of social conservatism
has placed limitations on the frames within which the question of the
privatization of dependency is debated and discussed. The focus on
defending the traditional family—responsible fatherhood, marriage
promotion, defending opposite-sex marriage—puts some questions
on the table, while bracketing other ones. The debate is framed as
one of choice versus tradition, equality versus morality, economic
obligation versus gendered parental roles. While these are important
issues to be resolved and the resolution will affect the future of the
legal regulation of the family, the framework is one that precludes
attention to a range of other potentially more far reaching issues. For
example, how should we best regulate intimate relationships? Who
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should be responsible for supporting persons without market income?
Is marriage the most appropriate regulatory regime for the legal
regulation of intimacy? If we extend the legal regulation to marriagelike relationships, namely, unmarried cohabiting relationships on the
basis of their functional equivalency to marriage, why not extend legal
regulation beyond conjugality? Why should we privilege conjugal
over non-conjugal relationships?
One of the reasons that public policy has recognized and regulated
marital relationships has to do with the unique nature of the
economic and emotional dependency that characterizes these
relationships.
Society imposes rights and responsibilities on
individuals within these relationships of economic and emotional
dependency because of the unique vulnerabilities and
interdependencies.350 Other jurisdictions have extended recognition
significantly beyond marriage. Canada and Australia, for example,
extensively regulate non-marital cohabitation on the basis of the
functional equivalency of these relationships to marriage. What about
other non-conjugal relationships that are characterized by similar
economic and emotional dependency? What about the two adult
sisters who have lived together for forty years, in lives that are
economically and emotionally intertwined? If their relationship
breaks down, should one be able to look to the other for support?
Should the sister without market income be able to seek support if
she performed the role of homemaker? Or if she contributed to her
sister’s business without compensation? Or if she maintained the
home but never received legal title? These individuals were not
married, nor could they ever marry. But, nor were these individuals
living in a conjugal relationship. Therefore, even in jurisdictions that
recognize non-marital cohabitation, there would be little to no legal
interest in the dependency that might arise on the breakdown of such
a relationship.351
The example of the two sisters raises the question of whether
350. See Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, What is Marriage-Like Like? The
Irregularity of Conjugality, 18 CAN. J. FAM. L. 269, 281-82 (2001) (characterizing a
conjugal relationship, the basis for a marriage-like relationship, as one founded on
interdependency and equality, rather than on traditional gender roles). See
generally BRENDA COSSMAN & BRUCE RYDER, THE LEGAL REGULATION OF ADULT
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS: EVALUATING POLICY OBJECTIVES AND LEGAL OPTIONS IN
FEDERAL LEGISLATION (2000) (criticizing the law for identifying relationships based on
blood and marriage rather than in terms of contemporary norms such as qualitative
attributes), available at http://www.lcc.gc.ca/research_project/00_regulations_1en.asp (last visited June 17, 2005).
351. See LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY 30 (2002)
(recommending a fundamental rethinking of the legal regulation of adult personal
relationships).
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marriage and conjugality ought to be end the story for consideration
of the kinds of obligations individuals owe one another. It is not an
argument in favour of this recognition. Rather, it is simply an
argument about the kind of questions remain submerged within
contemporary public policy debates about the family. The continuing
influence of social conservatism focuses attention on a much narrower
set of concerns, namely, marriage. The broader questions are simply
not visible. Yet, libertarian and fiscal conservatives would have very
different perspectives on these broader questions of the appropriate
regulation of intimacy. Libertarians would, of course, be concerned
with private choice. They might support a legal regime whereby the
two sisters could structure their intimate relationships by contract and
have that contract enforced. They might support a legal regime
whereby the two sisters could opt into a legal regime, such as a
domestic partnership regime, that imposes rights and responsibilities.
But, they would oppose a regime that imposes rights and
responsibilities on the sisters without their consent.
Fiscal
conservatives, by contrast, might support such an imposition of rights
and responsibilities, simply on the basis of the economic
interdependency of the individuals. Fiscal conservatives, concerned
first and foremost with privatizing dependency and thereby reducing
the burden on the state, would be prepared to override private
choice, and impose support obligations.
The conflicts, contradictions and relative discursive power of the
three conservative visions thus not only impact the legal regulation of
the family, but also the very terms of the public policy debate whereby
some issues are kept in sharp relief, and others remain not only off
the agenda, but beyond the imagination. Again, it is the continuing
influence of social conservatism, and the mitigating influence of
libertarian conservatism that limits a re-imagining of the legal
regulation of intimacy, and not incidentally, a more extensive
privatization of dependency. Once again, it is the conflict between
and among conservative visions that makes some things possible, and
others not.
The relationship between these three conservatisms, and their
effect on the development of public policy needs further attention
and analysis. Many questions remain unanswered – indeed, many
remain entirely unasked. For example, is there a particular logic to
the development of federal public policy on the family? Was it
necessary for the fiscal conservative developments in child support
and welfare to precede the social conservative developments?
According to path dependency analysts of public policy, once a
particular policy direction has been chosen, the costs of reversal are
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high.352 In the context of the legal regulation and privatization of
dependency through child support and welfare, the shift from fiscal
to social conservatism has not required a reversal of public policy
initiatives. The institutional arrangements for the enforcement of
child support, and for limiting welfare assistance remain in place.
The social conservative initiatives currently under debate are intended
as supplements, not reversals of these earlier policies. Thus, it may be
important to further analyze not simply the shifts between the relative
power of these contesting conservatisms, but also to pay greater
attention to the underlying institutional structures that may enable
them. Beyond the specific issue of the partial privatization of
dependency within federal public policy, it would also be important to
consider how these contesting conservatisms influenced the
development of public policy as it affects the family in a range of
other areas, from taxation to social security. To what extent are
similar contestations being played out in different arenas of legal
regulation?
While the extraordinary influence of conservative
political discourse in the last several decades has become a common
place observation, its nuances, conflicts and cleavages are a rich and
unexcavated resource for those interested in the development of law
and public policy, of the family and beyond.

352. See, e.g., Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study
of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000) (defining path dependency as “once
a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high.
There will be other choice points, but the entrenchment of certain institutional
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of initial choice.”) (citing Margaret Levi, A
Model, a Method and a Map: Rationale Choice in Comparative and Historical
Analysis, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS: RATIONALITY, CULTURE AND STRUCTURE 28 (Mark
Lichbach & Alan Zuckerman eds. 1997)).
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